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ABSTRACT 
Statelessness is a phenomenon as old as the concept of nationality 
Until the beginning of the twentieth century However, statelessness was a 
limited phenomenon and consequently did not disturb international life 
However, soon after the First World War this problem assumed alarming 
proportions compelling the international community to initiate serious 
deliberations on this issue. While statelessness has long been recognized as 
an important problem in international law, the desire of states to exercise 
control over stateless persons in their jurisdiction has prevented effective 
action. The indifference of national government and inaction of the 
international community has affected a large number of persons who are 
particularly vulnerable to oppression because they lack the protection 
afforded by rights of citizenship The stateless persons are denied vehicle for 
access to fundamental rights, access to protection and access to expression 
as persons under the law A person may be stateless at birth in the sense 
that he has not acquired nationality at birth according to law of any state or 
he may become stateless, subsequent to his birth by loosing his nationality 
without acquiring another A stateless person can not be benefited from the 
law of diplomatic protection of nationals abroad in as much as such 
protection is available with certain minor exception, only if he has nationality 
More important a stateless persons cannot travel Internationally as he 
is usually without passport, which serves not just as an Identification 
document but also as guarantee on the part of Issuing state to other states 
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that It will accept the passport holder back into its territory in the event of 
his being expelled or deported It is even more important that every country is 
obliged to receive its national if they wish to return to their native country 
In the West Asian region the problem of statelessness is very acute 
The problem emerged during the process of creation of Israel on a part of 
Palestine Hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs fled their homes as a 
result of the creation of the Jewish State The Palestinian exodus began 
soon after the UN Partition Plan and continued even after the Armistice 
Agreements were signed between Israel and Arab States in early and mid 
1949. 
After the creation of Israel, the Israeli army continued to attack Arab 
villages, blew up houses and indiscnminately killed men, women and 
children The majonty of the original population of the country was forcibly 
displaced and uprooted by a militant minonty of foreign ongin Jewish 
terrorism and intimidation played a major role in the exodus of Palestinians 
from their homes in the newly created state of Israel. 
The Arab-Israel conflict of June 1967 once more threw West Asia 
tension into sharp relief and escalated the problem of statelessness in West 
Asia still further During the war Israel occupied all the territories commonly 
referred to as West Bank and Gaza Strip. In the aftermath of the June war no 
less than 300,000 Palestinian who had been living in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip were exiled. Most fleeing West Bank residents relocated on the 
East Bank, although some of those displaced persons continued on to 
second settlements areas mostly in Lebanon 
In the beginning the Arab States tried to help the refugee as best as 
they could but the number of destitute was so enormous that they finally 
referred the problem to the UN In late 1948. The UN Mediator Count 
Bernadotte appealed to Israel to accept repatriation of some of the refugees, 
but Israel vejec^eci \he Bemadotte proposal on the grouad that It could aot 
accept the refugee back in view of the continuance of the state of war. 
On 11 December, 1948, the UN passed another resolution GA 
Resolution 194 (III) and established a Conciliation Commission and 
instructed it, to take steps to assist the Government and authorities 
concerned to achieve a final peace settlement of all questions outstanding 
between them and to "facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic 
and social rehabilitation of the refugees and payment of adequate 
compensation to them. In November 1949 the Conciliation Commission 
recommended setting of special agency known as the UNRWA to look after 
the welfare of the stateless Palestinian refugees. 
The Arab State which gave refuge to the Palestinians have adopted 
varied approach in dealing with the problem of stateless Palestinian. Jordan 
approached the refugee problem in a manner that was abhorred by her Arab 
neighbours. Jordan's King Abdullah envisaged a settlement with Israel as a 
method of improving his country economic outlook and as opportunity to 
open up new development possibilities by means of the assistance obtained 
from the UN towards the rehabilitation of the refugees. Therefore, in 
1950, after annexing the Arab occupied portion of Palestine West of Jordan 
river. King Abdullah willingly integrated its native and refugee populations 
into his kingdom on the basis of constitutional representative government 
and equality of rights and duties of all citizens. But the Palestinians had no 
loyalty for the Hashemite Kingdom and neither intellectual, emotional or 
ideological attachment to monarchial rule. The Palestinians characterized 
King Abdullah's annexation of West Bank as a calculated scheme executed 
with Zionist approval. 
With the advent of the Palestinian guerilla movement in late 1960's, 
Palestinians started to acquire great power and influence within Jordan and 
began to develop a state within a state over which the Jordanian monarchy 
had virtually to control. Thus Palestinians were free to attack Israeli troops in 
the West Bank without restraint, and cross border attacks by both Israelis 
and Palestinian guerillas became more frequent. The growing military might 
of the Palestinian guerillas was perceived as a source of threat by the 
Jordanian monarch and in September 1970 King Hussain ordered his army 
to move against the Palestinian guerillas. In ten days of intense fighting, 
thousands of Palestinians were killed and the guerilla movement in Jordan 
was crushed. 
The Palestinians who took refuge in Lebanon lived in legal void. They 
were neither citizen nor were they classified as foreigners. Ninety percent of 
the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon were Muslim and this proved to be a 
source of great worry for the Lebanese Government. If the Lebanese 
government had officially sanctioned their permanently residence, the 
delicate balance betvk^ een Christians and Muslims which determined the 
countries political system would have been upset permanently residence. 
The first two decades of exile in Lebanon were marked by economic 
exploitation political and social marginality and officially sanctioned 
repression. 
Palestinians were subject to restrictions on their travel abroad and 
within Lebanon. The refugees were placed under the jurisdiction of the 
section of the Ministry of Interior, called the General Bureau of Palestinian 
Affairs. The General Bureau, in conjunction with the religious courts of each 
sect governed personal status matters such as marriage, divorce, custody 
and inheritance. Within the camps the Lebanese police and Lebanese 
intelligence exercised strict control over the population, contempting to 
prevent any form of political expression. Such measure not only 
discriminated against the poorer Palestinians who sought refuge in Lebanon 
but also made it difficult for broken families to be reunited with their kin and 
kith. Palestinians Christians were also separated from their Muslim 
compatriots, movements from one camps to another or from camp to the city 
was forbidden without express permission from the government authorities. 
In Lebanon, because of official restriction on their employment, refugees 
often provided black market labour at wages below the minimum established 
by government. 
Towards the end of the 1960s refugee camps became centers of 
political and social unrest. In December, 1968, the Israelis reacted to the 
military operations of Palestinian guerrillas from South Lebanon with a 
surprise attack on Beirut airport and Israeli airborne troops destroyed the 
greater part of Lebanon's civil aviation fleet. This first retaliation on Lebanese 
territory gave a foretaste of the problems raised by the new guerrilla activity 
of the Palestinians, who were now operating from Lebanon without the 
permission or even the knowledge of the Lebanese army. 
The sizable Palestinian presence in Lebanon contributed heavily to 
government immobilism as Lebanese political groups became increasingly 
polarized. Most Muslim supported the Palestinians and wanted the army to 
prevent Israeli attacks on southern Lebanon and on the Palestinian camps. 
Most Christians wanted government to restore sovereignty to Lebanon and 
control the Palestinians who seemed to form a state within a state. 
Growing polarization ultimately plunged the country into a bloody civil 
war in April 1975. As the Lebanese state collapsed, Israel stepped up its 
intervention in Lebanon and invaded the country twice, once in 1978 and 
again in 1982. Approximately 60,000 Palestinians were left homeless as a 
result of the Israeli invasion of 1982. After their camp homes had been 
destroyed, they took shelter in apartment garages, storefronts, unfinished 
apartment buildings and shelters built from scrap. With the signing of the Taif 
Agreement (1989) and the return of civil harmony to Lebanon, some attempts 
have been made to rehabilitate the Palestinian camps in the South Lebanon. 
In the Syrian Arab Republic, the overall size of the Palestinian 
community is smaller than the number of Palestinians in the other Arab state 
and regions bordering Israel. Palestinians have not been given citizenship 
and cannot travel abroad. In Syria, where economic restriction and controls 
of socialist government make free enterprise difficult, bu$iness minded 
Palestinians were much more restricted in money making. There were thus 
fewer gaps in the social structure of the Syrian Palestinian cortimunity. 
The Palestinian in West Bank and Gaza Strip came under Israeli 
occupation after the 1967 war. The war extended Israeli military rule to the 
occupied areas of West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israel violation 0f human rights 
of the Palestinians increased and were intensified after June 1967. Israel 
was faced with a large Arab population in the territory under its control which 
was constantly challenging the occupation. Israel resorted to illegal and 
brutal means to spread terror, reduced opposition and force the submission 
of the civilian Arab population even though such means cohstituted grave 
violation of human rights. 
In the Occupied Territories there is a surplus of unemployed or under 
employed labour among the Arab population. Thousands of Palestinian 
farms laborers also works on Israeli farms where they are undfer paid and are 
generally abused. The worst case of exploitation and abuse involve 
Palestinian children as young as eight and ten years old who work for 
Israeli's. Arab labour was largely responsible for Jewish settlement in and 
around Jerusalem and Hebron and the wages they are paid are far below the 
minimum wages paid to Israeli labour. The Occupied Territories not only 
served as a source of cheap labour but also provide Israel with markets for 
its goods. Since the occupation, Israel has increased six fold its exports to 
the Occupied Territories making these territory the second largest market, 
second only to United States. 
The track record of the Palestinian Authority setup after the Oslo 
Accords in the field of human rights has been no better. Intolerant of internal 
opposition to it policy and under intense pressure from Israel and the US to 
combat terrorism, the PA conducts mass and often arbitrary arrest of 
suspected militants and opponents of the peace process. 
The stateless Palestinians residing either in West Bank or Gaza Strip 
or in one of the front line Arab state have certain internationally protected 
rights. In general the rights of stateless persons are covered by the UN 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948), the Convention Relating to 
the Status of Stateless Persons (1954), the International Covenant of Civil 
and Political Rights (1966), and of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, Cultural Rights (1966). These instruments clearly deals with the 
Human and Civil Rights of Stateless Palestinian Refugees and other 
stateless person. While most host government have accepted these 
covenant, they have failed to abide by them and tend to apply their national 
laws. 
The UN Convention of 1957 and 1967 Relating to the Status of 
Refugees also covers the Palestinians with the exception that those 
Palestinian refugees falling within the UNRWA mandate have been 
excluded from the jurisdiction of UNHCR UNRWA has been functioning in all 
the refugees areas of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, as well as in Lebanon, 
Syria and Jordan. It has become an established institution in its area of 
operation and plays an important role in the lives of Palestinian refugees. 
UNRWA is not only an agency which provides valued services in the field of 
education, health and social welfare but is also the symbol of international 
commitment to the welfare of Palestinians and to a just resolution of their 
plight. 
The Oslo Agreement establishes hopes for a peaceful, eventually 
even a just solution. The agreement lays the foundation for a limited interim 
Palestine self-rule in those areas of Palestinian occupied by Israel since 
1967. The agreement does not define the political nature or territorial 
extension of the future Palestinian entity, but entails stipulations with regard 
to mechanisms and deadlines for a step-by-step implementation of peace 
process. Contentious issues like Jerusalem, refugees, settlements and 
borders have been left for future talks but the political reality is that they have 
been on everyone's mind and have dominated the agenda all the way since 
1993. The Oslo Agreement thus represents a starting point for a new 
Palestinian national vitality. It is true that Israel has not irrevocably renounced 
its sovereignty over the Occupied Territories. There is still not much to 
indicate that Israel intends to surrender the real control over the Occupied 
Territories and still less to indicate that it will surrender the very Zionist 
System itself. 
However, having already recognized the principle of Palestinian 
national rights, it would become extremely difficult for Israel to prevent the 
emergence of a Palestinian political entity, which has the sympathy of the 
world in the years to come. The strength of the stateless Palestinian is that 
they have justice on their side simply because they have been deprived of 
fundamental rights. The accords thus represent a new beginning for the 
Palestinian peoples enduring struggle for a decent life among the nations. 
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PREFACE 
Normally, every individual belongs to a national community and 
feels himself a part of it. He enjoys the protection and assistance of 
the national authorities. When he is abroad, his own national 
authorities look after him and provide him with certain advantages. 
The organization of entire legal and economic life of the individual 
residing in foreign country depend upon his possession of nationality. 
The fact that the stateless persons have no nationality places him in 
an abnormal and inferior positions which reduces his social value and 
destroys his own self-confidences. The stateless persons are denied 
vehicle for access to fundamental rights and access to expression as 
person under the law. Most important, a stateless person cannot 
undertake international travel as he is usually without passport. 
Further more, a stateless person actually has no country to take him 
back nor to issue passports to enter other foreign countries. 
In West Asia, the problem of stateless persons arose after the 
creation of state of Israel in May 1948 on a part of Palestine. 
Hundreds of thousand of Palestinian fled from their homes with the 
creation of the Jewish State. The exact number of stateless persons 
created by the 1948-1949 hostilities has been a matter of dispute. The 
Clap Mission estimated that 726,000 had been dislocated as a direct 
result of the first Arab-Israeli war. These Palestinians took refuge in 
Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
In June 1967, thousands of Palestinian were rendered homeless for a 
second time when Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip after 
the June 1967 war. These Stateless refugees have gone through 
untold sufferings during the past five decades and their struggle to 
establish a homeland of their own countries till this day. The five 
decades of their statelessness has been marked by extreme, political 
and social marginality and officially sanctioned repression. Social and 
political control over Palestinian by their host government was 
maintained through a variety of measures: work permit requirements 
the presence of police and intelligence force in the camps and pass 
laws. The host government response to political expression and 
activity was often arrest. Palestinians were subject to restriction on 
their travel abroad and within the host country. Such measures made 
it difficult for broken families to be reunited with their kith and kin. 
Because of official restriction on their employment refugee often 
provided black market labour at wages below the minimum established 
by the government. While the Palestinian living in the camps in the 
host country had no passport, no work and future, those who remained 
in the Israeli occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip were subjected to 
degrading and often inhuman treatment. Israel resorted to illegal and 
brutal means to spread terror, reduce opposition and force the 
submission of the civilian Arab population even though such means 
constituted grave violation of human rights Israel use of an array 
harsh measures against Palestinians in the Occupied Territories such 
as deportation, arbitrary arrest, policy of torture, demolition or sealing 
of houses, settlements of Jews on Palestinian land and denial of 
adequate water to Palestinians Palestinians in the Occupied Territory 
have enjoyed since 1967 no rights and no representative institutions 
There is no authority to which they can appeal, no protection which 
they can invoke 
The stateless Palestinian refugees are keenly interested to 
return back to their homeland and to create new lives for themselves 
These stateless Palestinian are fully depend upon assistance from 
host country and UN agency and voluntary organization 
In order to tackle the problem of stateless Palestinian refugees 
more effectively and co-ordinate relief and rehabilitation work in a 
systematic and organized way, the need was felt to setup a broad-
based international organization which could deal with the problem of 
stateless Palestinian in its totality The result was the creation of 
UNRWA, which is exclusively a refugees welfare organization 
established in 1950 by UN and designated as a temporary non-
political organ of the UN General Assembly 
The aim of this study is to analyse and highlight the problems of 
stateless Palestinian refugees in West Asia It looks into the legal 
political and socio-economic dimension of the refugee problem and the 
measures that have so far been taken by the international community 
to ameliorate the flight of the Palestinians. 
The thesis is divided into 7 chapters including conclusion 
Chapter I Which is by way of an introduction discusses 
statelessness and relevant International Law and International 
Covenants dealings with stateless persons. The statelessness is a 
phenomenon as old as the concept of nationality. This chapter then 
goes on to deal with the types of stateless persons and the causes of 
stateless persons and rights of statelessness. 
The Second Chapter highlights the process through which the 
indigenous people of Palestine were reduced step by step to the 
status of stateless refugee. Under the Ottomans, Palestine was an 
integral part of Ottoman Empire and Palestinian were not treated as 
subject but as a citizen of sovereign and independent country. The 
Palestinians enjoyed full civil and political rights equally with the 
Ottoman citizens. The Balfour Deceleration was first step in the 
systematic campaign to usurp Palestine from its indigenous 
inhabitants and reduced them into stateless refugees. The Zionist 
moment, British Mandate, large scale Jewish immigration to Palestine 
and its consequences, UN partition plan and consequences of 1948 
war have all been dealt with in this chapter. 
The third Chapters begins with a discussion of the condition of 
stateless refugees in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. It then discuss the 
condition of Palestinians who have remained in West Bank and Gaza 
Strip. 
The Chapter IV narrates briefly the rights of stateless 
Palestinian refugees. It also throw lights on the more specific aspect 
of residency status of Palestinians, right to return, right to self 
determination, right to compensation, UN and Palestinian rights. 
The Chapter V opens with a discussion of the human rights 
situation in the Occupied Territories. Israel use of draconian laws to 
force the Palestinians into submission, Israel settlements policies, its 
water policies, its response to the Intifada and the Israeli labour policy 
in the Occupied Territories have been deed with in this chapter. The 
chapter thus goes on to briefly discuss the human rights violations 
after the setting up of the Palestinian Authority. 
The Chapter Vl deals with the role of UNRWA in Jordan, Lebanon, 
Syria, West Bank and Gaza Strip. UNRWA has become an established 
institution in its area of operation and plays an important role in the lives of 
Palestinian refugees. It is not only an agency which provides valued services 
in the field of education, health and social welfare but is also the symbol of 
international commitment to the welfare of Palestinians and to adjust 
resolution of their plight 
The concluding section brings together the various issues raised in the 
context of stateless persons in West Asia. 
CHAPTER - I 
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF 
STATELESS PERSONS A N D 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Statelessness, in its technical sense, is the result of denationalization 
by the country of origin of a person who has acquired no citizenship 
elsewhere.^ Statelessness is a phenomenon as old as the concept of 
nationality. Until the beginning of the twentieth century, however, 
statelessness was a limited phenomenon and consequently did not disturb 
international life. While statelessness has long been recognized as an 
important problem in international law, the desire of states to exercise control 
over stateless persons in their jurisdiction has prevented effective action. The 
indifference of national government and inaction of the international 
community has affected a large number of persons who are particularly 
vulnerable to oppression because they lack the protection afforded by rights 
of citizenship. The stateless are denied vehicle for access to fundamental 
rights, access to protection and access to expression as persons under the 
law.2 
Today, the problem of statelessness is very acute. The state is not a 
private club, which can induct or expels members arbitrarily. Rather, the 
development of customary international law has placed certain limitations on 
states regard the conferment of citizenship. 
Article I of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons defines a stateless person as one who is not considered as a 
national by any state under the operation of its law.^ According to P. Weis, 
stateless person is a person who is not having the nationality under the law 
of any state/* Lawrence Preuss refers to stateless person as staatenols or 
apatride. Protection and assistance may be withdrawn by the country of 
origin of a person without juridical suppression of that persons nationality. 
Such a person outside his own country, though not fully nationalized, is in a 
position in some measure akin to that of stateless persons, as he neither has 
the protection of any government.^ A person may be stateless at birth in the 
sense that he has not acquired nationality at birth according to law of any 
state or he may become stateless subsequent to his birth by loosing his 
nationality without acquiring another.^ A stateless person cannot be benefited 
from the law of diplomatic protection of national abroad in as much as such 
protection is available with certain minor exceptions, only when he has a 
nationality. More important a stateless person cannot travel internationally as 
he is usually without passport which serves not just as an identification 
document but also as guarantee on the pat of issuing state to other states 
that it will accept the passport holder back into its territory in the event of his 
being expelled or deported.^ 
Although, many refugees are stateless, statelessness is not the 
essential quality of refugees, who is defined in accepted international usage 
as a person who for a political reasons has been driven from his country of 
origin or who fears the political consequence of his return. He may be 
stateless or although not technically denationalized, may have lost the 
protection of his government by refusing to return home when possibility was 
presented. As person without government protection, he losses the 
advantages of international rights, which depend for enforcement on the 
action of his home government. Further more, a stateless persons who is not 
a national or any state is denied many of the privileges of citizen, granted 
reciprocally through treaties. Such treaties gives the citizens of one state 
privileges in other states party to the treaties, including right to work, the 
benefits of social insurance and right to education.® 
It is even more important that every country is obliged to receive its 
national if they wish to return to their native countries. The stateless actually 
have no country to take them back, nor to issue passports for them to enter 
other foreign countries if they so desire, although in theory there may be a 
duty on the part of denationalizing state to receive back its former citizens if a 
state of refuge insists.^ 
There are two categories of stateless persons De-Jure and De-Facto. 
De-Jure Stateless persons: Are persons who are not national of any state 
either because at birth or subsequently they were not given any nationality or 
because during their life time they lost their own nationality and did not 
acquire a new one. 
De-Facto Stateless persons: Are persons who having left the country 
of which they were national, no longer enjoy the protection and assistance of 
their national authorities, either because they refuse to grant them assistance 
and protection or because they themselves renounce the assistance and 
protection of the countries of which they are national. Thus a de-facto 
stateless person is one who is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of government of his country of nationality or former nationality. 
De-Facto stateless persons were the subject of a recommendation in 
the Final Act of the 1961 Convention on Stateless Persons it being assumed 
that they had voluntarily renounced their citizenship and were in any event, 
refugees. 
The final Act of 1961 Convention like the 1954 Convention includes a 
recommendation that the provision be extended to de-facto stateless persons 
wherever possible. The Conference recommended that "persons who are 
stateless de-facto should as for as possible be treated as stateless de-jure to 
enable them to acquire an effective nationality" 
Refugees and Stateless Persons: 
In accordance with Article 1A Section 2 of 1951 Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees, the term refugees applies to "any person who: owing 
to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social groups or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his/her nationality and is unable or owing to such fear, 
is unwilling to avail him/herself of the protection of the country or who, not 
having nationality and being outside the country of his/her former habitual 
residence as a result of such events, is unable or owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to return it.^ ° This definition also applies to a people without 
nationality in the country of their habitual residence. Draws the distinction 
between persons possessing a nationality and stateless persons. The 
requirement that a person in order to qualify as a refugee must be out side 
the country of his residence could not be applied to stateless persons. The 
Convention, therefore, substituted the country of former habitual residence 
for the country of nationality in this case. In general a refugee is a person 
who has been forced to abandon his home and flee to other country in 
search of protection. Some have fled due to the most appalling human rights 
atrocities while. Others have left their country due to religious or ethnic 
persecution. 
Refugees may also be defined as, an involuntary migrants, a victim of 
politics, war and natural calamities. In a restricted, sense, refugees may be 
defined as persons who have left the territory or state of which they are 
nationals and no longer enjoys the effective protection of the state.^ ^ 
A considerable majority of stateless persons are at present refugees. 
These refugees are de-jure stateless persons if without having been deprived 
of their nationality they no longer enjoy the protection and assistance of their 
national authorities. Their legal status is determined by the legislation of the 
receiving state and with some exceptions, is equal to the legal status of its 
own nationals. ^ ^ 
In case of refugees has become a category on whose basis 
international organization and individual states engage in a process of 
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worldwide triage. Refugee status is privilege or entailment, giving those who 
qualify access to certain scarce resources or services outside their own 
country. Such as admission into another country a head of a long line of 
claimants, legal protection abroad and often some material assistance from 
private or public agencies.^ ^ 
Like refugee, the stateless persons no longer enjoy the protection and 
assistance of their national authorities. Refugees have right to return to their 
original homeland but stateless persons cannot return to their original 
homeland but stateless persons cannot return to their homeland and no 
country to take them back, nor to issue travel documents for them to visit 
other foreign countries. Like refugees, the stateless person is not granted 
them the same status as that of their own national. Therefore, the rights and 
legal status of stateless persons varies from country to country. Both 
refugees and stateless persons have rights to form non-political and non-
profit making association and trade union but only refugee has given right to 
vote in favours of any political parties. 
In sum the stateless persons are anaiogus to refugees because both 
of them are a victims of War, revolution and state-formation. Like refugees, 
stateless persons may be compelled to move because they cannot receive 
adequate protection. 
There are various causes of statelessness, which are more or less 
similar in all parts of the world. Some of the main causes of statelessness are 
follows: 
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Wars: One of the main causes of statelessness, wars in the past have led to 
the creation of large numbers of stateless person and refugees. For example, 
World War I, World War II and the Arab Israel Wars have produced millions 
of stateless refugees. 
Revolution: Revolutions also produce the stateless persons. The government 
that resists revolutionary movements may fight for a lengthy period before 
eventually, being brought down. Even if it is not brought down the fighting 
oppresses the population, in much the same way that the international 
hostilities do.^ ^ For example, after the 1917 Revolution, the mass exodus of 
Russian Refugees, who were at the time actually stateless persons, 
confronted the League of Nations with the problem of the international 
protection of stateless persons. 
Political Warfare: This also gives rise to a stateless persons or refugees 
movement. Duhng the time of tension between two nations propaganda 
through Radio, Television, and Newspapers excites the people of enemy 
state to flee their home.^ ^ For example Israel always used this tactic against 
the people of West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
Separatist or Secessionist Movement: Separatist a Secessionist 
Movement in may countries of the third world have produced a large number 
of stateless persons. The Government in question comes down heavily on 
the revels fighting for a separate state of their own compelling hundred of 
thousand to flee to neighbouring countries for shelter. For example Tamil 
separatist movement in Sri Lanka. 
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There are many persons who have been technically stateless since 
World War I. After the political and social crisis which followed the First World 
War, statelessness assumed unprecedented proportion. Before and following 
the World War I large numbers of stateless persons from Russian and 
Ottoman Empire moved to Central, Western Europe and Asia.^ ^ 
The Revolution and Civil War in Russia (1917-1923) created the first 
large groups of stateless refugees. Over 15,00,000 Russians escaped 
persecution and saved their lives and personal freedom by fleeing to Central 
and West Europe and China. Another result of the Russian Revolution was 
that many Russian were rendered stateless by the Soviet decree of 1921. 
These were the Assyrians, Turks, Greeks, Bulgars, Romanias and other 
minority groups living in the southern parts of Russia.^^ 
The Soviet Government promulgated a series of decrees in 1920's 
(December 15, 1921, Oct. 29, 1924 and November 13, 1925) by which the 
nationality of the USSR was lost by the persons who left the country after 
November 7, 1917 without consent of the Soviet authorities, by persons who 
lived abroad for more than five years without applying for a passport by 
certain date, by persons living abroad who failed to register with 
representatives of the USSR in the country in which they resided and by all 
persons who had taken part in counter revolutionary organization. In Russia 
the ranks of the uprooted were steadily swollen by masses of army 
deserters, of civilians escaping white or red terror and just trying to get out of 
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the way of fighting and fleeing minorities, many of whom poured into 
provinces that were emerging as successor states. Although, estimates of 
refugees originating in Russia ranged at the time upto 3 million, many of 
them were displaced Poles and Germans, who were merely returning to their 
homes. A more realistic assessment was that the Russian Revolution 
created I million refugees outside the boundaries of the old empire. Many 
were defeated counter revolutionaries who initially made their way to 
Germany and France, where they evoked considerable political sympathy.^ ^ 
During the years 1923-1939 large new groups refugees were formed as 
result of religious, ethnic, political persecution. The establishment of Fascist 
regime in Italy forced 200,00 Italian refugees to leaves their country and take 
shelter in Eastern Europe, North and Latin America. Several thousands of 
them went to Palestine.^ ^ Such emigres however, were denied protection 
and were treated as stateless. 
As an aftermath of the Spanish civil War in 1937, a large group of 
Spanish Republican refugee left their country because of the loss of 
protection of the Spanish government and sought refuge in France and in 
Central and Latin America.^ ° 
During the Second World War, nine million or more national and 
ethnic German were expelled from the Eastern province of Germany and 
sought refuge in Poland. German minorities, amounting to almost 3500,000 
people were also forced to leave Czechoslovakia, Hungry, Romania and 
Yugoslavia. Many of them found new homes in Austria.^ ^ 
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The German order of November 25, 1941 deprived German Jews 
living abroad of their status as German National and authorized confiscation 
of there property.^^ During the Second World War, the exodus of German 
opposed to Nazism and Fascism and of persecuted Jews from the Axis 
countries and occupied territory greatly increased. In the Far East too, 
massive population movement occurred as result of Japanese aggression. 
After the 2"^ ^ World War the exodus of Palestinian from Palestine in the wake 
of the creation of Israel, led to the emergence of hundred of thousands of 
stateless refugees in West Asia. 
International Organization and the Problem of Stateless Persons: 
The League of Nations: 
The League of Nations was one of the first international organization 
to take up the problems of stateless persons. On 12 April 1930 the Hague 
Codification conference adopted a document known as Convention on 
certain questions relating to the conflict of nationality laws in order to reduce 
the incidence of statelessness. It also adopted a Protocol on the same date 
relating to a certain case of statelessness. It further, requested its members 
states unanimously to make every efforts possible to bring down the 
numbers of cases of statelessness.^^ 
The Article I of the Hague Convention empowered each state ot 
decide for itself who its national are and other states are under a duty to 
recognize them only in so far as such recognition is not inconsistent with 
international conventions, international customs and principle of laws 
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generally recognized with regard to nationality.^* In the context of Hague 
Conference of 1930 a number of states gave expression to the inherent 
limitation on the rights of the states in matter of nationality.^^ another 
Convention adopted at Geneva in 1938 conferred on stateless persons, the 
right to equal treatment with friendly aliens. 
The United Nations is the second most important international 
instrument to take up the problem of stateless persons. Under the guidance 
of United Nations, the Commission of Human Rights was established and its 
second session (1947) adopted a resolution regarding Stateless persons. It 
stated (I) that UN make recommendation to member nation to ensure that 
every one shall have an effective nationality and (ii) that the UN give early 
consideration to the legal status of those who do not enjoy the protection of 
any Government, in particular pending the acquisition of nationality as 
regards their legal and social protection and their documentation.^^ 
It is well noted that after the resolution of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
reads as follows: "Article 15(1) Every one has right to nationality. 
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied 
right to change his nationality.^^ 
The fore-mentioned resolution of the General Assembly deals 
precisely with the means of implementation of Article 15 of the Universal 
Declaration namely "the adoption of interim measures to afford protection to 
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stateless persons" and action "to ensure that every one shall have an 
effective right to nationality".^° 
In regards to the recommendation made by the commission on 
Human Rights, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United 
Nations instructed its Secretary General to undertake study of statelessness. 
On 11 August 1950 at its 11''' Session, the ECOSOC deal with the question 
of refugee and stateless persons. It examined the report of the Adhoc 
Committee on statelessness and related problems. The Committee 
recommended an international convention as the most effective approach to 
the solution of the problems referred to the Council. It decided, in viev^ / of 
urgency of the refugee problems and the responsibility of the United Nations 
in this field, to address itself first to the problem of refugee, whether stateless 
or not.^ The Committee prepared a draft Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, which consisted of preamble and rO articles covering general 
provisions, legal status, gainful occupation, administrative measures, 
implementation and transitory provisions. It provided in Article I a definition of 
term "refugees". The Committee also prepared and submitted to the Council 
its observations and comments on the draft convention. Although the 
Committee did not feel that it could draw up a separate draft Convention 
Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons who were not refugees and in 
this connection, prepared a draft Protocol Relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons. It reviewed the basic causes of statelessness including failure to 
acquire nationality at birth, loss of nationality through marriage, voluntary 
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renunciation of nationality and deprivation of nationality. It discussed the 
responsibilities of the various organs of the United Nations in this field 
including International Law Commission on the Status of Women. 
The Committee decided to recommend to the council the adoption of 
resolution inviting member states to re-examine there nationality lav\/s v i^th a 
view to reducing as for a possible cases of statelessness. Which arise from 
the operation of such laws and recommending to the member states involved 
in changes of territorial sovereignty that they include in the arrangements of 
such changes the necessary provisions for the avoidance of statelessness. 
The resolution further invited member states to contribute to the reduction of 
the number of stateless persons by extending to persons in their territory an 
opportunity to be naturalized. It requested that Secretary General to seek 
information from member states with regard to the carrying out of the 
resolution and to report to the Council. The committee further recommended 
that considering that progress in the elimination of statelessness required 
joint international action, the conclusion of an agreement for this purpose 
was necessary. The Council should request the International Law 
Commission to prepare an International Convention to eliminate the problem 
of stateless.^" 
International Convention Relating to Stateless Persons: 
The condition of statelessness is a legal anomaly and states usually 
try to reduce the number of stateless persons. The Convention Relating to 
the Status of Stateless Persons (1954) and the Convention on the Reduction 
of statelessness (1961) are two important international documents which not 
only aim at reducing the instances of statelessness, but at granting to 
stateless persons some privileges on the territory of the Convention 
participants.^ ^ 
The 1954 Convention was originally drafted as Protocol to the 1951 
Convention on Refugees. The pressing need of refugees in the wake of the 
Second World War and the issue of statelessness was the subject at the 
1951 Conference of Plenipotentiaries held at New York. The conference 
adopted the Refugee Convention, while the Statelessness Protocol, with 
articles mirroring those of Refugee Convention was postponed for adoption 
at later date. 
In 1954, this Protocol was made a Convention in its own right. A 
narrow definition of stateless persons was adopted covering only "a person 
who is not considered as a national by any state under the operation of its 
law". As regard most matter the treatment accorded to stateless persons is 
the same as that accorded to the refugees under the Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugee. As regards certain rights, however, the Convention 
places stateless persons in a position less favourable then that assumed for 
refugees, with regard to wage earning, employment and right of association. 
Decision upon the acquisition or loss of nationality will be recognized only so 
far as they are consistent with contemporary international legal norms. 
Currently, these norms are expressed in the 1954 Convention Relating to the 
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status of Stateless Persons and 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness. 
Prior to the 1954 convention, Statelessness was viewed merely as an 
indication of one's status as refugees. The mandate of 1946 Inter-
governmental Committee on Refugees did not mention. Statelessness at all, 
and thus the Committee regarded de-jure and de-facto statelessness, merely 
as one of the criteria of eligibility (for refugee status) in conjunction with 
others e.g. flight into another state as a result of racial, political or religious 
persecution.^^ 
As the definition of Refugees was being continually narrowed during 
the 1940s, many stateless persons could no longer receive the protection 
afforded by League of Nations High Commission for Refugees or the 
International Refugee Organization (IRO).^^ This led to the Commission on 
Human Rights to request that early consideration be given by the United 
Nations to the legal status of persons who do not enjoy the protection of any 
government, in particular pending the acquisition of nationality, as regards 
their legal status and protection and their documentation.^ 
Seven years were to pass, however, before the UN was to take action 
upon this recommendation. During the consideration of the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, the problem of statelessness was put 
aside for lack of time. In view of the urgency of the refugee problem and 
responsibility of the United Nations, in this field the committee decided to 
address itself, first to the problem of refugees, whether stateless or not and 
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to leave to later stages of its deliberations the problem of stateless persons 
who are not refugees.^ ^ 
The 1954 Convention was the first real attempt to deal with the 
problem of statelessness in it own rights. The Convention requires states to 
grant stateless persons many of the same rights accorded to the citizen 
under national law. It also protects stateless persons from expulsion in all but 
exceptional circumstances. However, through an apparent oversight no 
provision was made for a supervisory body similar to the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees^ .^ 
A document drafted under such conditions was not likely to greatly 
improve the condition of stateless persons nor has it. However, Article 11 of 
Convention did provide for a relief agency to deal with the problem of 
stateless persons. UNHCR was charged with the responsibilities of the 
Article 11 and thus the problem of statelessness was again connected to and 
to same degree overshadowed by, the concern of refugees. 
A renewed attempt to tackle the problem of statelessness was the 
1961 Convention. The antecedents of this convention can be traced back to 
1952 when the convention was adopted and opened for signature by the 
United Nations Conference on the elimination or Reduction of future 
statelessness, convened by the Secretary General pursuant to General 
Assembly Resolution 896 (IX) of 4 December.^ ^The Conference met at the 
European office in Geneva from 24 March - 18 April, 1959 and reconvened 
at UN headquarters in New York from 15-28 August, 1961. The Convention 
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provided for the establishment within the United Nations system, of a body to 
which a person claiming the benefit of the Convention provisions may apply 
for assistance. Since 1974, such assistance has been provided by the UN 
High Commission for Refugees. 
The International Law Commission for the first time discussed the 
problem of stateless person at its fourth session on the basis of report 
prepared by one of its member Manley 0. Hudson, as a Special 
Rapporteur.^^ It requested Robert Cardova, to prepare a draft convention 
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with a view to the elimination of statelessness. 
Cardova, prepared a draft, which was sent to the number of countries 
for their comments. After taking all aspects of the problem into consideration 
the sixth committee of General Assembly at its ninth session discussed the 
draft which was drafted by International Law Commission, It decided to 
request the Secretary General to convene an International Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries for the conclusion of the Convention for the Reduction or 
Elimination of Statelessness. It said that the conference should be convened 
as soon as at least twenty states had communicated to the Secretary 
General their willingness to co-operate in the matter. A proposal to create an 
independent tribunal for stateless persons to press nationality claims was 
quickly squashed.'*^ 
Article 1 of the 1961 Convention states that, a contracting state shall 
grant its nationality to person born in its territory who would otherwise be 
stateless and shall not deprive a persons of his nationality, if such deprivation 
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would render him stateless. Further, a contracting state may not deprive any 
person or group of persons of nationality on racial, ethnic, religious or 
political grounds. 
Article 4(1) of the Convention states that the contracting state shall 
grant its nationality to a persons, not born in the territory of contracting state, 
who would be otherwise stateless, if the nationality of one of his parents at 
the time of person's birth was that of that state. 
Article 9 of Convention also states that a contracting state may not 
deprive any person or group of persons of their nationality on racial, ethnic, 
religious or political grounds. However, the deprivation of nationality, in 
particular mass denationalization, has been declared inconsistent with the 
international obligation of the state. Others have tried to prove that 
denationalization for penal or political reason is inconsistent with the nation of 
human being as person in law. It has been reinforced that deprivation on 
ground of policy of racial inequality or persecution is contrary to international 
law and elementary principles of humanity. The act of denationalization may 
not per se have delectual consequences, but it is probable that it would be 
breach of provision of the UN charter concerning equality of peoples and 
human rights. Further, the deprivation is not entitled to recognition by others 
international actors because it disregarded the doctrine of effective link and 
represent an attempt is avoid the responsibilities of the territorial sovereignty 
and statehood. 
The common standards of non-arbitrariness in deprivation of 
nationality have provided some generalization including (1) deprivation of 
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nationality prescribed by law after full legal proceedings involving review and 
appeal, (ii) deprivation not leading to statelessness, (iii) deprivation 
acceptable if nationality secured by fraud or (iv) if the national engages in act 
posing serious threat to national security. 
For nearly 35 years following the1961 Convention, the problem of 
statelessness was given little attention by the international community. The 
right of all persons to a nationality was reiterated in the International 
Convention. On civil and political hghts and the Convention on the rights of 
child but again no specific measure or procedures were mandated. And 
although the provisions of the 1985 Declaration on the Human Rights of 
Individual who are not a national of a country in which they live applied to a 
stateless persons and established the fundamental rights of aliens, the 
declaration was addressed to aliens more generally and did not elaborate up 
on or even mention the fundamental right to a nationality established by 
Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
The issues of nationality has received greater attention recently in 
response to the nationality legislation of the newly created states. In 
response to the growing number of stateless persons the Executive 
Committee of the High Commission's program has recognized that UNHCR, 
strengthen its effort in the domain including promoting accession to the 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and Convention Relating to 
the Status of Stateless Persons.^ ^ Further, the Executive Committee of 
UNHCR adopted a Conclusion on the prevention of statelessness and 
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protection of stateless persons which reiterates the need for UNHCR to more 
activity promote the welfare of stateless persons.'*^ The UNHCR has also 
noted that it has special responsibility for stateless persons and that this 
office has been designated as an inter-mediatory between states and 
stateless persons under the 1961 Convention. Most recently UNHCR has 
been requested by the Executive Committee to place the matter of 
Statelessness in its agenda."*^  
From initial efforts in these areas it is clear that certain steps 
necessarily preceded others in assuming a systematic approach to the 
problem which appears, with variation in different parts of the world. While 
the basic human rights of stateless persons are in principle to be respected 
in their country of habitual residence. Statelessness itself creates 
vulnerability. Stateless persons hold an unequal status in their society which 
is particularly aggravated by political changes and may result in 
complications including displacement and flight. As party of Its humanitarian 
role UNHCR seeks to prevent and mitigate as for a possible such involuntary 
dislocation and movement. Their lack of national protection places stateless 
persons In position analogus to that of refugees. Indeed, one means of 
overcoming refugee status Is realization of an effective nationality. The 
Executive Committee of the UNHCR has promoted the accession to the 1954 
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and 1961 Convention 
on the Reduction of Statelessness on behalf of stateless refugees. Technical 
advice has been given to government seeking to assist refugees who may be 
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stateless. Moreover, since statelessness can be one element in the creation 
of refugees, UNHCR is concerned with statelessness as a function of its 
mandate under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 
Rights of the Stateless Persons; 
If a person acquires the status of stateless persons, it means that he 
has lost his nationality of the county, he was citizen. He also loses all the 
constitutional rights of his country. However, the Human Rights Commission, 
1951 Conventions and some Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO's) have 
granted certain legal rights to the stateless persons^ 
Under modern law in civilized countries every individual is recognized 
as having personality. For the stateless persons to enjoy any given right, it 
must be conferred on him by the country where he is living. This principle is 
reaffirmed in the International Declaration on Human Rights'*^ 
Bilateral treaties concluded by state on behalf of their nationals 
naturally contain no clauses relating to stateless persons. The same holds 
true for general Conventions. However, some of the agreements especially 
those for protection of rights rather than persons of any given nationality e.g. 
the Convention on the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the Berne 
Convention of 9 Sept. 1886 article 3 and Berlin Convention of 13 November 
1908 Article 67 do entitle stateless persons to avail themselves of their 
provisions, but such Conventions are exception to the general rule by which 
only the nationals of the contracting states enjoy the advantages laid down in 
the agreements.'*^ Clearly stateless persons can not comply with the 
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requirement of reciprocity stipulated in the laws and treaties, hence, they are 
refused enjoyment of numerous rights. In the majority of the countries then, 
stateless persons are more or less on the fringe of law. 
Moreover, even when stateless persons are not debarred from 
enjoyment of right, they are in practice often deprived of it is as much as it is 
dependent on the fulfillment of certain formalities, such as production of 
document, Intervention of consular or other authorities with which, since they 
do not enjoy the protection of national authority, they are not in a position to 
comply. 
One of the important basic rights of stateless persons contained in 
Article 4 of the 1954 Convention states that the contracting states shall 
permit the stateless persons with respect to freedom to fraction their religion 
and freedom as regards the religious education of their children. In addition, 
under Article 7 of the Convention the stateless persons are exempted after 
three years residence in the host country from conditions of legislative 
reciprocity.''^ 
The other basic rights of stateless persons in his country of residence 
are in the area of personal status. The personal status of stateless persons is 
governed by the law of his country of domicile or by the law of country of his 
residence. Further, his personal status determined such matters as his 
capacity to enter into contracts. The validity of marriage is to determined by 
the laws of his country of domicile.'*® 
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Another most important feature of the Convention is that it equate the 
rights of stateless persons with those of the national of the host country in 
certain specific areas such as: 
Protection of artistic and industrial property rights. 
Right of association as regards to non-political and non-profit making 
association and trade union. 
Right of access to courts of the host country. 
The rights of all stateless persons with regard to wage earning employment 
to those of nationals. 
Right to self-employment as regards the rights to engage in his own 
account in agriculture, industry, handicrafts and commerce and to establish 
commercial and industrial companies. 
Eligibility for legal assistance. 
Participation in rationing system if such system exist in the host country. 
Right to elementary education in the host country. 
The right of public relief. 
Most of the rights granted under labour and security legislation.^ 
The other essential and basic rights granted under the Conventions 
offer protection from expulsion from the host country concerned. Article 31 of 
the Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons pointed out that the host 
country may not expel stateless persons on the ground of national security or 
public order, in which case the person concerned is eligible for certain 
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minimal procedural guarantees. Under Article 28 of the Convention all 
stateless persons have the basic right to receive valid identity papers and 
travel documents by the host country or country concerned. Once identity 
papers has been issued the validity of such papers and document can not be 
challenged. °^ Many Governments insist that stateless persons be in 
possession of such papers and documents. For instance, Article 10(1) of the 
Austrian Passgesetz, 1951 as amended by Federal Law of 24 February, 
1954, stipulates that foreign national and stateless persons should be in 
possession of a valid passport or passport substitute while crossing the 
frontier as well as throughout their stay in Federal Territory so long as an 
International agreements or a decree issued by the Federal Ministry of the 
Interior does not provide otherwise.^ ^ 
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CHAPTER - II 
BACKGROUND TO THE CREATION OF STATELESS 
PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN WEST ASIA 
The Arabs are pre Islamic people who lived in Palestine and various 
parts of West Asia before the advent of Islam. In 1517, the Ottoman Turks 
conquered Palestine and occupied it until 1917. The year 1917 marks a 
turning point in the history of Palestine not only because of the end of Turkish 
rule but also because of issuance of Balfour Declaration in November 1917.'' 
Under Ottomans, Palestine was an integral part of 'Ottoman Empire' and 
Palestinians were not treated as subject but as citizens of sovereign and 
independent country. The Palestinians enjoyed full civil and political rights 
equally with Ottoman citizens. In fact, in the Ottoman Empire these rights 
were reaffirmed by the Ottoman Constitution of 23 December 1876. Article 
48 of the Constitution recognized the right of every Ottoman citizens to elect 
and to be elected for national representation. The same rights for al citizens 
were again reaffirmed in the Ottoman constitution of 1908. When the First 
World War broke out and Turkey joined Germany in the war, the British 
Government and its allies encouraged the Arabs to revolt against the Turks. 
As a result, they gave them several assurances to recognize their 
independence from Turkey at the end of the War. These assurances 
included an assurance for the independence of Palestine.^ The Balfour 
Declaration was the first step in the systematic campaign to usurp Palestine 
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from its indigenous inhabitants and reduce them into stateless refugees. The 
Balfour Declaration was a sequel to the Zionist campaign in Europe to 
establish a Jewish State in Palestine. 
Zionist Movement: 
Zionism as modern political movement started in the 1890's when the 
Hungarian Jewish leader Theoder Herzi, convened the first Zionist congress 
in Basle, Switzerland in 1897 and declared as its objective the establishment 
of 'Jewish national home' in Palestine secured by public law.' The Zionist 
leader realized from the beginning that the biggest obstacle to the objective 
of transforming Palestine into a "Jewish State" would be the fact that it was 
already some ones homeland.* It was thus expedient for the Zionists to 
picture Palestine as neglected Wasteland, as an empty, deserted land. From 
the start the movement, therefore, used the slogan, "land without people, for 
a people without land".' 
The original concept of "Jewish National Home" was based upon the 
desires of the Jews to escape from the discrimination and persecution, which 
they suffered particularly in Europe. But when Palestine was chosen as the 
future location for as such a home, Zionist Jews invented the concept of a 
historic right to the country. Zionist claim of historic right did not have a legal, 
political or even moral basis was the home land of Palestinians, who 
inhabited the country from the dawn of history until the creation of Israel, 
when majority of them were forcibly expelled by Jewish terrorist 
organizations.® 
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Balfour Declaration is now viewed by Arab nationalist and by some 
historians as the root causes of Palestinian tragedy and Arab-Israel conflict/ 
The withdrawal of the Turks from Palestine duhng the First World War 
did not lead to Palestine independence, as in the case of other peoples who 
were liberated from Turkish domination, on the basis of the pledges given. 
This was because of contradictory pledge given to Zionist Jews by Great 
Britain. On 2 November, 1917, in a letter addressed by Arthur James Balfour, 
British Foreign Secretary, to Lord Roths Child. 
Balfour Declared: 
"His majesty's government views with favour the establishment in 
Palestine of a "National Home" for the Jewish people, and will use 
their best endeavors to facilitate the objects, it being clearly 
understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil 
and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in 
Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any 
other countnes".' 
In the Balfour Declaration the British Government had expressed its 
support for the idea of establishing in Palestine a "Jewish National Home" in 
Pslestine.^" The declaration was issued and approved by Britishers and their 
allies with the object of winning the support of Zionist Jews during the war''V 
At that time of Balfour Declaration, the Jewish population in Palestine 
numbered some 56,000 against an Arab population of 644,000". The Jews 
represented eight percent of the population while the original inhabitants 
Muslim and Christians represented ninety tow percent of the population^^. In 
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the course of next two decades, the Jews made important strides in 
organizing themselves for community self-government. Creating a labour 
movement, pioneering new forms of settlement, establishing a Hebrew 
education system, and creating a national press and so on..''* 
The declaration gained the endorsement of US and European leaders 
as well as Vatican. When Britain was given the mandate over Palestine the 
declaration was included in the League of Nations statement regarding the 
Mandate over Palestine. In the years that followed, Balfour Declaration stood 
as symbol of British and Great power commitment to Zionism over Arab-
nationalism in Palestine." It provided international sanction to the Zionist 
movement and gave the Zionists the necessary great power backing for 
increased immigration into Palestine." 
The acquisition of land in Palestine had always been a central 
objective of Zionist movement. As Palestine was subjected to this process of 
demographic transformation, it suffered under cognate economic mutation. 
The transfer of land to Zionist settler was always and still is a major objective 
of the Zionist movement. Zionist policy of land acquisition transformed 
Palestinian society into a community of landless peasants.^^ During Zionist 
movement, the land had been acquired wherever possible by purchase 
mainly from absentee landlords. The area of land involved was a small, but 
even so the process aroused widespread resentment, especially because the 
new Jewish owners at once dispossessed the Arab tenant farmers who were 
actually working on the land and who thereby live their livellihood." 
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Sir John Hope Simpson, who was sent by the British government to 
Palestine to study its economic conditions, found that Zionist land policy 
involved the acquisition of much more land than was needed for the 
settlement of Jewish immigration. The policy thus led not only to the 
displacement of the Arab farmers but also to the neglect and deterioration of 
much of the country's agricultural land."*' 
Jewish immigration to Palestine and its Consequences: 
Immigration is Israelis lifeblood. For the Zionist, Jewish immigration 
was a vital and indispensable condition for the growth and strengthening of 
Palestine Jewish community, for the prosperity of the country and building of 
"Jewish National Home" in Palestine. 
Prior to the first Zionist congress the number of Jews moving to 
Palestine was not great about 25000 between1881 and 1900 and their 
impact was limited. Even after the Basle Conference, the movement 
remained small for another two decades. The new immigrants, who like 
those. before them came to Palestine to escape discrimination, were 
frequently socialist, committed to Jewish common living on agricultural 
settlements. Because of their Zionist philosophy within the community and 
desire to strengthen the Jewish people through physical activity, they insisted 
that only Jewish labour could be used on lands owned by Jews. This policy 
led to tensions with Palestinians peasants who lost their traditional rights to 
sharecrop the land when it was sold to Zionist immigrants by absentee 
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owners and were then unable to find work among the new immigrants 
communities.^" 
Between 1923 and 1932, the number of Jews who immigrated to 
Palestine rose to 844,54. After 1933 as a result of Nazi persecution, the Jews 
came to Palestine in large numbers within a quarter of century their number 
increased from 56,000 in 1918 to 608,000 in 1946. In other words, their ratio 
changed from one twelfth to one third of the total population^V Meanwhile, 
Palestinians fears and frustration grew in indirect response to Zionist 
immigration. In the eye of the Palestinian community the European 
immigrants were exclusivists and arrogant in their political and economic 
ideas, too western, too modern, too aggressive and in general a corrupting 
influence. More important, Palestinians quickly recognised that Zionism 
would be detrimental to nascent Palestinians nationalist aspirations. The 
Jewish immigration was threatening the numerical superiority of the 
indigenous Arab community and Zionist colonization was shaking its 
economic foundation." However, it was becoming clear with each wave of 
immigrants that Jewish immigration into Palestine was inspired, promoted 
and financed by Zionist organizations with one political objective, the creation 
of demographic nucleus which would lead to the domination of Palestine and 
the establishment of Jewish State. The original inhabitants of Palestine 
Muslim, and Christians, opposed the flow of Jewish immigration into their 
country. Their opposition took the form of protests, demonstration, riots and 
civil disturbances against the Mandatory government." 
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After each serious disturbance the British government appointed a 
Commission of Enquiry to determine its causes. Commissions of Enquiry-
were appointed in 1920, 1929 and 1936. In all cases the causes for 
disturbances were found to be same Palestinian opposition to Jewish 
immigration, their fear of the establishment of "Jewish National Home" and 
their desire for national independence. Nevertheless, the finding of these 
commissions failed to arrest the flow of Jewish immigration. The last 
commission known as the Peel Commission, which investigated the unrest in 
1936, recommended the termination of mandate and Partition of country 
between Arabs and Jews.^* 
UN Partition Plan: 
The question of Palestine came up for discussion at UN in 1947 after 
the end of Palestine Mandate as a result of dissolution of League of Nations. 
The Mandate requested to the UN Secretary General that the question of 
political future of Palestine and its inhabitants be placed on the Agenda of 
Special Session of the General Assembly. The General Assembly Resolution 
of 15 May 1947 set up the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) 
and requested it to prepare a report for the General Assembly and to submit 
such proposals, as it may consider appropriate for the solution of the problem 
of Palestine. UNSCOP heard the Jewish case, presented mainly by the 
Jewish Agency and Arab case presented mainly by the Higher Arab 
Comrnittee,^' Palestinians however, boycotted UNSCOP and did not 
participate in its investigations. The UNSCOP submitted two plans known as 
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the majority. The majority plan proposed the termination of Mandate and 
Partition of Palestine, the creation of Arab State and Jewish State with 
Economic Union between them and city of Jerusalem, which would be 
subjected to a international regime to be administered by the UN. The 
minority plan also envisaged the termination of mandate but proposed the 
establishment of a federal state, which would comprise and Arab and Jewish 
State with Jerusalem as the capital of federation.^* Both United States and 
Soviet Union supported the UN Partition Plan. The majority of the Jews were 
in favour of Partition.'' 
Partition however, was unacceptable to the Arabs. The Palestinians 
organized strikes and demonstration. The Arab States and Arab League and 
the Arab Higher Committee rejected the Partition proposal. They argued 
rightly that the UN can make recommendation and could not pass binding 
Resolution. In particular, the UN did not and does not have right to determine 
a country's fate without consulting the people of that country.^^ They raised 
the issues of the invalidity of the Balfour Declaration and Mandate.^' In the 
end, the General Assembly in its Resolution 181(11) dated 29 November 
1947 adopted majority view of UNSCOP. It recommended to the mandatory, 
the Security Council and the members of UN that they adopt and implement 
with regard to the future government of Palestine, the plan to Partition with 
Economic Union contained in the Resolution. The Resolution 181(ii) 
commended for the Partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish State. The 
boundaries of the two states were delimited in the Resolution. The 
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Resolution also provided that the independent Arab and Jewish State would 
have an economic union.'" The UN decision in 1947 to Partition Palestine 
into two states was unanimously rejected by the Arab States as immoral and 
unacceptable. Like Palestine Mandate, the UN Partition Resolution 181(ii) 
deprived the Palestinian of their sovereign rights on the whole of Palestine by 
stipulating a provision for the creation of Israel.'^ 
The UN Partition Resolution opened the door to chaos in West Asia. It 
led to an immediate out break of bloodshed, which culminated in, wars 
between Arab and Jews. The Palestinian exodus began soon after the UN 
Partition Plan and continued even after the Armistice Agreements were 
signed between Israel and Arab states in early and mid 1949. The exodus is 
classified into three phases. The first phase started from November 29, 1947 
to mid March 1948, the second phase from late March to May 15, 1948 and 
third phase started from May 15, 1948 onwards." Here all but most of the 
biased of Zionist works agree that expulsion became standard policy and 
was carried out systematically. During the second and third phase was 
openly practiced and direct expulsion was carried out when Palestinians did 
not leave willingly. 
The first phase of Palestinian exodus started shortly after the UN 
General Assembly issued a Resolution in 1947 ordering the Partition of 
Palestinian to two independent state one for Jews and other for Arabs. At 
first the exodus consisted of mainly of middle class urban Palestinians 
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anxious to avoid the sporadic fighting, which broke out between the unit of 
Haganah, the underground Israeli army and Palestinian irregular. 
The 1948 war itself was replete with an abnormal degree of terror to 
destroy the other. In short, overwhelmingly disastrous and horrifying nature 
of the war in Palestine breeding numerous atrocities and massacre giving 
rise to mass fear and panic and added by Zionist efforts to exploit to the 
fullest this growing fear and panic, created not an orderly exodus but mass 
flight of civilian throughout the country. The crisis began with the departure of 
British and proclamation of Jewish State on 14*^ ^ may 1948. The neighbouring 
Arab States entered Palestinian to prevent the establishment of Jewish 
State. At the end of 1948 was the Israeli held a crescent shaped majority of 
the land running from Sinai Peninsula in the South to Galilee in the north 
leaving the Arabs only a central area from Jerusalem to Jordan River and 
tiny Strip of Gaza. The war also involved the major reshuffling of population. 
Over 750000 Palestinians Arabs who lived in the area that came under Israel 
control were displaced in the course of fighting both before and after 14'*^  
May, 1948'' and became refugees in Jordan (45,000) Gaza Strip (10.000) 
Syria (5,000) and Lebanon (5,000).'* By the end of 1948 war hundreds of 
thousands of Palestinians refugees were living in orchards, barns and caves 
convents, army barracks and other places of shelters provided by charitable 
organizations.'' The 1948 war not only assured the existence of the Jewish 
State but it also enabled this state to extend its boundaries well beyond those 
laid down by the UN Partition Resolution in 1947. This increased the size and 
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created rooms for Jewish immigration and greater physical security.'® In 
1948 Israel signed Armistice Agreement with Arab countries that shared its 
borders. These agreements, which put end to the war left, many issues 
unsettled. Israeli territory expanded from 56.4% of Palestine allotted to it 
under the UN Partition Plan to 77.4% within 14 months of foundation of 
Jewish State. The Armistice Agreements while acknowledging territorial 
changes said nothing about the refugees, but a UN Resolution of December 
1948 had ruled that those Palestinians wishing to return and live at peace 
with their neighbours should be allowed to do so.'^ After the creation of 
Israel, the Israeli army continued to attack Arab villages blew up houses and 
indiscriminately killed men, women and children. The majority of the original 
population of the country was forcibly displaced and uprooted by a militant 
minority of foreign origin.'^ Jewish terrorism and intimidation played a major 
role in the exodus of Palestinians from their homes in the newly created state 
of Israel. 
The closing months of the Mandate had seen a steady build up of 
violence. The Zionist terrorist organisations like the Irgun Zvai Leumi and 
Stern Gang who represented the most extreme settler view point had 
mounted a campaign against the British Mandate authorities to wrest control 
of the country from them. In actions against the Arab population, these were 
joined by the Haganah, which had put on a more respectable front for public 
relations purposes. According to the British authorities, the Zionist military 
groups by 1946 had built up organised forces of nearly 70000 armed and 
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trained men some 62000 in the Haganah between 3000 and 5000 in the 
Irgun and between 200 and 300 in the Stern Gang." 
The Deir Yassin massacre convinced ttiost Palestinians villages that 
their wives and children were not safe and that they could only be protected 
from massacre by avacuation.*° The main objective behind the Deir Yassin 
massacre was terrify the Arabs civilization population. It succeeds with 
disastrous results.*"* The Dier Yassin massacre achieved its purpose of 
terrorizing the Palestinians and they began an exodus, which assumed 
catastrophic dimensions.*^ 
The terrorist activities by the Zionist forces to force the exodus of the 
Palestinians that began during the Mandate continued after the creation of 
State of Israel and was carried out by the organised troops of the new state. 
Having occupied most of the Arab towns in Palestine, with the exception of 
the old city of Jerusalem, Nablus and Hebron, Jewish terrorist actions was 
concentrated on villages. Many villages were destroyed and razed to the 
ground after being occupied by Israeli forces. According to Yitzhak Rabin 
former Chief of Staff and later Prime Minister of Israel summed this policy 
with the brutal clarity. He said: "By the razing villages to the ground and 
Dividing out the inhabitants, we will ensure that there are no villages left for 
Arabs to return to". 
Dr. Stephan Penrose while commenting on the Deir Yassin massacrs 
right. 
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"There is no question but that frightful massacre such as that which 
took at Deir Yassin in April 1948 were perpetrated for the major 
purpose of frightening the Arab population and causing them to 
take flight. It was small wonder that many Arabs families began a 
history of exodus from the battle area and from a sector, which 
might soon became battleground. Terror was contagious and it 
built up the tremendous migration, which has led to the result, 
which may be witnessed in the refugee camps".*' 
Although atrocities and massacre were not unusual, the barbarous 
extermination of the village of Dier Yassin by Irgun and Stern Gang terrorists 
became symbolic too much of the population of the kind of war it was fighting 
and the type of enemy it was opposing.** In most areas, the Palestinians 
were actively forced to flee or deliberately panic sthcken into fleeing with 
reminders of the, April 1948, Deir Yassin massacre. After the capture of 
Ladda and Ramalah on 11-12 July, for instance, all men of military age were 
herded into camps and the remaining resident were ordered to leave within 
half an hour. Perhaps thirty thousand people or more almost entirely women 
and children snatched up what they could and fled from their homes across 
the open field.** 
Expulsion was another cause of Palestinians exodus. The expulsion of 
Palestinians was carried out in Haifa, Lydda and Ramllah, Tiberias, Safad 
Beersheba and several other towns and villages. On various occasions 
Israeli forces used loudspeakers to threaten the civilian population and to 
order it to lea^e. According to Edgar 0. Balance, a military historians "Israeli 
vans with loudspeakers drove through the streets ordering all the inhabitants 
to evacuate immediately by and such were reluctant to leave were forcibly 
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ejected from their homes by the triumphant Israeli whose policy was now 
openly one of clearing out all the Arabs civil population before them. No 
longer was there any reasonable persuasion. Bluntly, the Arabs inhabitants 
ejected to flee into Arab territory. Wherever, the Israeli troops advanced into 
Arab country, the Arab population was bulldozed out in front of them".*® The 
extent to which the refugees were savagely driven out by Israeli as part of 
deliberate master plan has been insufficiently recognised. The Zionist 
concept of Jewish State called for the ousting of the indigenous Arab 
population from its homeland and emphasized that this objective means 
ranging from expert psychological warfare to ruthless expulsion by force. 
The Israeli later claimed that they urged the Arab inhabitants to stay 
that they were not driven from their home and they fled of there own freewill. 
The truth of matter was that it was the concerted policy of the Zionist 
movement to oust the Palestine Arabs from their homes and country 
because they needed Palestine to make room for their mass immigration 
policy. Without Arabs land and property it was not clear how the Zionist could 
establish a 'Jewish State'.*^ According to Zionist historians, the Arabs in 
Palestine were asked to stay and live as citizens in the Jewish State. Instead, 
they chose to leave, either because they expected an Arab military victory, 
which would annihilate the Zionists. On the other hands, the Arabs claimed 
that the Palestinians did not leave their homes voluntarily but were expelled 
by Zionist aggression. For years, Israeli historians have maintained that the 
Arabs were made to leave following instruction from their leaders and despite 
the best efforts of the Zionist to persuade them to stay they choose to 
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leave.*^ Israeli historians maintained that these alleged evacuation orders 
were broadcast on Arab radio station/' The recently found Israel archival 
material document that Haganah's policy of forcing the evacuation of the 
Arabs population from the coastal plain between Haifa and Tel Aviv, 
designated as the core of Jewish State. This material provides new evidence 
about.the provocative attack by the Haganah, IZL, and Lehi against the 
unarmed Arab population. The early December 1947, terrorist attacks of the 
IZL and Lehi in Jerusalem Haifa and Jaiffa, invited Arabs retaliation, which 
was then eagerly seized and capitalized upon by Haganah to launch 
offensive strikes against Arabs civilians. In Haifa, initial terrorist attacks 
against the Arabs were begun by the Irgun and Lehi. The Irgun carried out a 
bombing attack against Arabs workers waiting at the gates of the Haifa 
refinery. This resulted in the death and wounding of many Arabs workers and 
provoked a vengeful, yet spontaneous Arabs attack on Jewish refinery 
workers. The Heganah strategy in Haifa and other parts of the country was 
not intended not only punish individual Arabs 'culprits' but was rather a 
psychological blitz of right raids aimed at widening the hostility. The objective 
was to shock, frighten and throw the communities off balance forcing Arabs 
neighborhoods and villages to evacuate. Recent Israeli archival material 
provides cumulative evidence that a large number of Haganah-Palmach IDF 
commanders at company battalion, brigade and high command level took 
part indirectly ordering numerous case of expulsion from Arab rural areas. At 
the same time, and contrary to the official Israeli myth, the Israeli forces 
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appeared on numerous occasions appeared to be it disciplined and engaged 
in orgy of looting, rape and acts of brutality which caused panic and led to 
exodus from various parts of the country.'" 
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C H A P T E R — III 
PROBLEM OF STATELESS PALESTINIAN 
REFUGEES IN FRONT LINE ARAB STATES 
AND OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 
As a result of the conflict in Palestinian almost of the whole of the Arab 
population fled or was expelled from the area under Jewish Occupation. 
Following the first Arab-Israel War in 1*948, the exact number of stateless 
Palestinians refugees created by the 1938-49 hostilities has been matter of 
dispute. The number of Palestinian refugees who fled to Jordan, Syria, 
Lebanon, West Bank and Gaza Strip."* In 1967, 12,80,823 were registered 
with UNRWA whom 54% lived in Jordan^ 25% lived in Gaza Strip and West 
Bank. Lebanon with 11 % was not in a strong position. Syria has host about 
15% of refugees mostly homeless and unproductive. Many Palestinians 
subsequently found their way to other Arab countries and later some 
immigrated to the West.^ 
There were few Palestinians generally upper class, who left on their 
own initiative immediately after the UN partition vote instead of being forced 
out of their homes. Many in these groups were able to join family members 
already living abroad and found it economically easier to rebuild their lives. 
But they are still in exile.' 
Although the Arab states tried to help the refugee as best as they 
could but the number of destitute was so enormous that they finally referred 
the problem to the UN.* The UN mediator Count Bernadotte appealed to 
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Israel to accept repatriation of some of the refugees. But Israel rejected the 
Bernadotte proposal on the ground it could not accept the refugee back in 
view of the continuance of the state of war. Bernadotte disappointed with 
Israel's response reported to the UN*: 
"No settlement can be just and complete if recognition is not 
accorded to the right of the Arab refugees to return to the home 
from which he has been dislodged by the hazards and strategy 
of the armed conflict" 
He submitted a progress report outlining officially for the first time the 
dimensions of the refugee's problem: 
"The Arab inhabitants of Palestine are not citizens or subjects 
of Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Trans Jordan, the state which are 
at present providing them with a refugee status. As residents of 
Palestine, a former mandated territory for which the 
international community has a continuing responsibility until a 
final settlement is achieved these Palestinian refugees 
understandably look to the United Nations for effective 
assistance'^ 
In other words, the situation created two distinct problems, the 
problem of emergency relief and the problem of permanently, re-establishing 
the homeless people. A relief programme was initiated under the supervision 
of a UN Director of Disaster and Relief and with the assistance of the World 
Health Organization (WHO) and other specialized Agencies of the United 
Nations.' The Disaster Relief project initiated by Count Bernadotte was soon 
replaced by United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees (UNRPP), 
established under a General Assembly Resolution on November 19, 1948 in 
54 
which the Secretary General of the UN was requested to "take all necessary 
steps to extend aid to Palestinian refugees and to establish such 
administrative organization as may be required for this purpose, inviting the 
assistance of several governments, the specialized agency of the UN, and 
other voluntary agencies. In this resolution it was estimated that $29,500,000 
was needed for relief of 500,000 refugees over a nine month period plus 
$5,000,000 from the working capital fund of the United Nations and member 
states were urged to make voluntary contribution.' On 11 December, 1948, 
the UN passed another resolution GA Resolution 194 (III) and established a 
conciliation commission and instructed it, to "take steps to assist the 
Government and authorities concerned to achieve a final peace settlement of 
all questions outstanding between them" and to "facilitate the repatriation, 
resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and 
payment of adequate compensation to them.' An important section of this 
resolution with respect of refugees said that: those refugees: 
"Wishing to return to tiieir homes and live in peace with their 
neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest 
practicable date and that compensation should be paid for the 
property of those choosing not to return and for the loss or 
damage to property which under the phnciple of international 
law or in equity should be made good by the governments or 
authorities responsible"^^ 
The Conciliation Commission had three members one each from 
France, Turkey and United States of America. It sought to implement 
repatriation, compensation and promote resettlement. The commission 
believed that: ,. >^^;^J:!:l^^'^ 
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"A solution of refugees problem would help not only to relieve 
human suffering but also to open other avenues to progress for 
other conflicting points. "^ ^ 
But the commission found the Israel sides inflexible. Repatriation was 
almost impossible in view of the lack of security for Arabs in Israeli controlled 
areas and the lack of guarantees of protection of minorities called for under 
the partition plan. The Arab complained also that Israel had blocked the 
refugee account and had liquidated their real and personal property. The 
Israeli absentee law was strongly protested. The commission was requested 
to obtained positive clarification of Israel's position." 
Israel replied that since the resolution specified that refugees who 
wished to return to their homes should "live at peace with their neighbour's," 
repatriation was contingent on the establishment of peace. Israel did not 
exclude the possibility of the repatriation of limited numbers of refugees, but 
consistently look the view that the solution of the major part of the refugees 
question lay in resettlement in Arab states." The Arab States made it clear 
that until there was a satisfactory resolution of the refugees issue, they would 
not discuss other issues. They wanted the refugees to be given an 
opportunity to choose between repatriation and compensation.''* 
•Under pressure from the Conciliation Commission Israel offered to 
take back 100,000 refugees and where to put them. This offer was 
contingent upon the Arabs agreeing to a final peace settlement. The 
Commission found this offer unacceptable, as did the Arab States having 
failed to make substantial headway by political means the Conciliation 
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Commission adopted an economic approach. In August 1949, it set up an 
Economic Survey Mission under the chairmanship of Gordan Clapp to: 
"Examine the economic situation arising from the recent 
hostilities and recommend to the Conciliation Commission 
means of overcoming resultant economic dislocation, 
reintegrating the refugees into the economic life of the area, 
and of creating the economic conditions which will be 
• conducive to the establishment of permanent peace. ""^^ 
The Economic Survey Mission soon found many obstacles, 
particularly, political and psychological to economic development.""^ In an 
interim report, November 16, 1949, the mission stated that the refugees 
themselves were the most serious manifestation of economic dislocation 
created by the Palestine hostilities. The mission suggested that the most 
constructive course immediately available was to give the refugee an 
opportunities to find work under existing conditions.''^ It recommended setting 
up a special agency for these purpose. Accordingly within a month the 
General Assembly passed a resolution to establish the United Nations Relief 
and Work Agency for Palestinian refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) to take 
over the function of UNRPR In the enabling resolution it was said that: 
"Without prejudice to the provision of paragraph II of the 
General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 
continued assistance for the relief of the Palestinian refugees is 
necessary to prevent conditions of starvation and that 
constructive measure should be undertaken at an early date 
- with a view to the termination of international assistance for 
relief''' 
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The Second Phase of Palestinian Exodus: 
The Arab-Israel conflict of June 1967 once more threw West Asian 
tensions into sharp relief and escalated the nineteen years old refugee 
problem." The refugee problem become further complicated with the Israeli 
aggression. During the War, Israel Occupied all of the territory commonly 
referred to as the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In the aftermath of the June 
War no less than 300,000 Palestinian who had been living in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip were exiled. Most fleeing West Bank residents relocated on 
the East Bank, although some of these displaced persons continued on 
second settlement areas mostly in Lebanon. 
Whereas just before the June War, some 63% of all Palestinians still 
lived in Palestine, by the end of 1967 this percentage had dropped to only 
50%. The losses were experienced primarily on the West Bank and 
secondarily in Gaza. The immediate effect of 1967 war was an increasing the 
dispersion of the Palestinian population. While the East Bank of Jordan 
received the largest number of new expellees about 5% of the population 
scattered in other Arab countries. Some were refugees from 1948 war who 
had been living in camps the newly Occupied territory, who were forced to 
flee for the second time in their lives. Thousand of other left as the military 
occupation and the expansions of the Jewish settlements deprived them of 
their homes and livelihoods and left them vulnerable to economic stagnation 
and political oppression.^" 
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In this connection, the UN Secretary General U. Thant's report of 
August 18, 1967 argued that more than 200,000 Palestinian residents had 
been displaced as a result of 1967 war. He noted that the densely populated 
Gaza Strip had suffered considerably more civilian causalities and property 
damage than any other areas. In the aftermath of the June War Israel had 
followed a systematic pattern of expulsion encouraging. Arab residents to 
leave certain areas." Most Israelis were keen on the Arabs going away for 
the few the Arabs in the country, the easier the governance. It would also 
facilitate annexation of the newly acquired territory.^ ^ But the refugees have 
unfortunately become a sort of political football. Israel accuses the Arab 
states, of publicizing the plight of the refugee to would World opinion against 
the Israelis. In course of time Israel started using the refugee as a debating 
point With the Arabs. Settlement of the refugees problem was convetiably 
made contingent on a final peace settlement. At one point Israel offered to 
take back all the refugees in Gaza, if the Gaza Strip itself were also included 
in the deal. The Palestinian themselves have also put pressure on the 
various Arab host governments to take extreme and hostile position for 
instance, to bypass the provisions stipulating peaceful repatriation." 
Israel insisted that the refugee problem could be solved only in the 
broad context of peace. She offered a general outline of plan in which she 
proposed that Consultations should immediately be initiated between Israel 
and the Arab host countries, together with the main contributing countries, to 
negotiate a five year plan for the rehabilitation of the refugees and their final 
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integration into the economic life of the region. She would contribute to a 
reintegration and compensation fund to provide the financial means for 
solution of refugee problem in all its aspect. She expressed willingness to 
consider repatriating number of newly displaced persons on compassionate 
ground.^* However, Israel opposed repatriation of old and argued that there 
is no room for them. At the same time, Israel continued to call for more 
Jewish immigration." 
The Arab states on the other hand insisted that the absorption of the 
refugee into adjacent lands would imply Arab approval of continued retention 
by Israel of refugee property and would indicate a tacit Arab recognition of 
Israel. The hopeless Palestinian refugees thus became a sort of political 
football in the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Arab states with 
neither side showing genuine willingness to solve the problem. 
Stateless Palestinians Refugees in Jordan: 
After the 1948 struggle for Palestine, Jordan approached the refugee 
problem in a manner that was abhorred by her Arab neighbours. Jordan's 
King Abdullah envisaged a settlement with Israel as a method of improving 
his country economic outlook and as opportunity to open up new 
development possibilities by means of the assistance obtained from the UN 
towards the rehabilitation of the refugees.^* 
From May 1948 to 1967, hundred of thousand of Palestinians Arabs 
moved to the West Bank of the Jordan River, which had come under the 
control of Jordan. About 300,000 Palestinians crossed the river Jordan after 
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the June 1967 War. Jordan became a dual society with two main political 
communities Palestinians Arabs and Jordanians. This situation set the 
background for conflict, tension, and allegiance for the next decades." 
Today half of the Jordan's population is Palestinians, most of them refugees 
after 1948 and 1967 wars. The presence of Palestinians in the population 
influences and constrains Jordanian policy more than any other domestic 
factor. They comprise an important and influential component.^^ 
Palestinian refugees in Jordan have a unique legal position. Unlike, 
the other state hosting Palestinians, many Palestinians in Jordan have been 
permitted to become host country citizen automatically. Many Palestinians in 
Jordan have been granted full citizenship right including right to vote. They 
could vote in elections most of which were manipulated by the government. 
In general Palestinian refugees with Jordanian citizenship are treated equally 
with other Jordanian citizens. Jordan does not offer citizenship to those 
Palestinians who originated in Gaza Strip, over which Jordan never claimed 
sovereignty. The few who wanted to travel abroad could obtain Jordanian 
passports. Instead of using travel documents of stateless persons, 
Palestinians refugees not only vote in elections but some hold public office. 
Other Palestinians achieved high posts in Jordanian government. Many 
regarded the privilege with skepticism since there was little reasons for 
loyalty to the Hashemite regime." 
Palestinians who benefited from the right of Jordanian citizenship 
were indigenous West Bank inhabitants. After formal incorporation into the 
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Hashamite Kingdom in 1950, increasing number of West Bank Palestinians 
received high government appointments. Since then they have held most 
important cabinet positions including the Premiership, Foreign Ministry and 
Ministry of Defence. Hashemite policy at one time was to designate half the 
parliament and half the Cabinet from Palestinians.'" Therefore, in 1950, after 
annexing the Arab Occupied portion of Palestine West of Jordan river. King 
Abdullah willingly integrated its native and refugee populations into his 
kingdom on the basis of constitutional representative government and 
equality of rights and duties of all citizens. But the Palestinians had no loyalty 
for the Hashemite Kingdom and neither intellectual, emotional or ideological 
attachment to monarchial rule. The Palestinians characterized King 
Abdullah's annexation of West Bank as a calculated scheme executed with 
Zionist approval.'^ Abdullah dilemma was clear he had to devise policies 
which would win Palestinians acquiesce and advance their integration 
without upsetting the original Jordanian people and endangering his own 
power base. At the same time he had to make the Palestinians feel that they 
had taken on a Jordanian identity. While simultaneously supporting their 
demand to return to their pre-1948 homes, Abdullah, therefore, encouraged 
'his Palestinians' refugees and non-refugees to take part in political life of the 
Jordan. Except the army, which the Hashemite have always regarded as the 
corner stone of their regime, practically all avenues were open to the 
Palestinian." The Jordanian political system allowed the Palestinian area of 
the West Bank its share of representation, at least when Parliament 
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functioned and Palestinian had an equal share with Jordanian system neither 
created specifically Palestinian political parties not did they engage actively 
in dissenting ethnic politics. 
The number of UNRWA registered Palestinian refugees in Jordan 
stood at 1,358,706 in 1996 and Jordan estimated that another 800,000 
Palestinian "displaced persons" were residing in Jordan. Jordan also boasted 
the lowest percentage of Palestinian refugee living in camps. Although, 
Jordan maintained ten camps that sheltered 258,204 refugees during the 
years,. 81 percent of the registered refugees in Jordan lived outside camps. 
The Jordanian government unofficially estimates that it hosts 800,000 
Palestinian displaced because of the 1967 war. The government called the 
1967 arrivals "displaced persons" rather than refugee because at that time, 
Jordan claimed sovereignty on both the East and West Bank of the Jordan 
River. 
With the advent of the Palestinian guerilla movement in late 1960's, 
Palestinians started to acquire great power and influence within Jordan and 
began to develop a state within state over which the Jordanian monarchy 
had virtually to control. Thus Palestinians were free to attack Israeli troops in 
the West Bank without restraint, and cross border attacks by both Israelis 
and Palestinian guerillas became more frequent. The growing military might 
of the Palestinian guerillas was perceived as a source of threat by the 
Jordanian monarch and in September 1970 King Hussain ordered his army 
to attack move against the Palestinian guerillas. In ten days of intense 
fighting, thousands of Palestinians were killed and the guerilla movement in 
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Jordan was broken. Within a year of "Black September", virtually all the 
Palestinian fighters had been expelled from Jordan and forced to seek 
refugee in neighbouring Arabs country like Lebanon and Syria. 
After 1970 those Palestinians who sought a way out of the camps into 
more amenable jobs or into educational institution found themselves forced 
to give up all political activity and to acquiesce innumerable restrictions, 
which the regime imposed on them.'^ 
Israel's Likud Government has declared a many times that Palestinian 
state already exists, namely, Jordan with her large Palestinian population. 
Ariel Shorn has long (since 1967) advocated the demise of the Hashemite 
monarchy so that the Palestinian may establish their own state in East 
Jordan. There would then be no need to form a Palestinian state in the West 
Bank which he and other Israeli claim as part of 'Eretz Israel.'* Ariel Sharon 
has stated that "Jordan is Palestine, the capital of Palestine is Amman if 
Palestinian Arabs want to find their political expression they will have to do it 
Amman.'^  
In this context, the Israeli leaders justified their claims that Palestine is 
a Jordan, by indicating that approximately three quarters of the inhabitants of 
Amman came from Western Palestine. Many of Jordan, Cabinet Ministers 
and members of Parliament are originally from Western Palestine the major 
part of the country's economy and government administration is in the hands 
of former residents of Western Palestine. Their conclusion is that Kingdom of 
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Jordan is actually a Palestinian state and that any solution of Israel's 
Palestinian problem must come at Jordanian expense.'^ 
King Hussain has warned against attempts to turn Jordan into a 
replacement homeland for Palestinians. He challenged Israel's position, 
which tries to present the Palestine issue as if it were that of people without 
land, a people who are searching for land. He maintained that Jordanians are 
one people and their destiny was one and the same. In addition, Palestinians 
were not interested in turning Jordan into a Palestinian homeland; they 
favored the West Bank and Gaza Strip for a Palestinian state." 
Stateless Palestinians Arabs in Lebanon: 
After the first Arab-Israeli conflict more than 1000,00 refugees from 
Palestine came to according to some Lebanese estimate, the number was 
170,000.'' 
.In 1950, about 1000,000 certainly not many more unemployed 
Palestinian refugees had to be cared for by humanitarian aid organization, 
but by 1975 the number of refugee in Lebanon who were cared for by 
UNRWA had almost doubled.*" 
The Palestinians who took refugee in Lebanon lived in legal void. 
They were neither citizens nor were they classified as foreigners. The first 
two decades of exile in Lebanon were marked by economic exploitation 
political and social marginality and officially sanctioned repression. Social 
and political control over Palestinians by the Lebanese government was 
maintained through a variety of measures: work permits requirement, the 
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presence of Lebanese police and intelligence force in the camps. The 
government response to political expression and activity was often arrest. 
Palestinians were subject to restrictions on their travel abroad and within 
Lebanon. The refugees were placed under the jurisdiction of the section of 
the Ministry of Interior, called the General Bureau of Palestinian Affairs. The 
General Bureau, in conjunction with the religious courts of each sect 
governed personal status matters such as marriage, divorce, custody and 
inheritance. Within the camps the Lebanese police and Lebanese 
intelligence exercised strict control over the population, contempting to 
prevent any form of political expression or organizing.*^ 
Such measure not only discriminated against the poorer Palestinians 
who sought refuge in Lebanon but also made it difficult for broken families to 
be reunited with their kin and kith. Palestinians Christians were also 
separated from their Muslim compatriots: Movements from one camps to 
another or from camp to the city was forbidden without express permission 
from the government authorities.*^ 
In Lebanon, because of official restriction on their employment, 
refugees often provided black market labour at wages below the minimum 
established by government. The Palestinians in Lebanese refugee camps 
became centers of political and social unrest. Their situation was complicated 
by the fact that some 90% were Muslims. If the Lebanese government had 
officially sanctioned their permanent residence, the delicate balance between 
Christians and Muslims, which determined the country's political system 
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would have been upset. The rise of the Palestinian Resistance Movement 
after the June 1967 War led to a transformation of the Palestinian refugee 
camps In Lebanon into strong holds of the guerilla organization. A small 
number of Christians Palestinian were able to acquire citizenship through 
devious means such as producing forged birth certificate or Christians 
Lebanese family connection.*' 
Of course, not all Palestinians in the Lebanon remained in camps. 
Many of the well qualified and the enterprising achieved successful careers 
outside. Palestinians doctors built up successful practices and when 
conditions deteriorated left for the richer pastures of the Gulf. Hundreds 
exploited their intelligence, their industry, their education to achieve wealth. 
The Lebanese administration however, always actively discouraged the 
employment of Palestinians in remunerative jobs.** One of the largest 
financial institutions the Intra-Bank was established and handed by the 
Palestinian Arabs until it collapsed in 1966.*" 
In Lebanon, the refugees in the camps were forbidden to own land 
and the nature of existing land tenure system, which differed considerably 
from that of Mandate Palestine made it almost impossible to obtain a tenancy 
or shareholding. However, some refugee could obtain seasonal work in the 
citrus and banana groves along the coast, in the vegetable and wheat fields 
of the eastern Baqqa valley and in the Orchards and tobacco growing areas 
of southern Lebanon.** 
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In brief, it can be stated tiiat economic conditions of Palestinians 
camps in Lebanon was very depressed and harsh and the standard of living 
in general was very low. In the first place no permanent employment was 
available for a large number of people. Secondly, wages were generally 
low.*^ The economic situation of poor Palestinians in Lebanon reflected all 
the distortions of advanced forms of underdeveloped capitalism. Public 
services to the rural areas, roads, electricity, water, medical care, education, 
remained almost zero. Almost quarter of Palestinian work force in Lebanon 
is still engaged in agriculture. Relations between employees and worker 
remain highly feudal and exploitative in he rural sectors. Palestinians in 
Urban camps have greater opportunities and economic exploitation with 
them takes different forms. Unlike, the other host countries Palestinian in 
Lebanon are not permitted to work in government services and they are 
permitted in certain private jobs like in banks, hotels and large foreign 
companies.*' 
According to Lebanese survey of 1971, the level of education, among 
Palestinian camps was very low. The over-whelming majority of refugees in 
the camps never get beyond the elementary stage 76,020 persons above the 
age of 5 received one to six years of schooling. In comparison, only 2,310 
completed preparatory school and 1,020 secondary school levels. A mere 
300 residents possessed University education. Another factor to be noted 
and one which may have serious repercussions in the immediate future is the 
high discrepancy between male and female illiteracy, 48.7% and 68.7% 
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respectively. Even allowing for traditional attitudes to girls education, the 
existence of this discrepancy is significant.*' 
The health care situation has not deteriorated as badly as once 
feared. The health needs of the refugees are exacerbated since Lebanese 
hospitals charge for treating Palestinian. But even more important than the 
shelter and health needs, are the physical and legal protection of the 
Palestinian refugee in Lebanon it is the problem of their permanent status. 
In judicial matter, the police tended not to interfere in small disputes 
within Palestinians camps in Lebanon, usually doing so only when there, was 
potential for violence. If violent crime, such as murder was committed or in 
case of theft the police arrested the accused who was processed through the 
Lebanese judicial system. But quarrels over such things as boundaries 
between houses, sewage overflow, trespassing and family problems were 
usually settled in the manner customary in rural Palestine, where neutral 
parties or village elders were asked by the supporters of the disputants to 
mediate. Usually, settlement was reached through compromise and the 
payment of compensation.'" 
.In December, 1968, the Israelis reacted to the military operations of 
Palestinian guerrillas from South Lebanon with a surprise attack on Beirut 
airport and Israeli airborne troops destroyed the greater part of Lebanon's 
civil aviation fleet. This first retaliation on Lebanese territory gave a fore taste 
of the problems raised by the new guerrilla activity of the Palestinians, who 
were now operating from Lebanon without the permission or even the 
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knowledge of the Lebanese army.'^ The Palestinian resistance movement 
established i(s open, armed presence in the camps in Lebanon in 1969, after 
a year long series of battles with the Lebanese army. Concomitantly, the 
Lebanese authorities withdrew from the camps. With this newly acquired 
freedom to organize the PLO over the next several years proceeded to 
construct a number of social institutions in the camps under its control.'^ 
After their expulsion from Jordan, PLO headquarters were transferred 
to Lebanon. Since 1970 southern Lebanon became the main military base for 
the Palestinian resistance. The sizable Palestinian presence in Lebanon 
contributed heavily to the government immobilism as Lebanese political 
groups became increasingly polarized." Most Muslim supported the 
Palestinians and wanted the army to prevent Israeli attacks on southern 
Lebanon and on the Palestinian camps. Most Christians wanted government 
to restore Sovereignty to Lebanon and control the Palestinians who seemed 
to form state within state. The army seemed unable to do so. Therefore, 
there was no effective centralized authority over the armed Palestinians in 
Lebanon Palestinians dragged Lebanon virtually into the Arab-Israeli conflict 
and gave money and weapons to Muslim and leftist parties sympathetic to 
their cause. Many Arab countries particularly Syria pressured the Lebanese 
government into tolerating this development. Almost the entire Muslim 
community sided with the PLO as well.*^ 
Growing polarization ultimately plunged the country into a bloody civil 
war in April 1975 which came to an end in October 1976. While violence 
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subsided in much of Lebanon after October 1976, peace continued to elude 
the south Lebanon throughout the following year. Palestinian guerillas 
regularly carried out raids against Israel from their bases to Southern 
Lebanon. Israeli responded in its usual heavy handed manner by carrying out 
massive retaliatory attacks against PLO and Lebanese targets in the south 
culminating in the March 1978 Israel's limited invasion of Southern Lebanon. 
A buffer zone ranging a depth from five to twenty km. Stretching from the 
coast to the foothills of Mount Harmon came under Israeli occupation. After 
the Israelis invasion guerilla raids into northern Israel declined sharply but the 
Palestinian fighters continued to shell northern Israel from their positions 
outside the Israel controlled territory. 
In 1982 Israel launched yet another invasion of Lebanon with the 
specific aim of crushing and destroying the PLO as a political and military 
force in Lebanon. During the 1982 invasion the PLO was expelled from 
Lebanon and most of its civilian as well as military institution in the country 
collapsed. 
Approximately 60,000 Palestinians were left homeless as a result of 
the Israeli invasion of 1982. After their camp homes had been destroyed, 
they took shelter in apartment garages, storefronts, unfinished apartment 
buildings and shelters built from scrap. With the signing of the Taif 
Agreement (1989) and the return of civil harmony to Lebanon, some attempts 
have been made to rehabilitate the Palestinian camps in the South Lebanon. 
In South Lebanon, the campgrounds have been cleared and infrastructure of 
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water and sanitary facilities and erection of new concrete homes were started 
in 1990. Hospitals and schools that were destroyed in 1982 were rebuilt. 
However thousands of Palestinians refugees who had fled to the Bekka 
Valley in 1982 are still in a poor condition with inadequate resources." 
Stateless Palestinians in Syria: 
In 1948 the Palestinian community in Syria was estimated at 75,00. 
Since then it has rapidly increased reaching an estimated 270,000 in 1987. 
This is still less than 3 percent of the country's total population and in terms 
of overall size of the Palestinian community is smaller than the number of 
Palestinians residing in the other Arab states and regions bordering Israel.** 
Palestinians have not been given citizenship (although they are eligible for 
military service) and the Laissez-passer which they are granted for travel can 
also be used to restrict movement. Palestinian registered with UNRWA, live 
in ten camps. The largest concentration of more than three-quarters of the 
total Palestinian population is residing in the camps around Damascus the 
remainder are mostly concentrated around Homs, Hama and Aleppo.*' 
In Syria, where economic restrictions and control of socialist 
government made free enterprising difficult, business minded Palestinians 
were much more restricted in money making. There were thus fewer gaps in 
the social structure of the Syrian Palestinian community." 
The conditions of Palestinians were better in Syria, where the 
government set up its own organization, the Palestine Arab Refugee Institute 
(PARI). The PARI made conscious efforts to assists the Palestinians both 
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economically and politically. PARI attempted to find employment for 
Palestinians at prevailing wage scales and to organize them in a ways useful 
to Syrian policy. The PARI also provides food, clothing and housing to the 
refugees. The camps run by PARI were equipped with better educational, 
social and health services than those available in the UNRWA and special 
cash subsidies were granted to those refugees most in need. Housing grants 
for each family were also provided." 
However, the Palestinians as in other Arab countries were forbidden 
to carry arms until the mid 1960s and for most of the period, since 1948 have 
been forbidden to form political parties or associations without the permission 
of the government. Syria was the first Arab government to assist guerilla 
organization after 1948, although the Syrian military and security authorities 
exercised the strict control over all Palestinian groups within their borders. 
One form of control were through assistance in organizing, supplying and 
training. Palestinian military and para-military groups such as Palestine 
Liberation Army and Saiqa have been established and are controlled by 
Syria. One pre-Bathist regime appointed Ahmad Shuqairi, a Palestinian 
leader as Chief Syrian representative at the United Nations.*" 
Within the host countries the gradual expansion of the local 
economies after 1948 and development of their infrastructure and industrial 
base provided other opportunities for Palestinian seeking work in the 1960s 
and 1970's. In Syria, the rapid growth of the residential areas in and around 
Damascus and other major cities, together with the demand for new factory 
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and office accommodation, led to a rapid increase in the number of 
Palestinians employed in the building trades. By 1981 some 7,800 
Palestinians refugees about 18% of the Palestinian labour force in the 
country were employed in construction and related field. Many of the skilled 
workers were trained at UNRWA's vocational center in Damascus, which 
opened in 1961. By 1981, 40,00 Palestinians had graduated from the center. 
While most had trained as bricklayers, plumbers, carpenters, building 
technicians and draftsman, others had finished courses in auto-mechanics, 
radio and television repair and pharmacy.^ "" 
The high number of Palestinian refugee who found work in the 
building trades was direct result of official government policy, which aimed to 
channel Palestinian labour. While some refugees still complain that they are 
discouraged from taking more advanced or from finding more amendable 
jobs in the services sectors or as self-employed workers, others have 
accepted the opportunities because of the need to support large families or 
to finance the high cost of education." 
Despite its relatively small size, the Palestinian community has always 
been regarded as important potential threat to Syrian stability especially with 
the growth of the Palestinian nationalist movement after 1968. There has 
also been the possibility that the action of Syrian based Palestinian 
commandos might increase the danger of Israeli retaliation against Syrian 
targets." 
Between 1970 and 1973 Palestinian military operation against Israel 
triggered Israeli retaliation against commands camps and Syrian villages. 
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Syria restricted Palestinian commando operations from its territory and 
encouraged raids from Lebanon and Jordan instead. By 1973 Palestinian 
resistance activities had been severely curtailed and subsequently in 1974 
Israel-Syria Disengagement Agreement seems to have been accompanied 
by tacit Syrian undertaking to stop commandos raids altogether.** 
TABLE - 1 
Distribution of Palestinian Refugees 
UNRWA-registered (30 June 1987) 
Location 
Lebanon 
Syria 
Jordan 
West Bank 
Gaza Strip 
TOTAL 
In camps 
14,3809 
75,208 
208,716 
94,824 
244,416 
766,973 
Not in camps 
134,800 
182,781 
636,826 
278,762 
200,981 
1434,150 
Total 
278,609 
257,989 
845,542 
373,586 
445,397 
2,201,123 
United Nations Relief Work Agency 
*Sources: Valerie, York, domestic Politics and Regional Security: Jordan, 
Syria, and Israeli Gower Brookfield and other, Sydney and other, 1988, p.32. 
Stateless Palestinian Refugees in Gaza and West Bank: 
As result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, thousands of Palestinian from 
some 144 cities, towns and villages came to Gaza. Refugees flooded into the 
tiny area, with estimates of their numbers ranging between 83,000 
(September 1948) and 250,000 (December 1948). By December 1949 a 
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thorough census by village and town of origin had been taken and the 
number of refugees was established at 202,606. The large refugee numbers 
combined with those of the native Gazans resulted in a population density of 
1,800 people per square mile." 
The UNRWA records show that there were 212,600 refugees in the 
Gaza Strip from the 1948 war. These people added to the original population 
gravely overcrowding the 362 square kilometers of the Strip.'* Both refugee 
and non-refugee Palestinians in Gaza have lived in international limbo since 
1948. The Gaza Strip formally part of mandated Palestine was Occupied by 
Egypt in 1948, but never annexed. 
Annexation would have implied that Egypt rejected the unanimous 
Arab demand for the refugees return to their pre-1948 homes.*' The Gaza 
region was governed by local Arabs who continued to administer the laws of 
Mandatory Palestine. Palestinian judges gave decisions in Palestinian courts 
and towns of the Strip were administered by Palestinian notables. But in 
most cases appointments were made or had to be approved by the Egyptian 
military authorities." 
Before 1948, Gaza was a small district in Palestine, which did not play 
a central role in the socio-economic or political life of the country.*' Today, 
the population of Gaza Strip is 9,50,000 of whom three quarter is refugees. 
The population grew gradually from 260,000 in 1948-1949 to 385,000 in 
1967. Following the 1967 war, the population decreased to 325, 900 as result 
of Israeli policy of encouraging residents to leave.'" The Strip has only 
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125,000 indigenous residents i.e. those who lived there before 1948. These 
includes a small number of large scale landowners and merchants who have 
invested in citrus, hold the major interests in trading firms and Palestine 
Bank, and established few industries that exist in the Strip. The families 
dominate Gaza politically as well as economically. Indigenous, residents of 
the middle class own shops in the towns, work as teachers, doctors, lawyers, 
or operate small firms. The condition of the poorest are materially worse than 
in the eight refugee camps, where UNRWA provided basic social and 
medical services.^ ^ 
As the Gaza Strip was isolated, its people went through no process of 
partial assimilation. They are distinct through no less a part of the Palestinian 
people. This distinctiveness was the result of a whole generation of time 
under Egyptian administration but without incorporation. There was some 
democratic freedom but no freedom of movement into Egypt to relieve the 
severely overcrowded condition of the Strip." Gaza population lived in 
isolated, overcrowded and economically deprived conditions separated from 
other Palestinian communities. They were also cut off from Egypt. As a 
contribution to the solution of refugee problem the Egyptian government 
trained several thousand Palestinian youths in Cairo and permitted a few to 
settle in various part of the country. A number of Palestinian also represented 
Gaza in the Arab Socialist Union and some professionals developed a strong 
Pro-Egyptian political orientation." ^;^';' ,\ida L 
/^ ^^  s \ 
^ ,\cc. No ^~l 
During nineteen years of Egyptian rule, the economy of Gaza never 
developed and could not support its resident. The refugee could find low 
paying seasonal jobs in the orange grooves but at least half of the adult were 
unemployed and per capita gross national product was only $80 in 1966. 
Citrus was the only grov^h sector and its profits accrued mainly to the 
indigenous landed elite. The produce was exported largely to Eastern 
Europe.^* 
The West Bank was also mandated Palestine until 1948. It was 
invaded and annexed by Jordan in 1950s. It remained integral part of Jordan 
until 1967 when it was taken by Israel. West Bank Palestinians have always 
envisaged themselves as an integral part of the larger Palestinian and Arab 
communities. But growing sense of psychological, political and physical 
vulnerability to Israel has made them turn to outsiders for political leadership 
and ideological guidance. The local elites lack of resources and regions 
economic dependence on outside forces - whether Jordan, the PLO, Israel 
or the Arab countries have obstructed the emergence of viable local 
leadership.^* Until the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, elite control local politics 
remained a primary feature of West Bank political life.'* 
After 1967, the West Bank and Gaza Strip political arena broadened 
substantially. Conspicuous growth in higher education, exposure to mass 
media, labour mobility and emergence of new mass based social forces 
brought for reaching changes in the West Bank and Gaza Strip social fabric. 
In particular the expansion the University education, the politicization of the 
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student movement, the formation of several youth, women's and professional 
organization, Israel licensing of several Arabic newspapers and labour 
mobility resulting from employment inside Israel widened participatory 
politics.^^ 
The West Bank and Gaza Strip area as whole was primarily rural. The 
economy is based on agriculture, bolstered by income from tourism and by 
UNRWA payments and remittances from abroad. In all approximately 85% of 
the West Bank's gross domestic product came from the agriculture and 
service sectors. The economies of West Bank have been transformed since 
1967. This especially in agriculture and an associated profession such as 
transport, construction, and evolution of small-scale industries in urban and 
even refugees' camp area.'' 
In the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Palestinian refugees had been 
integrated in the economy and the camps were becoming urban working 
class neighborhood. Most camps were incorporated in towns. The camp 
population is mobile and now includes many non-refugees.'' In the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, the camp population did not only comprise the 1948 
refugees. There was continuous stream of new arrivals. Some people moved 
from an outlying camp to one situated close to a larger city, in order to 
improve their chances of employment. But most of the new comers while 
officially designated as a refugee have never been in camps.'" Typically, 
they had been living in towns and their circumstances have changed. Some 
have lost their livelihood. They moved in camps because there were 
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advantage to gain in the camp.'^ They paid no rent and no municipal taxes 
and their water supply and sanitation were free. 
Health dinics for instance, were mostly located in camps and their free 
services available mainly to the inhabitants. The monthly food rations, which 
the head of refugee household had to collect personally, were distributed in 
camps. 
In the West Bank and Gaza Strip, education has been the most potent 
source of influence. The concentration of refugee population has made it 
possible for every boy and girl to have the first nine years of schooling. Some 
40% of the both sexes reach the secondary education. The 9,000 teachers 
employed in the pre secondary phase, organized by UNESCO are 
Palestinians. All are well qualified and may of them are graduates. The 
education staff in each region is headed by Palestinian field education officer 
working under the guidance of the UNESCO directorate of education. In the 
West Bank 57 UNRWA schools have to operate in double shifts with 
complete duplicate staff and 75 schools in the Gaza Strip have the same 
provision. ®^  The literacy rate of the refugees is approximately same as that 
of the rest of the population. About 50% of the adult male and 80% of the 
female are functionally illiterate and UNRWA hoped that the schooling could 
give at least the children of refugees a good head start. They put great efforts 
into building up a good system of elementary school. They also established a 
few vocational schools and two teachers colleges." 
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Under Israeli occupation, there has been greater social mobility 
among refugees in both Gaza and West Bank. Because of labour shortages 
in Israel after 1967 due to rapid rate of economic growth and influx of foreign 
capital, the government took a conscious decision to use Arab labour from 
the Occupied areas. Arab transients were critically needed in certain vital 
sectors of the Jewish economy, although they provided only about six 
percent of total Israel work force. No breakdown of Arab labour employed in 
Israel as to who are refugees and non-refugees is available but it may be 
assumed that refugees provide the largest source, since they are the most 
mobile, they least attacked to permanent occupations and subsequently the 
most readily available for part time or seasonal jobs. Wage rates usually daily 
basis have been higher than those existing before the occupation in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, although the benefit are diminished because of high 
inflation that has spread from Israel to Occupied areas."* 
•One of the ironies of the establishment of the Palestinian authority 
was the continued existence of Palestinian refugees camps under its 
jurisdiction and the continuation of refugees status for Palestinian living 
under the jurisdiction of Palestinian governing authority. Although the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) issues passport and other travel documents to the 
Palestinian residing in the areas under its jurisdiction, during most of 1996, 
the Israeli authorities prevented most Palestinian from traveling into Israel or 
East Jerusalem from the West Bank and Gaza Strip without specific travel 
permifs. The Interim Agreement provides for free passage between the Gaza 
Strip and West Bank but no such corridor was agreed upon in 1996 and 
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movement between two was exceeding difficult throughout the year. Israeli 
authorities rarely permitted Gazans to travel to the West Bank and made it 
difficult for Palestinian residents of Jerusalem to travel to PA controlled areas 
of the West Bank. Travel restrictions were particularly severe for young 
Palestinian males, considered by the authorities to be security risks. 
Palestinian often does not travel abroad for fear of being denied re-entry to 
the Gaza Strip or the West Bank. Israeli authorities do not permit adult 
Palestinian males traveling to Jordan to return less than nine months after 
leaving yet generally forbid them from returning permanently, if they spend 
more than three years abroad. The Israeli authorities require all Palestinians 
residing in the areas under Israeli control to obtain travel permits before 
traveling to other countries. Visitors to the PA self-rule areas such as from 
Egypt to Gaza or Jordan to Jericho, must first obtain Israeli visas." 
Even if the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Palestinians were considered 
solely under the term of Refugee convention, they would still qualify as 
refugees. Although, a Palestinian authority has been established in the Gaza 
Strip and West Bank, it does not have sovereignty. The Oslo and Cairo 
agreements explicitly state that during the interim period the territory of 
Palestinian authority is not a state. Although, the PA issues passports it does 
not confer citizenship. In order to obtain a Palestinian passport, an applicant 
must produce an identity card and Israel controls the issuance of identity 
cards. Israel continues to be occupying power under international 
humanitarian law. The territories even the Palestinian self-rule areas remain 
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subject to Israeli military government and according to Oslo II, Israel retains 
the over riding responsibility for security.^® 
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CHAPTER - IV 
RIGHTS OF STATELESS PALESTINIAN REFUGEES 
The host country themselves under developed and unable to provide 
jobs for their own people, simply could not cope up with hundred of thousand 
of refugees. The Palestinian did not wish to assimilate in the host countries. 
Agreements between UNRWA and Arab host countries could not be reached 
because of objection by the Palestinian refugees. Knowing that they were the 
victims of injustice, they insisted that they wanted to return to their country. 
The 1948 refugees expected to return to their homes within the days 
or weeks. Many of them moved in with relatives or rented temporary 
accommodation in towns. Those who had nowhere to go squatted under 
trees in the country side or on the outskirts of towns as close as possible to 
their region of origin. Most of them were villagers, often clusters of relatives 
and neighbours, who camped together for mutual protection. As it became 
clear that the refugee would not return to their homes in forseable future, the 
emphasis gradually shifted towards rehabilitation. In this connection housing 
and education were the two areas of priority. Permanent houses would 
induce the refugee to settle in the new surroundings, while education would 
facilitate their integration in the local economy or elsewhere in the Arab 
world^ 
In general, the rights of refugees are covered by the UN Convention of 
1957 and 1967 on the Status of Refugees. But in case of Palestinians an 
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exception has been made. Those Palestinian refugees falling within the 
UNRWA mandate have been excluded from the jurisdiction of the UNHCR. In 
effect, this meant that UNHCR does not concern itself with Palestinian 
Refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, West Bank and Gaza Strip although; it 
may assist Palestinian refugees outside the UNRWA mandate. As a result, 
the Palestinian refugees under the jurisdiction of UNRWA and residing in its 
area of operation lack both the protection provided by the UN Convention 
and International Protection provided by the UNHCR.^ 
This exception proved a serious obstacle for Palestinian refugees who 
had resided in one of the UNRWA'S area of operation and then elsewhere 
attempted to seek asylum and protection as refugees. A number of Western 
countries, for instance, interpreted the article very restrictively, maintaining 
that Palestinian previously resident in one of UNRWA area of operation can 
not benefit from the 1951 Convention unless they on prove either that 
UNRWA had ceased to assist them or that they were no longer allowed to 
stay in the area concerned. Consequently, very few Palestinians have been 
able to obtain full refugee status in Europe or North America.^ 
The other instrument that deals with the rights of Palestinian refugees 
include the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948), the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954), the 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (1966) and International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). These 
instruments clearly deals with the Human and Civil Rights of Palestinian and 
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other refugees. While most host governments have officially accepted 
these covenants, they have failed to abide by them and to integrate their 
national laws* 
Another instruments which deals with the basic rights of Palestinian 
refugees is the Casablanca Protocol, which the League of Arab States 
adopted in 1965. This protocol is relevant in particular to the rights of the 
Palestinian refugees to work to enjoy freedom of movement and full 
residency status. The Casablanca Protocol was followed by numerous 
collective and individual resolutions taken by Arab states reiterating the same 
positions. Most host Arab status including Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Iraq and 
more recently Yemen issued the Palestinians with Special Refugees 
Documents (RDs). Most of the Arab states do not appear to uphold this 
principle and many such as Lebanon and Gulf States never fully 
implemented the 1965. Protocol others such as Egypt, did so inconsistently.* 
Between 1970 and 1973, the UN General Assembly adopted a number of 
resolutions in which Palestinian rights in the context of the charter were given 
in detail. They can be summed up as follows. 
1. The Palestinian Arab refugees constitutes a people who have 
inalienable rights under the Charter and Declaration of Human 
Rights.^ 
2. The people of Palestinian are entitled to self-determination and equal 
rights.' 
3. The rights of the newly displaced persons after 1967 to return 
immediately to their homes." 
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4. The right of refugees to repatriation or compensation.^ 
5. The full respect of these rights and their realisation is a condition for 
the establishment of just and lasting peace in the Middle East.''" 
Residency Status of Palestinian Refugees:-
The Arab state do not grant to a foreigner full residency status which 
includes either naturalization or permission to remain indefinitely. As for the 
progeny of foreigner neither prolonged stay nor birth in the country is 
considered a valid basis for claiming residency status or nationality. In case 
of Palestinians most countries have special provisions prohibiting 
naturalization on political grounds and in accordance with Arab League 
Resolutions. Furthermore, marriage to a female citizen of a country does not 
constitute grounds for acquiring nationality or special residency rights either 
for husband who is not a national or the resulting chlldren.^^ Jordan is only 
country which gave the refugees full residency status and full citizenship. 
Those who wanted to travel abroad could obtain Jordanian passport and the 
freedom of movement and employment is not restricted in the host countries. 
Very small numbers of Palestinian in Syria, Egypt and Lebanon 
managed to acquire the residency status, and those who did were mainly 
from families who had settled there before 1948. In Syria, the government 
established its own organisation, the Palestine Arab Refugee Institute, which 
deals with the problems of Palestinian economically as well as politically.''^ In 
Lebanian. the Palestinian who took refuge lived in legal void. They were not 
longer enjoyed the residency status. A small number of Christian 
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Palestinians were able to acquire residency status in 1950 and 1960s 
through devious means such as producing forged birth certificate or a 
Chnstians Lebanese family connections " In Saudi Arabia and other Gulf 
states, few families were granted nationality as acknowledgment of their long 
and special services to these countries *^ 
The Palestinians remaining in the Occupied Terntones after the 1967 
war were registered in the Israeli census of 1967 as "Foreign residents' 
rather than citizens An estimated 150,000 Palestinian have lost their 
residency rights since 1967 as a result of Israeli restnctions including time 
limit for reentry for Palestinian who leave the country ''' Palestinians often do 
not travel abroad for fear of being denied re-entry to the Gaza strip or the 
West Bank Israeli authorities do not permit adult Palestinians male traveling 
to Jordan to return within nine months, yet, forbid them from returning 
permanently if they spend more than three years abroad The Arab states 
continue to insist on the unconditional return all displaced persons from the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip regardless of the particular circumstances of their 
displacement The Israeli willingness to consider allowing the return of 
displaced persons is much narrower and Israeli officials are adamant in their 
refusal to consider re-admitting persons who had been expelled for political 
or secunty reasons ""^  Insecure residency status in the country of first refuge 
has become a major problem for those who left the Occupied Territories or 
Arab host countnes for work in the Gulf States Libya or elsewhere ""^  
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Rights to return: 
The right to return is regarded as the natural, inalienable rights of 
every Palestinian refugee to return to his home or if he wishes, to be 
compensated and remain elsewhere. Only in the case of criminals was its 
denial regarded as a justifiable punishment, exile or banishment being 
regarded as one of the more severe penalties. The right of individual to 
return home was taken as a corollary to the basic right of freedom of 
movement once this was established. In case where persons had been 
forced to leave their country because of 'force majure' such as war, the right 
of return could not be questioned. The right of return normally is a personal 
and individual right. 
It is fact that the Palestinians are a people with national rights, among 
them the natural right to live in their ancestral homeland." The Palestinians 
right of return has been at the center of Palestinians position on the refugee 
issue throughout the post Madrid period. Palestinians claims in this regard 
are rooted in the principle of natural justice and historical experience of 
Palestinians dispossession." 
Count Bernadotte made it one of his first priorities to try to obtain from 
Israel the recognition of the right of return of the Palestinians. The mediator 
repeated this stand in his recommendation to the UN. He said that, 
"The right of the Palestinian refugees, to return to their homes in 
Jewish controlled territory at the earliest possible date should be 
affirmed by the United Nations and their repatriation, resettlement 
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and economic and social rehabilitation and payment of adequate 
compensation for the property of those choosing not to return, 
should be supervised and assisted by the UN Conciliation 
Commission" ^ ° 
The UN General Assembly accepted his recommendation to establish 
formally the nght of return of the Palestinians On 11 December 1948 it 
passed resolution 194 (111) which in paragraph (11) categorically declared ^^ 
"Refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with 
their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest 
practicable date and that compensation should be paid for the 
property of those choosing not to return and for the loss of or 
damage to property which under the principles of international law 
or in equity should be made good by government or authorities 
responsible" 
This resolution also established the Conciliation Commission for 
instructing it "to facilitates the repatriation resettlement, and economic and 
social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation"^^ 
This resolution has represented the consensus of international 
community on the subject since 1948 It has been reiterated every year in a 
new General Assembly with the support of United States and virtually every 
member nation of the UN except Israel ^^  The Arabs insisted on the "nght of 
return" as proclaimed in UN resolution 194 (in) with its choice of either 
repatriation or compensation for those refugees not wishing to repatriate The 
Israeli's rejected UN resolution 194(iii) as a basis of discussion saying that 
the "right of return" is incompatible with Israel s right of self-determination 
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Israel also insists that any discussion of compensation be based on the 
principle of reciprocity, taking into accounts Jews who were expelled from 
Arab countries as a result of the establishment of state of Israel.^* Israel's 
unwillingness to accept this resolution has sometimes been explained in 
terms of "security". Israel does not wish to absorb Palestinians who might be 
hostile to her. But the wording of resolution refutes this argument. By not 
accepting it, Israel is rejecting in principle the Arab willing to "live at peace 
with their neighbours". The reason is clearly a desire on racial grounds to 
have a purely Jewish state free of Arabs." To most of Israelis, Palestinian 
right to return is perceived as a code word for undermining the Jewish state. 
If accepted as a general principle, Israeli's fear the influx of large number of 
Palestinian could alter the country demography and lead to the 
"Lebanonization" of Israel a violent struggle between ethnic groups for 
political control.^ ® Admitting that the refugees would be seen as security 
threat. Israel also maintains that since the number of Jews from Arab 
countries who were forced to leave the homes and property roughly equaled 
the Palestinian refugees from Israel, then it is for respective Arab States to 
absorb the Palestinian as Israel did the Jewish refugees.^^ 
Israel denies the legality of the Palestinian claim. If it recognizes the 
"right of return" it would also be admitting responsibility and perhaps even 
culpability for creating the problem. But Israel categorically denies any 
responsibility for the war of 1948.^* On the contrary, the guilt and 
responsibility are all attributed to the Arabs. Israel also rejects return for 
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material reasons. There is no possibility of allowing the refugees to 
return to their original homes and lands without completely undermining the 
fabric of Israeli society." According to Shimon Peres 
"A maxim list claim, if accepted it would wipe out the national 
Character of the state of Israel, making the Jewish majority into 
minority. Consequently, there is no chance that it will be accepted 
either now or in the future".^° 
A number of influential Israelis, however, have been open to the "idea 
of return" to the Palestinian Authority (PA) areas provided that Palestinians 
explicitly abandon claims of a "right of return" to 1948 areas.'^ According to 
Mark Heller has suggested that given the impossibilities of implementing any 
'right of return' the refugees instead would be free to return to a Palestinian 
state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip." This might be accompanied by the 
admission of some former Palestinian refugees to Israel on humanitarian 
grounds.^' Shaloma Gazit also suggested that the refugee issue be resolved 
through the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in West Bank 
and Gaza and establishment of a Palestinian "Law of return" under which 
every Palestinian in the Diaspora who wishes would receive Palestinian 
citizenship carry a Palestinian passport that would grant him that would grant 
him international recognition and rights and if need be, the right to immigrate 
to the new state.^ Certain Palestinian political organizations belonging to the 
extreme left have repudiated the resolution as illegal, being itself based upon 
the illegality of the state of Israel. According to this point of view, the issue is 
not whether Israel has a legal duty to repatriate the refugees but rather by 
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what right can the illegitimate Jewish state prevent the return of the 
rightful indigenous population By contrast overwhelming majority of 
Palestinian living in the refugee camps have always viewed Resolution 194 
as an affirmation of their right to return to their homes within Israel For their 
part the Arabs state originally voted against the resolution, but by spring 
1949, they began to revise their position and soon became its strongest 
advocates They have since invoked paragraph II as authority for an 
immediate unconditional and wholesale repatriation of the refugees " While 
addressing the socialist members of the European Parliament in Strasbourg 
in Sept 1988, PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat declared that General Assembly 
Resolution 194 called for repatriation of the Palestinian refugees or payment 
of compensation for the property of those choosing not to return Arafat used 
identical language in his speech before the UN General Assembly in Geneva 
in December 1988 and added that the PNC called for the resettlement of the 
issue of the Palestinian refugees in accordance with the pertinent UN 
resolution ®^ 
Right to Compensation: 
The Palestinian refugees have right to compensation under 
international law according to the principle of state responsibility The right of 
individuals in Palestine to compensation was recognized by the United 
Nations well before the massive exodus of Palestinian Arabs in 1948 Under 
UN Resolution 181 of November 1947 expropriation of land was prohibited 
except for public purposes ^^  
99 
Following the expulsion and displacement of some 750000 
Palestinians from their homes and lands, the right to compensation for 
Palestinian refugee was codified in UN Resolution 194 of December 1948. 
Resolution 194 affirms two types of compensation: for non-returnees and for 
damages. To implement the directives issued in Resolution 194, UN 
established the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC). In an effort to 
protect refugee properties and rights, the PCC called for the abrogation of 
the Absentees Property Law, the suspension of all measures of requisition 
and occupation of Arab houses and the unfreezing of Waqf property. The 
UN General Assembly, mean while, called for establishment of a Refugee 
Office to facilitate the work of PCC regarding both compensation and return. 
Legal expert like Donna Arzt notes that a "state that has committed... and 
internationally wrongful act is obligated to discontinue the act and restore the 
situation status quo. A state to which a claim is made must negotiate in good 
faith to resolve it".^' But it practice compensation has been a difficult principle 
to raise with the international community. Until 1990s, only states were able 
to make compensation claims against other states. As there was no state to 
press claims for stateless persons, this situation meant that stateless 
persons such as Palestinians were unable to file claims for compensation.^' 
Right to Self Determination: 
The Palestinian people have the inherent nght to self-determination, 
national independence and sovereignty in Palestine. The right of self-
determination issue is a central one in the Palestinian question. The right of 
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self-determination derives from the general principle that the people 
determine the destiny of a territory. According to UN, self-determination is the 
right of the majority to exercise power within political entity *°. The basic 
rights of Palestinian people and their right to constitute a state of their own 
are based on customary law and the treaty law which together form the 
structure of the world legal order. The right of self-determination of people 
arises independently of grant and confer up on them the international law 
right to determine their political destiny without subjection to the control of 
any state. This was formulated in the UN Declaration on Principles of 
International law 1970, in these terms: 
"All people have right freely to determines without external 
interference of their political status. These establishment of 
sovereign and independent state, the free association or integration 
with an independent state or the emergence into any other political 
status freely determined by a people constitutes modes of 
implementing the right of self-determination by that people"*'^ 
The international law recognises the right of Palestinians to their 
homeland and it bestow upon them full and inalienable right to self-
determination over pre-1947 Palestine. 
"Not withstanding Palestine failed to emerge as an independent 
state because Britain occupied it in the aftermath of the defeat of 
Turkish Empire in the World Wars, the fact remains that the 
Palestinian people enjoyed full sovereignty over their land since 
them, for according to the international law an occupying power 
does not legally acquire the sovereignty over the land it occupies. 
Besides Turkey after its defeat transferred its sovereignty over 
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Palestine to none but the local inhabitants of the country as clearly 
specified in Article 10 of the Treaty of Lusane. July 24 1923, signed 
between Turkey and the Allied powers".*^ 
The Palestinian national rights have been developed by the 
Communities of States utilising multilateral action through the League of 
Nations and the United Nations over a considerable period of time. The 
Covenant of League of Nations also accept the Palestinians as the real and 
only claimant of sovereignty over Palestine. Article 22 (4) of the Covenant 
read as follows: 
"Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire 
have reached stage of development where their existence as 
independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the 
rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory 
until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these 
communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of 
the Mandatory'*^ 
The Palestine Mandate was authorised by Article 22 of the League of 
Nations Covenant that the provisional granting of "independence" of 
Palestine could not be withdrawn by the Mandate. In short, the purpose of 
Mandate like that of the Covenant was to lead Palestine to independence as 
an undivided whole.*^ The afore mentioned article authorised the Mandatory 
only to render "administrative advice and assistance" Furthermore, the 
Mandatory lacked permanency, the basic attribute of sovereignty, as it was 
only temporarily empowered with the task of supervising the mandate until 
such time when they (Palestinians) are able to stand alone. Since, there can 
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be no two sovereigns, it can also be ascertained from the language and 
sprit of this article that the Mandatory was merely the League of Nations 
appointed custodian of sovereignty of the mandated territories and real 
sovereign powers vested with the Palestinians.*' 
U.N. and Palestinian Rights: 
Some of the UN resolutions clearly speak about the establishment of 
sovereign state of Palestine. The right to establish a state and exercise 
sovereignty is based upon the right of self-determination and subject to its 
limitations. The UN General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV) and 2625 with 
regard to the obligation of an occupant and the right of the people of the 
occupied territory clarifies that 'an occupant is obliged to transfer all power to 
people... in accordance with their free will in order to enable them to enjoy 
complete independence and freedom.*® The UN General Assembly 
Resolution 3236(XXIX) of November 22, 1974, includes the "right to national 
independence and sovereignty" among Palestinian peoples in-alienable 
rights. In relevant part, its fifth pre-ambular paragraph recognised that "The 
Palestinian people is entitled to self-determination in accordance with the 
charter of the United Nations".*' 
UN General Assembly Resolution 39/146 of the 14 '^' December, 1984 
reaffirmed Palestinians right to statehood as entitled in the UN General 
Assembly Resolution of 1977*^ UN General Assembly Resolution 31/120 
1976 endorsed the recommendation of Palestinian Rights Committee 
constituted under the UN General Assembly Resolution 3376(XXX) 10, 
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November, 1975 regarding the establishment of the state of Palestine. 
The International Conference on the question of Palestine convened at the 
UN Office at Geneva from 20'^ August to 7, September, 1983 laid stress on 
the "attainment" by the Palestinian people of its legitimate and in alienable 
rights" and peaceful existence of all regional states within secure and 
internationally recognised boundaries" with justice and security for all people. 
It is pertinent here to note that with the UN approval of a sovereign state of 
Palestinians all alternative short of statehood like the ones achieved under 
bilateral agreements, for instance, the Camp David Accord, which envisages 
autonomy to Pales tine within the state of Israel and which is cited as a 
solution justifiable under international law by many western scholar stand 
invalid. In this regard a UN General Assembly Resolution of 1979 declares all 
partial agreements and separate treaties which constitute the flagrant 
violation of the rights of the Palestinian people as illegal and invalid. The 
importance of this resolution is that for the first time a clear link is established 
between the rights of the Palestinians to self-determination and their right to 
return. The necessary legal linkage of return and self-determination is 
designed to assure Palestinians the practical exercise of national self-
determination as a people. It is based on common sense conception that 
there can be no self-determination without return to the areas where self-
determination may be exercised. The General Assembly clearly speak that 
the "Palestinian Arab Refugees" are entitled to enjoy their "right to return to 
their homes and property'" while the "people of Palestine is entitle to exercise, 
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"Its right to self-determination" The use of Palestine Arab Refugees 
when referring to return is apparently meant to stand in contradistinction to 
the use of "People of Palestine" when reference is made to self-
determination *^ 
Almost all resolutions on the subject passed by UN General Assembly 
as well as the specialised agencies refer in one way or another to legitimate 
and unalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination and 
independence The Commission on Human Rights, in particular has 
recognised the importance of self-determination as a basic human rights and 
as the prerequisite for the exercise of all other human rights The 
Commission of 1978, resolutions entitled "The Rights of People to Self-
determination and its Application to Peoples under Colonial or Alien 
Domination or Foreign Occupation", affirmed the "inalienable nght of the 
Palestinian people to self-determination without external interference and the 
establishment of a fully independent and sovereign state in Palestine" 
Furthermore, it reaffirmed their right to return to their homes from which they 
have been displaced and uprooted and called for the return of all Palestinian 
refugees as a component of their right to self-determination " 
So far, the United Nations represents the only international forum to 
have extensively tackled the issue of Palestinian rights, defined them and 
placed them in their proper perspective It has done so with the express 
support of the international community which over whelming voted for 
General Assembly Resolutions Affecting Palestinian Rights The demand for 
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specific action regarding the issue of Palestinian rights has received 
consistent recognition and strong assertion by a pre-pondrent majority of 
member states. The UN in defining the concept of Palestinian rights and in 
implementing practical steps towards their attainment has also evolved its 
own unique approach toward a settlement of the West Asian conflict.*'' 
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CHAPTER - V 
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN ISRAELI 
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 
The primary issue of human rights which arose after 1948 war 
regarding Palestinians, were two fold, the status of the Palestinians 
expelled from their country and that of those who remained behind under 
Israeli rule. The Arabs who lived under Israeli mie since 1948 can be 
considered under general discriminatory Practices, violation of property, 
enforced exile or deportation and violent assaults including massacre\ 
Violation of human rights Israeli Arabs are constant and pervasive feature 
in Israel. The Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza Strip came under 
Israeli occupation after the 1967 war. The war extended Israeli military 
rule to the Occupied areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Isral's 
violation of human rights of the Palestinians increased and were 
intensified after the war of 5 June 1967. Israel was faced with a large Arab 
population in the territory under its control, which was constantly 
challenging the occupation. Israel resorted to illegal and brutal means to 
spread ten-or, reduce opposition. Israel resorted to illegal and brutal 
means to spread terror, reduce opposition and force the submission of the 
civilian Arab population, ever through such means constituted grave 
violation of human rights^. 
The problem of human rights violations in the Occupied territory of 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip have been documented by Amnesty 
International, International Red Cross and the Israeli League for Human 
Rights. More recently, the US Department of States. Report on the 
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Human Rights Practices in the Occupied Territories has also criticized 
Israel for its failure to uphold internationally recognized standards of 
human rights. Among the violations of civil and human rights mentioned 
by these organization and other are'. 
1. Shooting and beating of unarmed individual. 
2. Expulsion from the region without specific charges. 
3. Restriction on residency rights for Palestinians who were not 
present in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in June 1967. 
4. Suppression of Palestinian culture (e.g., the use of the word 
"Palestinian") display of the Palestinians flag or the wearing of its 
four colours are considered crimes. 
5. The closure of Palestinians national institution. 
6. Collective punishment such as curfews against entire 
neighborhood, villages and districts. 
7. Intimidation of families of individual in whom the authorities are 
interested. 
8. Military censorship of all publications. 
9. Confiscation of land and natural resources. 
10. Exploitation of labour forces in Occupied Territories. 
11. Illegal settlement policies of Israel in Occupied Territories. 
12. Differential taxation policies. 
13. Restriction on economic activities. 
Israeli Practices in the Occupied tenitory have been repeatedly 
been judged to be violations of UN Charter and International Convention 
on Human Right and the Fourth Geneva Convention. Israel has refused to 
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heed these condemnations and arrogantly asserts its own convention to 
the contrary. These Conventions grant the occupying power the right to 
take measure to maintain its security. However, the Convention is that 
military necessity can not be allowed to deprive human beings certain 
elementary protection. Israel adamantly holds that these Conventions 
does not apply to the Occupied Territories*. 
In connection with this the issue of human rights, adopted in 1948, 
by the United Nation Human Rights Commission which states in Article 2 
that every human being "without distinction of any kind such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status is entitled to all the rights and 
freedoms set-forth in this declaration". Article 5 reads" No one shall be 
subjected to torture or to crucial, in human or degrading treatment or 
punishment". Article 9 add that "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
arrest, detention or exile". The Fourth Geneva Convention, formulated by 
nations of the worid precisely to protect all people under military 
occupation such as the Palestinians^. 
The United Nations Human Rights Commission has accused 
Israel, of war crimes, in Occupied Arab Territories. The UN Commission 
has also reported that the human rights violation in the Occupied 
Territories represents violations of Geneva Convention of 1949 on "the 
Protection of Civilians in War Time". On December 19, 1968, the UN 
General Assembly established a Special Committee to Investigate Israeli 
Practices Affecting the Human Rights of Population of the Occupied 
Territories. The UN Commission on Human Rights on March 4, 1969 
124 
established a Special Working Group of experts to investigate allegation 
of violation of human rights and Fourth Geneva Convention, 1949. On 
Feb. 11, 1970, this group issued a report that found substantial Israeli 
violations of the 1949 Convention and the report was approved by the 
Commission on Human Rights. Israel has repeatedly refused to pennit the 
General Assembly's Special Committed to visit the Occupied Territories to 
investigate the allegations made against it*. 
Article 55 and 56 of the United Nations charter recognize 
and protect individual human rights. The Human right charter provisions 
have been supplemented by an international bill of rights consisting of the 
Universal Declaration of Human rights. Human Rights Conventions carry 
most of provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These 
are the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, the 
International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial 
Discrimination and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide^. 
Israeli Violations in the Occupied Territories: 
Palestinians in the Occupied Territories have enjoyed since 1967 
no rights and no representative institution. There is no authority to which 
they can appeal, no protection which they can invoke. Their every 
movement and action is subjected to the artDitrary authority of Israeli 
Military Governor. They can be detained, imprisoned, deported without 
the intervention of any tribunal. Their houses and property may be 
destroyed, their land confiscated, their camps burned and their trees cut 
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down. Attempts, made by Amnesty International or by the International 
Red Cross, by private organization or individuals or even by the formally 
constituted United Nations Special Committee to Investigate Israeli 
Practices in the Occupied Territory have met with no co-operation from 
the Israeli government*. 
Israel use an array of harsh measures against Palestinians in the 
Occupied Territories such as deportation, arbitrary an^est, policy of torture, 
demolition of houses, settlement of Jews on Palestinian Land and denial 
of adequate water to Palestinians'. 
Deportation: 
It is one of the cruelest measure by which the Israeli authorities 
have consistently tried to stifle political activities in the Occupied Territory. 
It has been employed especially against those providing leadership in 
their communities. The deportation are normally carried out by Israel in 
brutal circumstances, the victims being taken blind fold to the border and 
turned loose, often in very difficult country and without food or means of 
transport, sometimes with short fired over their heads^°. 
There are two categories of arbitrary deportation, in the first 
category are political leaders active in fomenting acts of civil disobedience 
or encouraging tenrorist action against Israeli forces. In the second 
category are terrorists imprisoned for a very long period whose release 
would entail a serious security risk^V 
The first category of deportation is very effective against a certain 
class of persons mainly the organizers of civil unrest or terrorism, many of 
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them professional persons who stand to loose their clientele and 
livelihood as a result of their deportation. Organizers of protests against 
the annexation of East Jerusalem and activists in petitions and strikes 
against changes in the educational, religious and legal system were 
deported^^. For instance two mayoral candidates in the April 1976 West 
Bank municipal electrons Dr. Ahmad Hamzi and Dr. Abdul Azia were 
deported on charges of inciting the Palestinian population against Israeli 
occupation". In November 1979, the threat of deportation was posed 
against the radical mayor of Nablus, Bassam Shakr allegedly for 
supporting the PLO use of terrorism against innocent Israeli civilians. 
Massive protest including the largest demonstration in the history of West 
bank and the resignation of the many mayors from the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip as well as political considerations about the future of the 
autonomy plan for West Bank and Gaza Strip, led the Military 
Government to cancel the deportation and free the detained Shakr. 
Deportation was used in May 1980 against the mayors Fayd Kawasme of 
Hebron and Mohammed Milhem of Halhul and against the Supreme Court 
Muslim Judge of Hebron, Shaikh Al Tamami, accused of incitement 
against the state and supporting the PLO''*. 
With regard to second category the persons deported were 
saboteurs, members of terrorist organization and persons actively 
engaged on behalf of the Arab Government in acts against security and 
public order and most had been in administrative detention prior to their 
deportation, for long period of time''®. 
According to Julius Stone, stated that Article 45 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention allows for the deportation of aliens from the territory 
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of a party to the conflict. According to Haim Cohen J. suggested that any 
deportation of citizen from his country was invoilation of customary 
International Law weather the deportation are arbitrary or not. But 
customary International law, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not forbid all 
deportation but only arbitrary deportation. The European Convention of 
Human rights and American Convention on Human rights also make the 
prohibition of deportation absolute. The prohibition and deportation of 
protected persons regardless of their motives contained in Article 49(1) of 
Fourth Geneva Convention shows that this Article forbid all kind of 
deportation of protected persons in Occupied Territories for whatever 
purpose". 
Deportation were routinely used so suppress the Intifada of Israel 
announced that it would resume as deterrent to Intifada violence. Israeli 
authorities ordered four Gaza leaders of Hamas (an Islamic Resistance 
Movement) deported alleging that they were Intifada field commanders 
who had activity incited violence. Under relevant decisions of the Israeli 
High Court deportation orders are subject to judicial review and in 
accordance with these rulings, appropriate legal petitions were filed in 
these cases. The High Court justice has issued a deportation order to 
against Gaza leader, which contravene Article 49 of Fourth Geneva 
Convention". 
The situation worsened further in mid December 1992, following 
the decision of the Government of the Israel to deport over 400 
Palestinians form the Occupied Territories Clashes between Palestinians 
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and Israeli security forces rose significantly following the deportation. 
Throughout, December 1992, Israeli forces responded to civilian 
disturbances including the frequent and excessive use of lethal force. 
Following the deportation attacks by Palestinians against Israeli military 
personnel, settlers and civilians both inside Israel and in the Occupied 
Territories rose sharply"". 
Administrative Detention Or Arbitrary Arrest And Policy Of Torture 
Against Palestinians: 
Administrative detention is defined as the internment of individuals 
by administrative proceedings i.e., not the basis of conviction and 
sentence by aiminal proceedings, or on the basis of judicial order. A 
person is arrested with a view to initiating such criminal proceedings. 
Administrative detention is the confinement of individuals by the 
administrative authority according to administrative process. According to 
Israeli military authorities, administrative detention is not intended as a 
political but as a security detention. Israeli authority maintain that 
administrative detention is used only against persons recently and 
repeatedly engaged in actions threatening security and that political views 
and activities are not ground detention. Many individual including 
academics, journalists and Human Rights Workers who have not engaged 
in or advocated violence or other acts threatening security, have been 
detained. Israeli officials have confirmed that in some instances release of 
detainees is dependent upon the behaviour of the people in the area 
where the detainee lives". 
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Israeli officials state that administrative detention is used when IDF 
legal advisors have determined that there is sufficient evidence to detain a 
person and that the evidence has been conroborated. Most administrative 
detention orders are for a six-month period. The maximum length is 12 
months and several dozen Palestinians have been detained on 1-year 
warrant. Each detention order is subjected to judicial security with access 
by court to all evidence including secret evidence and each order must be 
approved by the Minister of Defense. Approximately 10% of all detention 
were extended beyond original term. Israel denies imposing 
administrative detention of Palestinian for the expression of political views 
or non-violent activity, claiming that administrative detention is imposed 
only for activity that is both dangerous and serious^". A detainee has right 
to see lawyer as soon as possible. However, in the case of security 
detainee, an officer may issue a written order to delay access to council 
for no longer than 15 days for reasons of security or the efficiency. Higher 
ranking officials or judges may extend this period by upto 75 more days 
for the same reasons. In Practices, security detainees are usually denied 
access to lawyer during the initial investigation for a period of 7 to 15 
days. Israeli regulations permits prisoners to be held in isolation from 
family and from other detainees during interrogation^''. The Palestinian 
claim that Israeli authorities does not attempt to post notification within 48 
hours. They asserts that families and lawyers are nomnally notified must 
later and often locate the detainee through their own efforts. The 
International Committee for Red Cross attempts to help by passing on to 
family (telephone) the information it receives from Israeli prison officials. A 
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military judge may delay notification of arrest to immediate family 
members attorneys and consular officials under the law for upto 12 days. 
A military judge is empowered to extend this period in security cases for 
an unlimited period. Crucial information about the reasons for detention is 
almost invariably with held by the authorities from administrative 
detainees and their lawyers. This seriously implied any meaningful 
exercise of the right to challenge the detention" 
About 25000 Palestinians, including prisoners of conscience were 
arrested in connection with the Palestinian uprising. The Occupied 
Territories. Over 4000 served periods in administrative detention without 
change or trial, several thousand other were tried by military courts. At 
least 45 Israeli pensioners of conscience were held most of whom were 
conscientious objectors to military service thousands of Palestinians were 
beaten while in the hands of Israeli forces or were turned or ill treated in 
detention centre^'. 
For example, Prisoners of consciences held in administrative 
detention included Semi-al-Kilani, a writer and post detained between 
April and October 1991 and Faisal Husayni, a leading Palestinian figure 
who was released after 18 months detention. Other administrative 
detainees included Badrain Jaber, a teacher held under consecutive order 
since March 1988 and Ribhi Haddad, a laborer since March 1988 and 
released in November 1989. Thousands of Palestinians have been tried 
by military courts in the Occupied Territories. Some have received 
sentences of upto five years imprisonment for stone throwing and upto 
nine years for throwing petrol bombs. Amnesty International called for the 
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release of prisoners of conscience and for administrative detainees to be 
released unless they were given an adequate opportunity to challenge 
their detention. It also delivered an oral statement to the UN Commission 
on Human Right about human rights violation inOccupiedTerritories^*. 
Torture has been routinely used by Israel against Palestinian who 
have been detained by security forces. It is a widely accepted fact that 
Palestinian Arabs have been beaten and tortured during their 
interrogation. Some of the victims reported that they have lost 
consciousness during the beating. Some of them claimed both 
psychological and physical torture. Some of the victims also reported that 
the torture included immersion in cold water, hanging by the hands and 
feet and various forms of sexual sadism, beating on genitals, inserting 
bottle into the rectum, threatening to bring females of the arrested person 
for public rape in the prison". In October 1990, Sha, Wan Jabarin, a 
humanist workers held in administrative detention said in an affidavit that 
he had been severely beaten and burned with cigarettes several time by a 
soldier while he lay on the floor in detention center in Hebron. Mahmud al-
Masri died of a perforated stomach ulcer in Gaza prison in March 1990 
while being interrogated by the general security services. Khalid Shaikh 
Ali died in the same prison in December 1991 due to internal bleeding 
from the abdomen". 
Demolition/Sealing of Houses 
It is one of the harshest violations of human rights in the Occupied 
Territories. The presence of the saboteur in the house or the presence of 
sabotage material in the house can lead to its sealing or demolition. If the 
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house did not belong to the terrorist it could be demolished for the owner 
knowledge of the presence of the saboteur or of the sabotage material. 
According to the ICRC upto 1978 1,224 houses had been demolished or 
sealed up since 1967^^ . According to US Department Reports of 1996 on 
Human Rights in Occupied Territories this number had gone up to 2300. 
Military authorities in the Occupied Temtories may enter private 
Palestinian homes and institution without warrant in pursuit of security 
objectives. Israeli authorities claim that forced entry may lawfully occur 
enter is resisted. Under the presently applied regulations, military 
commanders may order the demolition or sealing of any house from which 
they suspect a firearm has been discharged or bomb thrown or any house 
situated in an area, town, villages, quarters or street whose inhabitants 
have committed offenses against the regulations. Authorities asserts that 
they demolish or seal only those houses Occupied by Palestinian known 
to have actively participated in a murder or caused serious physical 
injury^ .^ In many cased public institutions have also been sealed a 
number of times for security reasons. 
Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations and Article 53 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention both permits destruction of enemy property when 
absolutely required by military necessity. But these conventions forbid the 
destruction of private property. The Israel action therefore has been 
criticized by the UN and international community time and again but Israel 
had paid little heed to international condemnation^'. 
The Palestinian in the Occupied Territories have also been 
subjected to curfew, mass identity checks, school closures and seizures, 
business closures and confiscations, roundup of searches and arrest, 
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trade and travel restrictions, closed areas orders and action involving the 
families of the suspected terrorist. All these measures violate Article 33 of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention which prohibit collective penalties and 
reprisals against the populations in Occupied territory^". 
Exploitation Of Palestinian Labours from Occupied Territories: 
In the Occupied Territories, there is a surplus of unemployed 
or under employed labour among the Arab population. Thousands of 
Palestinian from labourers also works on Israeli farms where they are 
under paid and are generally abused. The worst case of exploitation and 
abuse involve Palestinian children as young as eight and ten years old 
who work for Israelis. All workers from Occupied Territories have to carry 
identity cards where they are required to show on demand. They are in 
Israel only as migrant workers and must returns to the Occupied 
Territories every night. There are estimated 30 thousand unorganized 
workers who gather every morning to go to work in Israeli farms. Forty 
percent of their wages is deducted for insurance funds, yet they are 
entitled to no benefits and do not receive any benefits. In shorts, in many 
economic respects, the workers of the Territories are a treasure for the 
Israeli economy". 
Arab labour was largely responsible for building the Jev\/ish 
settlement in and around the Jerusalem and Hebron and the wages they 
are paid are far below the minimum wages paid to Israeli labour. The 
Occupied Territories not only served as a source of cheap labour but 
provided Israel with markets for its goods. Since the occupation., Israel 
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has increased sixfold its exports to the Occupied Territories malting these 
Territories the second largest market second only to the United States. In 
classical colonial fashion, the economies of Occupied areas are distorted 
to serve Israeli interests^ .^ Palestinians agriculture has also been distorted 
to serve Israeli interests, in addition to being divested by massive land 
expropriation, expulsion, and displacement. Palestinian crops have been 
destroyed by petrol, sprayed poison on fields, thereby, destroying many 
acres of wheat, barley and olive groves. However, instead of opening 
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opportunities in Israel to all Palestinians in the Occupied areas it has 
especially excluded skilled and professional workers. This policy is clear 
violation of Article 52 of the Fourth Geneva Convention". 
Israel's Policy of Jevvish Settlement in the Occupied Territories 
Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is now more 
than 33 years old. Since it early days, this occupation has followed a 
colonization policy aimed at establishing settlements and exploiting every 
advantage possible in theOccupiedTerritories'*. After the occupation of 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, Israel has adopted a policy 
incremental annexation of Palestinian lands by establishing Jevi/ish 
settlements in the Occupied Territories. The establishment of Israeli 
settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip seems to follow the long 
adopted Zionist policy of obtaining political ends by bringing Jewish 
immigration to Palestine. After the 1967 war the Israeli government have 
requisitioned half the area of the West Bank and Gaza Strip for numerous 
purposes such as military, housing, agricultural, establishing industrial 
plants and wori^ shops and construction of extensive network of road^*. 
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It is obvrous that settlements in West Bank and Gaza Strip have 
political purpose in that they aim to create fait accompli which would 
change the demographic balance and geographical composition of the 
Territories in question. They would also breakup the contiguity and 
encircle the densely populated Arab areas situated along the West Bank 
watershed. The main purpose of these settlements are to solidify the 
option for an Israeli annexation of at least part of the West Banks. Thus 
the adherent of demographic security approach support the establishment 
of a large number of Jewish settlements that would be scattered 
throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip'^ 
Jewish settlement in the Occupied Territories began shortly after 
the June 1967. Since the Israeli occupation, approximately 200000 Israeli 
citizens have settlement in some 200 location in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip. Which include both rural and urban area and expanded East 
Jerusalem". More than 60% of the land has been seized by Israeli 
authorities. Intensive build up of new urban and community settlement 
have taken place around Jerusalem, Hebron, Nablus, Jenin and other 
Palestinian cities in Jerusalem and Habron Jewish settlement were 
established inside the cities themselves''. The settlements which are 
located on land purchased or confiscated from Palestine are frequently 
established on the tops of hills overlooking Palestinian villages. Their 
existence is a constant thorn in the Palestinian side. Since 1987 a 
succession of Israeli government had supported settlement activity in the 
Occupied Territories citing various security, religious and nationalistic 
justification^^ The first settlement in the West Bank outside of the East 
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Jerusalem were justified on the basis of plan designed by Yigal Allon, 
which was intended to achieve maximum territorial increase for Israel 
with minimal increase in Palestinian population. In other words, Allon 
wanted to built settlements on and eventually annex as much of the West 
Bank as possible to provide "defensible borders" without having to add to 
the Palestinian population of Israel*". The initial Israeli settlement was 
based on the strategy and political concept combodied in the famous 
Allon Plan.. It was submitted tentatively in July 1967 and the plan was 
approved by Israeli Cabinet in June 1968. Allon argued that the 
permanent borders of Israel must be defensible from strategic point of 
view and had to depend on topographical obstruction to withstand modem 
armies. As results, these security borders had to become political 
borders. To achieve, this end, Jewish settlement had to be created in 
these areas. The labour government supported this plan and called for the 
establishment of Kibbutzim and Moshavim in the designated areas. These 
early settlement were based on agriculture and light industry. By 1971, 
ten settlements were built and within five years, two chains of settlements 
were established. All of these settlements were forms and produced 
winter vegetable, bananas and citms and flowers*V Residents in any of 
these settlements could easily commute to their jobs in Jerusalem or Tel 
Aviv and still benefited from the generous housing subsidies provided to 
the settlers. Many of the rural settlements are small but nonetheless 
require the full component of services, roads, water, electricity, schools, 
health clinics. In the Occupied Territories, Jews now make up 
approximately 13% of the total population of the Territories. In East 
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Jerusalem, the Jewish population has even surpassed the Palestinian 
population. About one half of the land in the West Bank has been 
dedicated by the Israeli authorities for Israeli use, although currently 
Israeli settlements occupy only a fraction of this land. A land about one 
third of land in Gaza has been reserved for Israeli use^ .^ 
Apart from the Israeli government directly building settlements, 
Jewish organisation have also been carrying out settlement activities with 
government backing. The same official Jewish settlement of Tekaoh, Ofra 
and Qaddum, were sponsored by Gush Emunim (Faith Bloc), a Jewish 
religo-political organisation zealously committed to the idea of West Bank 
being an inseparable part of the divine ordained land of Israel. Supporters 
of Gush Emunim considered the settlement and eventual annexation of 
the entire West Bank and Gaza Strip, to be religious duty. They were in 
large part responsible for the dramatic increase in Jewish settlement in 
the Occupied Territories. It was created in early 1974 and acted as 
pressure groups to gain governmental approval for more settlement 
especially in the West Bank region of Samaria**. It was made up of right 
wing nationalist and ultra-orthodox religious groups and received the 
support of Likud party. From 1974 to 1980 it was the pioneering activities 
of Gush which led the way and defined the ideology in settlement 
activities. Dozens of new settlements were established in the central 
massif and Western foothills of the West Bank. This settlements were 
semi-Urban**. 
In May 1977, when Likud government under the leadership of 
Menanchem Begin came to power, a strong settlement movement was 
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under Begin embarked on a steady and energetic policy of permanent 
incorporation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip into Israel. The core of this 
policy was rapid expansion and diffusion of Jewish settlement and land 
acquisition^^. 
By September 1983, 106 Israeli settlements had been established 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (excluding East Jemsalem). Of these 98 
were located in West Bank and the other eight were situated in Gaza. By 
summer 1983, there were 12,731 housing units in the Occupied 
Territories either Occupied, vacant or under construction. The number of 
families settled in West Bank by September 1983 was 6000 (275,00 
people) while 200 (900 people) were living in Gaza. Jewish families 
tended to be scattered throughout the West Bank region while the Jewish 
population in Gaza was clustered in the south-west coastal line*^. By 1988 
there were already about 140 Jewish settlement in the Occupied 
Territories, housing about 140,000 people and more were planned 
Palestinians on small farms and in villages were being surrounded by 
aggressive Jewish settlers. Which made them feel harassed and 
intimidated. It seemed that there was an Israeli master plan to deprive 
them of their land and homes. At the time all Palestinian movement 
between the Gaza Strip and West Bank prohibited. It was hope that with 
the signing of the 10 allow in 1993, settlement activity would come to the 
west. But this has not happened. The Israeli government announced the 
creation of a pemianent new settlement in the heart of the Hebron and 
expansion of two settlements in Jerusalem and Nabulus. It was also the 
Israeli plan to expanded the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem and 
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establish an umbrella authority to include a number of illegal settlements. 
This represent a conaete step towards the illegal annexation of more 
Occupied Palestinians land maintaining a specific demographic 
composition with the aim of furthering the process of the Judaization of 
the city*^ 
Despite the restriction imposed in Oslo Accord and Popular 
Declaration prohibiting the parties from carrying out any activities that 
would alter the character of Occupied Territories settlement activity 
continues unabated. When Netanyahu came to power in May 1996, 
settlement activity assumed an overtly aggressive posture*^. Netanyahu 
earmarked half billion US Dollars for investment in settlement activity with 
key focus being on the East Jerusalem area and the old city. The 
settlement projects at Jabal Abu Ghanien and Silwan have focused 
international attention on Jerusalem. It is projected that the settlement at 
Jabal Abu Ghanien called Har Homa is intended to house nearly fifty 
thousands Jew. There are also plan to expand the massive settlement of 
Maale Adunim on the outskirts of Jerusalem. There has also been 
settlement activity in Yakir and Barkan all in Nabulus area as well as in 
other places. The settlements bring with them attended infrastmcture like 
industrial zone and bypass roads that further aggravate Palestinian 
losses. They are also a means of maintaining ultimate military control as 
they dissect and isolate Palestinian population centres*'. 
The international law has placed certain restrictions on the action 
of belligerent occupying powers against civilian population under their 
control such as forbidding confiscation of private property. These 
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restrictions and others were codified in the 1949 Geneva Convention 
relating to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. The Article 
49(6) of the Convention says that "a belligerent occupying power shall not 
make any changes in the laws, institution or government of territory or 
place civilian settlements into the territory which it occupy". In other 
words, land may be used by the occupying power only for military reasons 
and only military occupation may move in. It is on this basis that most 
international legal institution or scholars have condemned Israeli 
settlement activities". 
The intemational community has repeatedly expressed its strong 
opposition to the Israeli policy of confiscation, colonizing and settling in 
Arab lands. The UN Security Council in 1979 adopted a Resolution 446 
which determined that the Israeli policy and Practices in establishing 
settlements in the Occupied Territories has not legal validity and 
constituted a serious obstruction to achieving a just and lasting peace in 
the West Asia. In Venice Declaration of June 1980, the EEC countries 
stated that the Israeli settlements constitute a serious obstacle to the 
peace process in West Asia. They consider that these settlements, as 
well as modifications in population and property in the Occupied 
Territories and illegal under International law^V 
Israel's Water Policies in the Occupied Territories: 
Israel is perpetually in a need of water resources in order to meet 
the ever inaeasing demand for water caused by the constant influx of 
immigrants and the establishment of new settlements. Every new 
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acquisition of water has been made at the expenses of the Arabs and 
particularly the Palestinians. This has led to further escalation of tension 
in the region. After taking over river waters, and exhausting all the surface 
water resources. Israel turned to exploiting the subterranean waters in the 
West Bank, claiming that she has rights to these waters, as they are 
important sources feeding the subterranean waters in the West Bank in 
order to meet the need of the settlements there. Israeli acquisition of 
water resources have aeated more difficulties for the Arab inhabitants 
and this has helped Israel to seize more land and water and depopulate 
the West Bank'^ 
The first of the major water sources secured by the Israelis in 1967 
was the water from the catchment basin of the West Bank itself. Most of 
the rainfall in the West Bank penetrates the soil and reaches aquifers 
beneath that stretch up to Israel proper. An estimated annual volume of 
some 200 million cubic meters of West Bank water flows into the coastal 
reservoir that had already begun to be exploited by the Israelis in the early 
1950". These aquifers are integral parts of an elaborate system of 
extraction and injection well sited along the coast between Eshkelon and 
Haifa. The sustained recharge of these coastal reservoirs is critically 
important to Israel's water balance because it permits her to withdraw the 
same amounts from the coastal aquifers for consumption in Israel. 
Seizure of the West Bank was thus, the prerequisite to ensure that this 
flow of Arab water would remain available for Israeli consumption^. 
Preemption of this aquifer is in fact much more important than the more 
frequently discussed squabbles between Israeli settlers and Arabs 
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residents over the existing wells on the West Bank. By controlling the 
West Bank the Israeli military administration can guarantee that the Arab 
inhabitants do not develop this indigenous water resource. The 
Palestinian people thus were deprived twice of their right to the water. 
First, when they were expelled from their villages and agricultural lands, 
thus losing their means of livelihood and becoming refugees and 
secondly, then Israel seized the Jordan River waters and banned the 
irrigation of new lands in'the West Bank®'. 
Mekorat, the Israeli National Water authority has been responsible 
for the public water supply in the West Bank and Gaza Strip since 1967. 
Control of water was a key factor to the political and economic control of 
the Territories during the first years of the occupation. The water rights of 
the Palestinian farmers were already enaoached upon by the Israeli 
authorities. Israel's political attitudes towards the political future of the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, its rejection of the establishment of a 
Palestinian state there, and its insistence on retaining them appear to be 
partially attributable to the water factor in these Palestinian Territories. It 
seems to be difficult for Israel to accept a political settlement in the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip that would result in its relinquishing of its control 
over water resources in these Territories. Moshe Dayan has said that 
Israel will continue to control the water resources in Judea and Samaria 
(West Bank) which constitute the main water resources for the coastal 
plain and that, the Arabs in Judea and Samaria would not get more water 
than they had today". 
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Before 1967 Israel had been pumping away from the West Bank's 
water supply, some 500 million cubic meters annually by means of 
artesian wells drilled in Israel. This constituted approximately one-third of 
Israel's annual water consumption before 1967 and it constituted five sixth 
of the West Bank water^. 
Israel has imposed severe restrictions on Arab inhabitants wishing to dig 
wells, while allowing Zionist settlers to proceed unhindered. It is 
noteworthy that the average water consumption of the Israeli settlers in 
the West Bank equals about seven times the consumption of the Arab 
inhabitants there. These arbitrary measures have had serious effects on 
the living conditions of the people under occupation. 
No well can be sunk by a Palestinian in the West Bank without first 
obtaining a permit from the representatives of the water commissioner at 
the military government offices. The Israeli authorities, have been 
completely prohibiting Palestinian farmers from drilling of any new wells 
for irrigation purposes since such drilling would be carried out in the area 
whose aquifer Israel is exploiting through the artesian wells in Israel.^' 
Water meters have been placed by the Israeli authorities on existing Arab 
wells to keep a daily check in order to maintain the limitations imposed on 
the amount of water the Palestinian are permitted to use." According to 
Israel's military order 158 of 1 October 1967; no water installation was 
allowed without a license from the military commander. The Israeli Area 
Military Commander thus has complete and absolute control over access 
to water throughout the occupied territories. The order also gives the Area 
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Military Commander the power to cancel any license or armed it or make 
it conditional or change any of its conditions as may be required.^^ 
Between 1967 and 1987 there were only five cases of Palestinians 
being allowed to sink new wells for drinking water." Not a single 
application for the drilling of wells for irrigation has been approved since 
1967. The ban on the drilling of new wells and the increasing consumption 
of water by the Israeli settlements and their fanfns have adversely affected 
Palestinian water resources. Israeli's water policy in the West Bank has a 
devastating effect on neighbouring Arab springs and wells. Israelis have 
been drilling wells in close proximity to springs and wells that existed 
before June 1967 and on which Palestinian towns and villages have relied 
on for crop inrigation and domestic consumption." 
In 1968 when the Israeli settlement of Mehola was established 
near the villages of Bardalah and Tel El Bada, Mekorat advised the 
settlement authority that the drilling of a planned well to supply water for 
the settlement would adversely affect the five wells and spring used by 
neighbouring Arab villages. Fully aware of this report, the Israel's dug the 
well. Until 1970 little effect was registered." In 1970 villages from 
Bardalah, Tel El Bada and Bardalah began reporting a decline in t he 
output of their springs and a lowering of the water level in t heir wells.^^ In 
the Gaza Strip as well as in t he Jordan valley wells for Israeli settlements 
were dug right next to springs which Palestinian farmers used for watering 
their animals, irrigating their fields and obtaining their own drinking water. 
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In some cases, these new wells wee meant exclusively for the use of the 
new settlements." 
Dr. HIsham Awartani, Chairman of the Department of Economics of 
Al-Najah National University in Nablus (1978) presented an insightful 
study of Israel's water policies in the West Bank. His conclusions are 
follows:" 
1. The total number of artesian wells in the West Bank in 331 of which 
17 have been drilled by the Israel water company (Mekorot) in the 
Jordan Valley to serve Israeli settlements in that area. 
2. Twelve Arab wells have dried up following the 1967 occupation, 
many others in the Jordan Valley (mostly in the northern part) are 
suffering a declining water level and increasing salinity. 
3. The total volume of water discharged from 314 Arab wells amounted 
in 1977-78 to 33 million cubic meters whereas the 17 Israeli wells in 
the Jordan valley discharged 14.1 million cubic meters. 
Water consumption of the average Palestinian family in the West 
Bank is estimated to be less than a quarter of that consumed by the 
average Israeli family. Many Arab villages rely totally on rainwater for their 
agriculture while Israeli farmers make extensive use of sophisticated 
irrigation system. Abedel Rahman Tamimi Director of the Palestinian 
Hydrology group, says "since 1967 Arab residents have been denied 
permission to drill for water while Israel has sunk dozens of mostly deep 
well for settlements and for military camps. All Jewish settlements in t he 
territories were supplied with running water. On the other hand, 51 
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percent of Arab villages and Hamlets are deprived of such a service and 
are obliged to rely on rain and spring water"." He further stated that "in 
some areas settlements had swimming pools, while Palestinian villages 
next door had a shortage of drinking water". There is a wise consensus 
that control of the territorial water resources is vital to Israel's well being. 
About 475 million cubic meters, i.e. one-quarter of Israel's annual water 
potential originates in the West Bank. According to Meir Ben Meir, the 
water commissioner, one quarter of the water reaching Israeli kitchens 
and farms originates in the West Bank. The annual potential of the West 
Bank aquifers is 600 million cubic meters of which Palestinian inhabitants 
are only allowed to use only 20 million cubic meters. Israeli takes 95.5 
percent and leaves the West Bank with 4.5 percent. The inequality of the 
allocation of water to Jews and Arabs can be seen in the 1990 plan in 
which 60 million cubic meters of water were available to 30 Israeli 
agricultural settlements while 90 million will be available for 400 
Palestinian villages." 
The structure of the Palestinian agricultural sector has been 
shaken and many people deserted their land because of the restrictions 
imposed on its irrigation and utilization. Shortages of water for agriculture 
have led to a sharp drop in the amount of inlgated Arab West Bank land 
from 27 percent before 1967 to 37 percent, today Israeli settlers, on the 
other hand, are irrigating 70 percent of their farm land.^" 
In sum, since 1982 Israeli national water company, Mekorat has 
been integrating the West Bank supplies into the Israeli network. It seems 
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clear that the control of these sources will not be surrendered. Therefore, 
it Is inconceivable that Israel will willingly abandon water resources, as 
these are considered essential to national security/'' 
In the Israeli occupied West Bank and Gaza strip the Palestinians 
have occasionally protested against Israel's exploitation of underground 
water resources to supplement supplies inside Israel proper and irrigate 
Jewish settlements. The Palestinians have little power to do anything but 
watch hundreds of their pre 1967 springs and wells gradually turned 
saline and then dry up while in the vicinity employees of Israeli water 
authorities have highly sophisticated water pumping and transport 
systems to inigate the Jewish settlements in the West Bank. The situation 
in the Gaza Strip is even more problematic. Heavy use of ground water 
supplied have allowed sea-water and even sewage to seep through the 
system. The deterioration in the quality of water has had an effect on 
agriculture output in the Strip." 
The General Assembly of the UN passed a Resolution on 19th 
December 1983 (Resolution No. 144) condemning Israel for her 
exploitation of the natural resources of the occupied territories and calling 
upon all states, international organizations and other institutions not to 
recognize or cooperate with or assist in any manner the measure 
undertaken by Israel to exploit these resources or to effect any changes 
in the structure of those territories." 
Human Rights Violations During the Intifada 
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The Palestinian Intifada (Uprising) began in the occupied territories 
in December 1987.^ * In earlier days, restless Palestinian youths had 
been motivated by the armed struggle but this was to be a civil 
movement. The Intifada was an explosion of frustrated energy waiting to 
happen after two decades of Israeli military occupation and all political 
efforts to improve the Palestinians conditions are moved towards 
statehood had failed. Initially Israeli countered the Intifada demonstrations 
by imposing curfews and a large military presence to overawe the 
protestors.^* However, as the uprising gathered momentum resorted to 
using live ammunition, rubber bullets, various fomis of tear gas, mass 
arrest, dismissal of democratically elected mayors, expulsion of scholar 
had teacher, closing down of colleges and universities dispersion of 
student demonstration with weapons and ban on cultural activities of the 
Palestinians." Various degree of economic punishment like ban on fuel 
and closure of shops etc. were also apply to force the Palestinian into 
submission. International telephone line, electricity and water connections 
were also cut down in same areas. Students faced schools closures, 
restricted access to higher education and minimal career opportunities, 
professional faced high taxes reiteration on their practices and limited job 
prospects in the occupied territories. Israeli authorities also dosed down a 
number of service oriented charitable and research organization allegedly 
for their support of the uprising." At least thirty trade unions were dosed 
by military order. Other unions closed their doors themselves, fearing 
army measures and reconing that they could mere effective on an 
infomial level." 
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The Israeli occupation authorities carried out wide scale arrest, 
detention, raids on homes in which suspects were thought to reside and 
more severe forms of punishment including deportation. The other severe 
measure applied in the Occupied Territories by Israel was deliberate 
damage of property, and demolition and sealing of the individual houses. 
As a result of causalities large number of Palestinian were killed and 
thousands arrested and detained often without charge or trial. There were 
frequent complaints about condition of illtreatment.^' 
In January 1988, the Israeli Cabinet announced the imposition of 
Iron Fist policy in the Occupied Territories to quell the uprising. By this 
time their were numerous media reports of soldiers using batons of an 
rifles butts against demonstrators, of limbs being deliberately broken, of 
soldier surrounding villages or localities known to be sympathetic to the 
uprising and imposing collective punishment prolonged curfews being the 
most common. The curfews affected the socioeconomic condition of 
Occupied Territories. The education of youths suffered in the Occupied 
Territories as a result of curfew, strike and closure order relating to the 
Intifada. Another forms of collective punishment was the ban on 
harvesting and marketing crops.®" 
Retaliatory measures against the Palestinians demonstrators 
continued including forcibly closing shops and markets preventing fuel 
and food from reaching offending refugee camps and with holding petrols 
filling stations. The Israeli military announced new measures against the 
Intifada, including the use of fire arms by Israeli troops even when their 
lives were not in immediate danger and inaeased use of collective 
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punishment, meaning the demolition or sealing of houses and the 
confiscation of property. Palestinian automatically refused permission to 
rebuild demolished houses.®^ 
Although Jewish rural settlements in the Occupied Tenitories were 
protected by the army, some produced band of vigilantes, that not only 
mounted protective patrols but occasionally took retribution into their own 
hands by raiding Palestinian villages and farms. 
Confrontation continued between gangs of Israeli settlers and 
Palestinian leading to reprisal raids on building and crops. Israeli settlers 
occasionally came into conflict with their own security forces, and some 
times barricaded their settlements against them. On one occasion 11 
March 1988, a Jewish group from Kiryat Arba swarmed into nearby 
Hebron, damaging homes and cars. The Army had to be brought into to 
evict from the dty. The culprits were members of Gush Emunim, a radical 
Jewish organization whose policy was to evict all Palestinians from Eretz 
Israel, and their excuse was that it had been a pre-emptive action to 
prevent Palestinians from marching on the local synagogue.^^ 
Palestinian Authority (PA) and Human Riglits 
Israel and the Palestinian Authority have consistently violated 
human rights in the name of security since they signed their first peace 
agreement in 1993. The human rights situation in the area of West Bank 
and Gaza Strip that were under Palestinian self mle deteriorated steadily. 
Intolerant of internal opposition to its policies and under intense pressure 
from Israel and the United States to "combat terrorism", the PA conducted 
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mass and often arbitrary arrests of suspected militants and opponents of 
the peace process 83 
The PA has been responsible for internal security in much of Gaza 
and Jericho, following the 4 May 1994, singing of the Gaza-Jericho 
agreement by the government of Israel and Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO). The PA now rules over 60% of the West Bank and 
Gaza population . By strictly limiting the boundaries of PA power, the 
'Oslo Accords' have denied the PA those powers (e.g., sovereignty) to 
mobilize people around a state building projects by maintaining effective 
control of the economy and pursuing unrestricted access to international 
market. Yet, the PA has been given all the power and resources needed 
to physically punish its people.** 
The number of security agencies which appeared accountable to 
no one but Palestinian Authority President Yasir Arafat, encouraged 
abusive conduct. The security forces routinely beat and dispersed 
demonstrator demanding the release from Palestinian custody of 
uncharged detainees. Palestinian Security forces raided the camps of an-
Najah University in Nebulous where students were protesting the large 
scale arrests by both the PA and Israel. Security forces fired their 
weapons in the air, beat students with clubs and used tear gas against the 
student.*^ 
Beginning in August 1994, the Palestinian Security forces have 
frequently conducted dragnets that have swept up hundreds of 
Palestinians at a time. Most commonly these sweeps have followed 
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deadly attacks against Israeli military or civilians and consequently 
pressure from Israel and United States on the PA to crackdown on groups 
openly hostile to the Oslo Agreements, particularly, the Islamic 
Resistance Movements (Hamas) and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In 
dozens of cases, the Palestinian Authority has detained persons at the 
specific insistence of the Israeli authorities. They have been detained in 
most instances, because of their non-violent opposition to the agreement 
negotiated between the Israeli and PA or on the basis of their affiliation 
or suspected affiliation with non military branches of Islamist 
organizations. There have been a systematic failure to bring detainees 
before a judge with forty eight hours required by the aiminal 
procedures law in effect in Gaza and the West Bank and to provide 
prompt access to legal counsel.^* 
The Palestinian Authority's security forces arrested more than 1200 
people on security ground including prisoners of consciences. Those 
detained included over 900 people arrested after the suicide bombing in 
Israel in February March 1997, by Palestinian groups opposed to the 
peace process with Israel which resulted in 63 deaths." Detainees were 
rarely charged with any offence or brought before a judge within a legal 
limits laid down by Palestinian law. Among the prisoners of consciences 
arrested during the year were human rights activists. Bassem Eid, a field 
workers of Israeli Human Rights Organization. Dr. lyad-al-Samraj 
Commissioner General of Palestinian Independent Commission for 
Citizens Rights was detained for making statement critical of the 
Palestinian Authority. He was held in Gaza Central Prison and charged 
with possession of drugs. Mohammad Dahman, Director of al-Damir a 
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Human Rights Organization was detained for 15 days, charged with 
incitements by spreading false infonnation after the organisation issued a 
communique suggesting that a detainee had died as a result of torture. At 
least 20 political detainees received unfair trial before the State Security 
Court. Trails were often summary and there was no right of appeal.*^ 
Although, there was no formal censorship of Palestinians 
newspapers the PA has imposed increasing restriction on right of free 
expression. There have been a numerous detention of Journalists usually 
for brief periods as also threat violence against reporters, editors, and 
publishers. The PA has sent clear warning against criticism when its 
forces detained Al-Quds (Jerusalem) editor Maher Alami, who had 
refused PA ordered to publish an article critical about President Arafat. 
The PA has been responsible for a number of arbitrary and repressive 
measures. There have been several incident of lawless behaviour on the 
part of its security forces and distributing absence of serous efforts to 
uncover abuse and to hold accountable those responsible." 
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CHAPTER - VI 
PALESTINIAN REFUGEE AND THE UNITED 
NATIONS RELIEF WORK AGENCY FOR 
PALESTINE REFUGEE IN THE NEAR EAST 
(UNRWA) 
Seeking to lession the plight of all the Palestinian refugees and 
displaced persons, the General Assembly in December 1949 established the 
United Nations Relief Work Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near 
East (UNRWA) as a temporary body pending the resolution of the question of 
Palestinian. "• On 8 December 1949 the General Assembly passed a 
Resolution 302 (IV) to give effect to the Economic Mission recommendation. 
The General Assembly established the United Nations Relief Work Agency 
for Palestinian refugees in Near East (UNRWA) to take over functions of 
UNRPR. It also provided for the establishment of an advisory commission to 
assist the Director of the Agency in the execution of its programme. In the 
enabling, resolution it was recognized: 
"That without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph (II) of the 
General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 
continued assistance for Palestinian refugees is necessary to 
prevent conditions of starvation and distress among them and to 
further conditions of peace and stability and that consen/ative 
measures should be undertaken at an early date with a view to the 
termination of international assistance for relief.^" 
UNRWA is exclusively a refugee v^^elfare organisation, established in 
1950 by the United Nations and designated as a temporary non-political 
organs of the United Nations General Assembly.' The UNRWA has been 
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functioning in all the refugees areas of the West Bank, Gaza Strip as well as 
in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan* It started its operations by taking over some 
50 camps that had been put up earlier by voluntary agencies to 
accommodate the refugees with 17000 employees, the largest operation in 
the United Nations system. It operates in the West Asia on the basis of 
accords agreed with governments of Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, since 1967 
with the Israeli authorities of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.' 
It has become an established institution in its area of operations and 
play a central role in the lives of Palestinian refugees UNRWA is not only an 
agency which proves valued services but also the symbol of international 
commitment to their welfare and to a just resolution of their plight.* 
After the establishment of UNRWA, it was given funds and authority to 
carry on relief and works projects for only eighteen months because there 
was then great expectation that the Arab-Israel problems would soon be 
solved by final peace treaties. Although, no significant progress was made in 
dealing with any of the major Arab-Israeli disputes, on December 2, 1950, 
the UN General Assembly extended UNRWA's mandate for only one year.^ It 
received a dual mandate from the United Nations under a resolution passed 
in December 1949, to provide relief based on need and to conduct relief 
measures to assist in the economic rehabilitation of the refugees.' It has 
been crucial to the improvement of health standards and to the large 
educational advances among the Palestinians. Almost 60% of budget is 
spent on education, 16% on health and 24% on relief services.' It gradually 
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extended its range of services to other areas such as social welfare, water 
and sanitation. It recruited temporary staff from among the refugees and 
rapidly became the chief purveyor of aid and welfare to the refugees, almost 
displacing other welfare organisation.''" At first, the major burden of support 
for the refugees was borne by three Western powers, the USA, Britain, and 
France. Later West Germany too began to send large donation to the 
refugee organisation. In contrast, ail communist States with the exception of 
Yugoslavia, have refused to make any financial contribution to the UNRWA. 
It has improved living conditions in the refugee camps. It has organised a 
regular supply of staple foods to the people in the camps and has 
established academic and trade schools for the children of the refugees. No 
Arab government, however, has ever agreed to integrate the refugees 
among the citizens of its own country. Through the continuing presence of 
the refugees, the Arabs hoped to force the Israelis to allow them to return to 
their old homes or recompense them for their losses.'''' 
The initial working of definition of refugees eligible for UNRWA relief 
was a person normally resident in Palestine who has lost his home and his 
livelihood as a result of the hostilities and is in need. UNRWA altered this 
definition to: A person whose normal residence was Palestine for a minimum 
two years immediately preceding the outbreak of the conflict in 1948, and 
who as a result of this conflict, has lost both his home and means of 
livelihood. This definition now extends to the children of such persons. Such 
persons must reside in one of the four countries in which UNRWA operates 
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namely Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt. On top of that there are several 
hundred of thousands Arab refugees who for some reasons or another never 
registered with UNRWA, but are still genuine refugees." 
Education: 
It is in the field of education that the UNRWA has made its most 
significant contribution. It has provided education for school population 
including general education, vocational and teachers training and University 
education." UNRWA has also awarded 600 to 800 University scholarships 
per year to outstanding refugee candidate mostly for undergraduate studies 
in Arab countries. In addition, a significant number of refugees have found it 
possible to get advanced education under the sponsorship of Arab 
governments or international voluntary organisation or through grants from 
business firms. In general, the Arab people and government, have looked 
favourably on education for the refugees, as evidenced by their co-operation 
with UNRWA^* In carrying out its task, UNRWA has elicited co-operation 
from other United Nations agencies such as the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) and United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
(UNESCO) and has been assisted by the valiant efforts of the numerous 
voluntary agencies that work in the region". The total refugees in all the host 
countries and occupied areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip has risen 
steadily from 43,000 in 1950s to the present 340,000. Besides the 
UNRWA/UNESCO schools there are 90,000 children in government and 
private schools. Out of the Agency's total staff of 16,730 the great majority of 
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local staff are Palestinian Arab.''® The UNRWA / UNESCO programme has 
also developed qualitatively. It was specially reviewed in 1970 as a part of 
the worldwide study of education in International Education year. Many of the 
priority themes then advocated already formed part of the UNRWA/UNESCO 
programmes for academic, vocational and teacher's training as well as public 
health and community development. As the UNRWA/NESCO programmes 
involves running a school system within the boundaries of host countries 
close co-operation with these government is required. Once a year 
UNRWA/UNESCO and the Arab host governments meet to consider aspects 
of the programme. It is highly important that this long established machinery 
for international co-operation is kept in being.''' 
The work of UNRWA/UNESCO in promoting education among the 
refugees has fallen into three phases: 
During the period of 1950-1955 much stress was laid up on large 
scale development projects directly assumed with refugees resettlement. 
These projects failed to achieve their purpose. In the ensuring period of 
1955-1959 UNRWA emphasised the smaller, practical self help projects 
along with basic relief. Since 1959 it has concentrated on expanding the 
much needed programme of vocational training for refugee youth, which the 
Agency had been conducting on a limited pilot basis since 1953. This 
programme is designed to develop the latent abilities of these youths to 
make them self-reliant, self-respecting and productive.'" UNRWA organises 
two years teacher training courses in four centres'". One centre for men and 
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another for women are in Jordan, the third training teachers in Lebanon and 
the fourth one is located in the Syrian Arab Republic. In the Gaza Strip the 
Agency subsidizes the training of refugee teachers at the Government 
teacher training centres in Gaza. The principals and instructors employed at 
the training centres are mostly Palestinian refugees. A number of UNESCO 
and UNRWA expatriate staff act as advisors to the pnncipals on teaching 
method and techniques. The training thus provided emphasised the 
applications of modern teaching methods and the use of education materials 
and teaching ids. Vocational, agricultural or commercial education is 
provided at eight residential centres, for which two were located in the Gaza 
Strip, three in Jordan, two in Lebanon and one in the Syrian Arab Republic. 
Two of the centres - the Women's Training centre in Romallah in West Bank 
and the Technical and Teacher Training Institute at Siblen in Lebanon - offer 
teacher training as well as vocational or technical education.^ an innovation 
for the region was the Women Vocational Training Centre in Ramallah (West 
Bank) inaugurated in 1962, offering a variety of courses in dress making, 
hairdressing, short hand and typing infant care, preparatory nursing home 
and institutional management and the teaching of home economics for girls 
refugees.^ ^ 
Since 1951-1952 UNRWA has maintained a small scholarship 
programme for refugee students in Universities and institutions of higher 
learning in the West Asia. This programme, involving awards to meritorious 
students annually, has helped meet some of the need over the years for 
young men and women qualified in professional and technical fields such as 
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medicine, engineering, science and law. A total of 2257 refugees have 
received UNRWA scholarship and graduated from universities since 1955." 
In addition, a large number of University scholarships were awarded directly 
to refugees by the Egyptian and Syrian governments. A few awards were 
made by European Government for study in their respective Universities. 
By 1954, UNRWA had begun a vocational training programme for 
small number of the refugees, who easily found employment after they had 
attained new skills. 
In June 1959, Secretary General Dag Hammars Kjold fold 
recommended the continuance of UNRWA services but he also noted that 
unemployed refugees should be regarded as an asset and not a liability in 
the future development of the region. However, when John H. Davis became 
Director of the UNRWA, he initiated a campaign to obtain funds for 
vocational training/educational purposes from private individuals and groups 
as well as from various governments. By 1960s the UNRWA was able to 
provide vocational training to an increasing number of refugees. In other 
words, the UNRWA was one of the prices and perhaps the cheapest that the 
international community was paying for the cause which it had not been able 
to uphold politically." 
During the 1964-1965 the UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Educations, 
main activity was the organization of in service training courses of UNRWA 
teachers who have not had the benefit of the professional training, in view of 
the Agency's financial difficulties. Thus inspite of considerable increase in the 
school population, only a limited number of new classrooms were built. 
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Consequently, the number of class rooms used on a double shifts basis rose 
considerably. Furthermore, in many schools the number of children per 
classroom has become excessively high. The curriculum followed in UNRWA 
/UNESCO schools continued to be largely the same as that of the 
Government schools in the host countries, the content of the syllabus and the 
textbooks being the same in both type of schools". Along with increase in 
numbers of students, improvement in the quality of education is also being 
sought by UNRWA in collaboration with UNESCO and in consultation with 
the educational authorities of the host countries.^ 
In the same period 7,225 graduates of the vocational / and technical 
and teacher training centres, while university graduates subsidized by 
UNRWA in the same period numbered 638.^ During 1970, the 
UNRWA/UNESO education programme ran 480 elementary and preparatory 
schools attended by 220,000 children. However, in 1970 it has 
UNRWA/UNESCO education and training programme for refugees that the 
agency spent the most.^ During 1971-72 UNRWA continued its programme 
of assistance to the Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, West 
bank and Gaza Strip. The economic and social council called for increased 
support for the UNRWA from the various organisation forming post of the 
UN. It also considered the need for emergency assistance to the Palestinian 
refugees. ^ ^ 
The UNRWA / UNESCO education programme operated smoothly 
with few interruption or other troubles apart from the continued prejudical 
absence of some text books in all areas except Lebanon^ .^ The UNRWA 
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educational programme is probably the cheapest in terms of impact output 
and highest in benefit cost ratio that has ever been undertaken any where." 
According to UNRWA officials the education programme has continued to 
improve through curriculum enrichment and continuous in service training of 
teachers^". 
By 1993, the UNRWA was operating 201 schools in the Kingdom of 
Jordan with total student's strength of 1,52,350. Besides this two vocational 
training centres, one at Amman and the other at Wadi Seer provided training 
to 1168 students in 27 vocational and technical courses. The Oman centre, 
in addition, to teacher training provided courses in the para-medical and 
commercial areas. The Wadi Seer Centre provided courses in the 
mechanical, electrical and building trades as well as a range of technician 
courses. In general comprehensive examination held in the summer for 
community colleges in the Jordan, the students of the two achieved 
outstanding results with success rates of 98 and 92% respectively.^' The 
Amman Training Centre offered post secondary Semi professional Training 
for assistant pharmacists, assistant laboratory technicians and business 
administrators. A new course in banking and financial management was 
introduced for 24 trainers. A hair-dressing for female trainers was offered at 
the post preparatory level.'" 
In 1993 in Lebanon, the UNRWA operated 76 schools with a student 
enrolment of 33,300. However, the generally, low academic achievement 
among Palestinian refugees in Lebanon remained a matter of great concern 
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to UNRWA. An internal evaluation with the aim of improving the education 
programme in Lebanon was conducted in March 1993 with the aim of 
improving the educational process. A separate assessment of the student 
achievement in Lebanon was conducted in May 1993 using international 
standardized tests in mathematics and science for eight grade of pupils.'^ 
The Sibling Training Centre in Lebanon provided a total of 640 training 
places, covering 18 vocational and technical courses". The centres as well 
as schools have been affected to some degree due to political instability and 
recurring violence in the country. However inspite of the critical situation in 
Lebanon for the last twenty years, UNRWA has succeeded in running its 
educational programs without any major interruption of its academic 
schedule. In 1993, in Syrian the UNRWA operated 111 schools with a total 
student population of 60,216. However, many UNRWA school premises 
remained inadequate, insufficient and severely overcrowded with 97.3% of 
elementary classes and 95.5% of preparatory classes operating on double 
shift. The agency did not have sufficient funds to carry out its planned 
construction programme alleviate overcrowding and replace rented premises. 
It is noteworthy that despite overcrowding and lack of proper facilities a 
Palestinian refugee students from UNRWA school scored 100% in the 
examination ranking first among ail pupils in the Syrian Arab Republic. 
UNRWA awarded 156 University Scholarship to outstanding students for 
study at Universities in Syria.'' The only vocational centre i.e. Damascus 
Training Centre operated smoothly providing more then 770 training places. 
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Courses were offered in the mechanical and construction trades. A new 
course in office machines was introduced. In addition, post secondary semi 
professional courses were offered leading to qualification as assistant 
pharmacist, paramedical laboratory technicians, architectural draughtsman, 
quantity surveyor, construction technician and industrial electronics 
technicians and in business and office practice. The Centre also established 
a computer laboratory to enrich the semi professional courses and installed a 
language laboratory to improve the English and Arabic language skills of the 
trainees. '* The in service training programme continued to be offered to 
teachers, head teachers supervisors and instructors to upgrade qualifications 
meet curriculum changes update teaching methodologies and develop skills 
in administration. A total of 202 education staff members enrolled in in-
service training courses.'* 
UNRWA's educational programs in the Occupied Territories were the 
worst but in the late 1980s and early 1990s, in the West Bank UNRWA 
operates 98 school with a total student strength of 4,2310. Since the 
beginning of the Intifada there were frequent disruption due to curfew, strikes 
and closures. By the end of June 1993, 14.8% of school days had been lost 
owing to genera strikes, military ordered closures and curfews. UNRWA 
temporarily reassigned teachers with West Bank identity cards to school in 
their areas of residence to help minimize the loss of school time caused by 
strikes, military ordered closures, and curfews. UNRWA developed self-
learning materials and worksheet, which wee distributed to pupils especially 
those in the most affected regions. The Agency also developed audiovisual 
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materials based on self-learning approach. Some schools in the West Bank 
remained overcrowded as a result of natural population growth and lack of 
suitable sites available to UNRWA for the construction of additional 
classrooms or schools. In the mathematics tests West Bank students from all 
school ranked 19*' among the 21 educational systems tested while in science 
they ranked 20"^ . The performance of UNRWA schools was lower than that of 
government and private schools in the West Bank. Result showed that the 
achievement of pupils in Agency schools in the West Bank had deteriorated 
greatly owing to frequent school closures since the beginning of the intifada 
and Israeli counter measures.'* In the West Bank, there are three Agency, 
training Centres, two in Ramallah and one in Kalindia, providing 1020 places 
for vocational and technical training. Courses covered the mechanical, metal 
electronic building and construction trades. All three centres also offered 
post-secondary, semi-professional courses covering the paramedical, 
construction, electronics, commercial, home and institutional management 
fields. A new course in nursing was introduced at the Ramallah Women's 
Training Centre and office machine mechanics and auto electrician courses 
were started at Kalindia. In addition the two centres at Ramallah provided 
550 places for students preparing to be school teachers. Since the beginning 
of 1988 all the three centres like other educational institutions were 
frequently closed down under Israeli military orders." 
In the Gaza Strip, the situation is no different from the West Bank. The 
UNRWA runs 153 elementary and preparatory schools in population of a 
student strength 104,709 pupils. Disruption in education remained a serious 
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problem from 1988 onwards. By the end of June 1993, 16.4% of school days 
had been lost as a result of military ordered closures, curfews, general 
strikes and other factors. The heaviest loss of teaching time took place in 
October and December 1992, when extended curfews were imposed on 
most of the Gaza Strip. To compensate for the loss of teaching time UNRWA 
continued to distribute, self-learning materials educational kits and 
worksheets to the entire schools population. In addition to those measures 
extra classes were scheduled before and after school hours. Attendance at 
those classes was mandatory, while instruction was provided by teachers on 
a voluntary basis. Throughout, the 1992-1993 school year, military incursions 
into schools, confrontations and alarming rise in the number of school 
children killed or injured also had negative impact on student achievement.'' 
UNRWA schools in Gaza Strip suffered from over crowding as a result of the 
rapidly growing student population. Many agency school especially those 
built in the 1950s, and 1960s had deteriorated to the extent that some were 
unsafe and required immediate replacement. For the first time UNRWA 
introduced short term vocational training courses of 20 or 40 weeks duration 
in areas such as brick and block laying and plastering. An in-service teacher 
training programme was offered to teachers, head-teachers, school 
supervisors and instructors to upgrade their qualification, meal curricular 
changes, update teaching mythology and develop skills in administration ' ' . 
Israelis critics charge that UNRWA education breeds anti-Israeli 
feelings. They claim that UNRWA teachers use their positions to preach 
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against peace with Israel that, educational materials are anti-Jewish and anti 
Israeli and that the schools are centres for hostile propaganda and political 
organising.*" Israeli also charges that UNRWA allows Palestinians to use the 
agency for their purposes. Palestinians charge that it sometimes co-operates 
too much with the occupation. The refugee who worked for UNRWA in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip have tried with occasional success to use the 
organisation as a buffer against the occupation authorities. Especially 
longtime employees, who have witnessed a series of interactions between 
the agency and Israeli governments recognise that UNRWA has some 
capabilities at least to impress upon the occupiers that their actions are 
internationally visible. UNRWA employees and clients seek to involve the 
agency in their efforts to control the degree to which the occupiers exercise 
the arbitrary authority over their lives.*^ 
Role of UNRWA in field of health Welfare: 
The health care programme of the Agency, which is primarily 
community health oriented provides basic health services for the eligible 
refugees population. The programme comprises curative and preventive 
medical care services, environmental health services in camps and nutrition 
and Supplementary feeding services. Its objective is to meet the basic health 
needs of the refugees in manner consistent with the humanitarian policies of 
the UN and basics principles and concepts of the World health Organisation 
(WHO).*^ Close cooperation between UNRWA's Health Department and the 
Ministries of Health of the host governments has continued and has been 
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particularly fruitful in such fields as the control of communicable diseases and 
mass immunization campaigns. Special contributions for health programme 
have been received from a variety of sources including host government, 
universities charitable organisations, commercial concerns and individuals. 
This assistance has taken the form of the provision of personnel, free 
hospital and laboratory facilities, medical supplies, supplementary food items, 
layettes, and help in immunization compaigns.*' 
The Agency's health education programme represents an important 
link between its medical services and refugee population. Through lectures, 
discussion, films, pamphlets, posters and other means information is 
disseminated to the refugees and their interests in good health practice is 
aroused. This programme is run by UNRWA health and in particular by 
health education workers. In order to protect and promote the health of 
certain venerable groups such as infants, young children, and expectant and 
nursing mothers and tuberculosis out patients, the agency provides to some 
refugees Supplements to the basic rations to which eligible refugees are 
ordinarily entitled. Sanitation facilities for the refugee in camps includes the 
provision of safe water supplies, waste disposal and drainage and the control 
of diseases vectors. However, there are serious sanitation problems in some 
of the larger camps, particularly in those adjacent to cities and town. The 
regular in-service training of the Agency's existing medical and para-medical 
staff has continued and special course have been held from time to time to 
train young refugees for para-medical work. Particular care is exercised in 
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selecting fields of training in the light of UNRWA's own operational needs 
and of general employment possibilities in the region.** 
In Jordan UNRWA provides health service to over 1 million refugees 
through a network 21 health centres and mother and child health clinics, 16 
dental clinics 18 laboratories dedicated to gynecology, ophthalmology and for 
the treatment of cardiovascular diseases and ear-nose and throat illness as 
well as 17 special care clinics for diabetes mellitus and 14 for hypertension. 
While the chronic problem of hospitalization costs for refugees remain largely 
unsolved in Jordan the provision for reimbursement of such cost were 
modified with effect from 1989 by the increasing the percentage of 
reimbushment.** 
In preparation of the introduction of family planning services in all 
health Centres during 1993, UNRWA in co-ordination with UNICEF, 
conducted nine workshops to train 130 medical and nursing personnel in 
planned parenthood education and family planning. In co-operation with 
Jordan University of Science and Technology, UNRWA held an interfiled 
workshop for UNRWA staff at Irbid in Jan. 1993. The main objective of the 
workshop was to assess the knowledge and skills of staff who possessed 
postgraduate qualification in public health and to assess future needs for 
post-graduate and in service training with special emphasis on applied 
epidimiology, statistics and computer skills.*^ 
In Lebanon, the Agency's health services have been frequently 
disrupted, especially in certain areas when heavy rounds of fighting or 
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shelling prevented access of staff on refugees to health centres. Since 1991 
the Agency's health program has shown some improvement. Four additional 
diabetes clinics and two hypertension clinics were established, bringing the 
total number of specialised clinics to eleven. In addition, a cardiac clinic run 
by specialist contracted to UNRWA was also established. The health centre 
at Shatila camp was reconstructed. Three additional dental unit were 
installed at Wavil, Saida town and Reshidich health centres and maternal 
and child health services were extended to three villages served by mobile 
team.*'' 
In the Syrian Arab Republic, approximately 315,000 Palestinian 
refugees benefited from Agency's health care services. Those services were 
provided through 21 health centres and mothers and child health clinics, 8 
dental clinic, 11 laboratories, 3 specialist clinics for cardiovascular diseases, 
obstetrics, pediatrics and gynecology as well as 21 special care clinics for the 
management of diabetes mellitus and 20 for hypertension. The Ministry of 
Health, WHO, UNICEF and UNRWA joined efforts to prepare a national work 
plan for health education in the Syrian Arab Republic. UNRWA also 
coordinated efforts and exchanged information with Ministry of health 
regarding programme for the treatment of diabetes mellitus, surveillance of 
the expanded programme of immunization (EPI) target diseases and family 
planning services. In Syria, despite modest improvements the agencies 
continue to encounter serious difficulties in securing the funding for much of 
its health care activities.*^ 
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In the West Bank, despite all obstacles, UNRWA sought to maintain its 
health operations and to attain some achievements both in the regular 
programme and emergency care programme. School health services 
however, were disrupted between 1988-1993 in all areas except East 
Jerusalem and Agency team were unable to carry out the regular 
immunization programme of school children. Fifteen additional emergency 
medical teams were established to reinforce the available infrastructure of 
the 33 health centres throughout the West Bank. Six additional health buses 
were acquired to improve the transportation of injured persons and 
equipment was procured to upgrade services and capacities in causality care 
for refugee population. Additional funds were earmarked to cover the cost of 
emergency medical supplies and extra hospitals expenses.*' 
UNRWA delivered primary health care services to some 480,000 
Palestinian refugees in the West Bank through a network of 34 health 
centres 15 dental clinics, 17 laboratories and 34 special care clinics each for 
the diabetes mellitus and hypertension. Six physiotherapy clinics operated 
jointly with UNICEF treated mainly disabilities arising from injuries. In addition 
hospital care was provided by the Agency 36 bed general hospitals where 
206 beds were reserved for the treatment of refugee patients.*" 
UNRWA delivered primary health care services to approximately over 
600,000 Palestinian refugees in Gaza Strip through a network of nine health 
centres, eight mother and child sub-centres, eight dental clinics, seven 
laboratories, six specialist for cardiology, cardiovascular diseases, obstetrics 
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and gynecology, ophthalmology and pediatrics and nine special care clinics 
each for the management of diabetes mellitus and hypertension. The joint 
UNRWA/UNICEF physiotherapy programme mainly for the treatment of 
injuhes sustained during the confrontations, continued at six clinics already 
established. In addition, UNRWA operated six maternity centres with a total 
of 60 beds, where approximately one third of all refugees' babies were 
delivered. In order to reduced overcrowding and improve the quality of care, 
UNRWA expanded afternoon shift clinics to provide full range of preventive 
and curative medical services. In 1992, the average patient load per doctor 
was 118, rising to more than 200 in several clinics. More than 2 million 
patient visits for medical consultation, dental treatment and other services 
were reported from the Gaza Strip. To improve access of the Gaza Strip 
patients to ophthalmic services, UNRWA co-financed a project to establish 
an outreach ophthalmology unit in the Gaza Strip, which would provide 
ophthalmic examination, treatment and minor surgery. In Gaza Strip, 
UNRWA undertook, a series of planning initiatives to address the immediate, 
intermediate and long term needs in the environmental health sector. A new 
department of environmental affairs was established and international 
consultants carried out a detailed study to identify strategic options for 
improvement in water supply sewerage, drainage and related works in the 
eight camps and adjacent municipalities.^^ 
Relief and social Services: 
The agency, from its inception has been charged with the dual 
responsibility of providing short term relief and long term programmes to 
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promote social and economic rehabilitation without prejudice to the right of 
the Palestinian refugee to return to their homes or receive compensation for 
their losses. UNRWA main task was concentrated on providing relief in the 
form of food shelter and clothing. However, as the refugees grew self-
supporting the agency shifted its emphasis to long term programme." The 
Agency has looked beyond short term programme aid to a longer term 
approach through which individual Palestinians, their families and 
communities would gradually strengthen their own capabilities. Material aid 
comprised food rations to provide a daily intake of 1,880 calories, blankets, 
summer and winter clothing for the children, assistance with the maintenance 
of shelters and small cash grants to meet urgent needs. The sons and 
daughters of special hardship cases continued to receive preferential access 
to the Agency's vocational and teacher training centres. After graduation, 
they are expected to provide for their families, which are then removed from 
the hardship rolls." 
In Jordan UNRWA pioneered initiatives in the community based 
rehabilitation programme of the disabled. It established four rehabilitation 
centres in which volunteers from refugees camps work with physically and 
mentally, handicapped children and their families. The rehabilitation 
programme received wide and generous assistance from the Jordanian local 
and expatriate community. Most important, however, was the commitment of 
refugees themselves. Apart from rehabilitation centres for the disabled there 
were active programmes for women that included training in the skills of 
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machine knitting, typing as well as sewing, embroidery and literacy classes." 
By the end of June 1990 previously destitute families were running small 
income generating enterprises from their homes with the help of self-support 
grants and technical follow up. Several proposals were fully developed, 
including a toy making workshop that would employ women in Jabal-el-
Hussein and two enterprises that would primarily provide work for physically 
handicapped refugees. The women's programmes expanded over the year 
and were run from 10 women programme centres. A wool spinning project 
was initiated in the spring of 1990 with UNRWA providing the premises and 
co-ordination and a non-governmental organisation the training and 
equipment^ *. 
While the socio-economic circumstances of refugees in Jordan were 
relatively stable, this was not the case in Lebanon. From 1975, when the 
country was plunged into a bloody and sustained civil war, emergency 
operations and reconstructions programs had to be mounted along side the 
regular relief assistance. The need for material assistance for destitutes 
continued to be higher in Lebanon than elsewhere. Delivery of assistance 
was frequently disrupted by localised fighting. Many special hardship families 
were unable to collect their food rations. Palestinian refugees were the worst 
affected of the economic squeeze that aggravated poverty among all needy 
groups. UNRWA also trained women refugees at the women's programme 
centres. Courses in dressmaking, artificial flower making and hairdressing 
were offered at six Women's Programme Centres". 
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In Syria, 14,244 refugees received special hardship assistance 
representing 5.22% of the registered refugee population. UNRWA provided 
the building material needed to repair or reconstruct the dilapidated shelters 
of special hardship families and community provided the Labour or the 
money to pay for it. Eight centres for women programme ran courses in 
dressmaking, traditional Palestinian embroidery, Knitting, home economics 
and health education. Income generation activities based in Women's 
Programme Centres expanded significantly over the years. Five independent 
production units and co-operatives were run by women supported by 
UNRWA through training in production, quality control, costing and 
marketing. The community based rehabilitation programme for the disabled 
concentrated on training volunteer rehabilitation workers and parents. 
Community awareness campaigns were conducted on such themes as 
prevention of childhood disability and disabling accidents. The quality of life 
of disabled refugees was improved through new arrangements such as a 
monthly distribution of Braille reading materials to sight impaired persons." 
The socio economic conditions of Palestinian in the West Bank has become 
quite unstable after the territory came under Israeli occupation. UNRWA 
supports small scale income generating enterprises in the West Banks by 
giving loans for industrial workshops, food production and essential services. 
It has also instituted several skill training programes for which there was a 
great demand. However, UNRWA regular and emergency programs have 
been frequently disrupted by curfews, strike and its relief service staff 
hampered by difficulties in obtaining curfew passes. 
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By the end of 1993/94, there were six community rehabilitation centres 
in the West Bank and additional five committees sponsored by Agency were 
also addressing issue of concern to disabled persons. In all areas, 
community rehabilitation centres placed particular emphasis on integrating 
disabled children into mainstream schools. Training of volunteer rehabilitation 
workers proceeded with the help of local specialist and international non-
governmental organisation. Agency representative continued to play an 
active role in supporting the Central National Committee for the 
Rehabilitation of the disabled including Liaison with external partners such as 
ILO." 
Of the 469, 385 Palestinians registered with UNRWA as refugees 
about two thirds of the total inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, belonged to 
families enrolled for special hardship assistance. Additional social workers 
were appointed to seek out those in need of extra welfare assistance. In 
common with other relief programmes, however, the performance of this 
function was hampered by the Israeli authorities refusal to issue the required 
number of curfew permits to agency staff. Income generating schemes, 
jointly sponsored by UNRWA and a non-governmental organisation found 
fertile ground in Gaza. Projects included seedling nurseries, market 
gardening, a small shoe factory and a workshop for the production of sanitary 
care products skills training another and other programmes. 
The women's Programme Centres run by UNRWA were conducted in 
dress making, machine-knitting, cooking and homes economics and hair 
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dressing. The opportunity for women to earn money from their homes or in 
small enterprises has grown perceptibly if slowly. The Agency has also 
assisted disabled people in Gaza to earn money through production units at 
the Training Centres for Blind and in six of the refugee camps. The Agency 
also to sponsor a number of children at specialised institutions. Within the 
Gaza Strip community based rehabilitation of the disabled has developed 
significantly. To promote employment and income generating opportunities 
for the disabled in Gaza Strip, UNRWA secured expertise from ILO in 1993." 
Role of UNRWA after the establishment of Palestinian Authority (PA): 
The signing of the Oslo Accord had profound impact on the work and 
responsibility of the UNRWA. With the establishment of Palestinian Authority 
in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho and anticipated extension of self-rule to the 
rest of the West Bank, UNRWA entered a new era in its relationship with the 
Palestinian people. 
In mid 1993, UNRWA began to prepare a forward-looking response to 
support the peace process in the changed environment, which would emerge 
in self-rule areas. Immediately, following the signing of the Declaration of 
Principles, UNRWA made a preliminary identification of projects that it could 
undertake to help improve social and economic conditions in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip, to improve the physical and social infrastructure which would 
be turned over to the Palestinian Authority in the future. At the same time 
UNRWA carried out consultations with the PLO leadership. On 6 October 
1993, at a meeting of its Advisory Commission, the Agency launched the 
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Peace Implementation Programmes (PIP). In formulating the first phase of 
the programme (PIPI), special emphasis was placed on projects to develop 
infrastructure; improve living conditions and create jobs in refugee 
communities, to provide benefits over both short and the long terms. Projects 
were to be implemented within all three of UNRWA, main program areas 
education, health, relief and social services. The agency stressed that funds 
acquired through PIP be adequately distributed in Jordan, Hebron, and 
Syrian Arab Republic. The second of the PIP phase shared the same basic 
goals of its predecessors; an evolution in UNRWA approach to increasing a 
greater degree of self reliance among refugees, increasing income 
generating opportunities to help alleviate poverty, expanding beneficiary 
participation in developing and implementing programs, supporting the 
private sector through the evolving loan funds and training for Palestinian 
business. 
UNRWA run primarily on voluntary contribution made by donor 
government. It has received contribution from about forty states. Ninety eight 
percent of the sums contributed have come from the USA, UK, Canada, and 
France. This complicates the Agency budgetary process because at the 
banging of the year the Agency is not in a position to make an accurate 
estimate of its income for the rest of year. The budget therefore has to be 
based on assumptions, which may or may not turned out to be correct. Many 
times during the last five decades the Agency had faced acute financial 
crises and has barely managed to get by.^ "* 
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In March 1972, the Secretary General made an appeal for more funds. The 
Chairman of working group on the financing of the UNRWA visited a number 
of Arab capitals. The agency followed it up with a number of steps on its own 
initiative. Special mention may be made of the approaches it made to the 
European Economic Community (EEC) as also to the specialised agency 
and other bodies of the UN system. After 1972 there was some improvement 
in the finances made available to the UNRWA but these were still for short of 
what was required." 
In the Agency's view establishing a five year financial planning horizon 
would enable the UNRWA, the donors, the hosts countries and the 
Palestinians to identify what resources would required for UNRWA to meet 
fully its commitment to provide services to Palestinian refugees in its area of 
operations. It would also help to rationalise the balance between support for 
ongoing programmes and special projects many of which would themselves 
create additional recurrent costs. Such a planning framework could focus on 
the goal of contributing to the socio-economic advancement of the refugees 
by emphasising initiatives to support greater self-reliance through the 
expansion of income generation and job opportunities. Such a trend would 
itself strengthen the basis for peace. 
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CHAPTER - VI I 
CONCLUSION 
statelessness is a phenomenon as old as the concept of nationality. 
Until the beginning of the twentieth century. However, statelessness was a 
limited phenomenon and consequently did not disturb international life. 
However, soon after the First World War this problem assumed alarming 
proportions compelling the international community to initiate serious 
deliberations on this issue. While statelessness has long been recognized as 
an important problem in international law, the desire of states to exercise 
control over stateless persons in their jurisdiction has prevented effective 
action. The indifference of national government and inaction of the 
international community has affected a large number of persons who are 
particularly vulnerable to oppression because they lack the protection 
afforded by rights of citizenship. The stateless persons are denied vehicle for 
access to fundamental rights, access to protection and access to expression 
as persons under the law. A person may be stateless at birth in the sense 
that he has not acquired nationality at birth according to law of any state or 
he may become stateless, subsequent to his birth by loosing his nationality 
without acquiring another. A stateless person can not be benefited from the 
law of diplomatic protection of nationals abroad in as much as such 
protection is available with certain minor exception, only if he has nationality. 
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More important a stateless persons cannot travel internationally as he 
is usually without passport which serves not just as an identification 
document but also as guarantee on the part of issuing state to other states 
that it will accept the passport holder back into its territory in the event of his 
being expelled or deported. It is even more important that every country is 
obliged to receive its national if they wish to return to their native country. 
Although, many refugees are stateless, statelessness is not the 
essential quality of refugees, who is defined in accepted international usage 
as a person who for political reasons has been driven from his country of 
origin or who fears the political consequences of his return. He may be 
stateless or although not technically denationalized, may have lost the 
protection of his government by refusing to return home when it is possible 
was presented. As a person without government protection, he losses the 
advantage of international rights which depend for enforcement on the action 
of his home government. Furthermore, the stateless person who is not 
national of any state is denied many of the privilege of citizen, granted 
reciprocally through treaties. Such treaty gives the citizens of one state 
privileges in other states party to the treaties, including right to work, the 
benefit of social insurance and right to education. 
Refugee may also be defined as an involuntary migrant, a victim of 
politics, war and natural calamity. In a restricted sense, refugees may be 
defined as persons who have left the territory or state of which they are 
nationals and no longer enjoy the effective protection of the state. A 
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considerable majority of stateless persons are at present refugees. These 
refugees are de-jure stateless persons if without having been deprived of 
their nationality they no longer enjoy the protection and assistance of their 
national authorities. Their legal status is determined by the legislation of the 
receiving state and with some exceptions, is equal to the legal status of its 
own nationals. 
Like refugees, the stateless persons no longer enjoy the protection 
and assistance of their national authority. Refugees have right to return to 
their original homeland but stateless person can not return to their homeland 
as they have no country to take them back, nor to issue travel documents for 
them to visit other foreign countries. Both refugees and stateless persons 
have right to form non-political and non-profit making association and trade 
union but only refugees have right to vote in favor of any political party. 
Several factors lead to statelessness, which are more or less similar in 
all parts of the world. Some of the principal factors are; wars, revolution, 
political warfare, separatist and secessionist movement. 
In the West Asian region the problem of statelessness is very acute. 
The problem emerged during the process of creation of Israel on a part of 
Palestine. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs fled their homes as a 
result of the creation of the Jewish State. The Palestinian exodus began 
soon after the UN Partition Plan and continued even after the Armistice 
Agreements were signed between Israel and Arab States in early and mid 
1949. The exodus is classified into three phases. The first phase started from 
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November 29, 1947 to mid March 1948, the second phase from late March to 
May 15, 1948 and third phase started from May 15, 1948 onwards. Here all 
but most of the biased of Zionist works agree that expulsion became 
standard policy and was carried out systematically. Over 750000 Palestinian 
Arabs who lived in the area that came under Israel control were displaced in 
the course of fighting both before and after 14 May, 1948 and became 
refugee in Jordan, Gaza Strip, Syria and Lebanon. By the end of 1948 war 
hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees were living in orchards, barns 
and caves, convents, army barracks and other places of shelters provided by 
charitable organizations. The 1948 war not only assured the existence of 
Jewish State but it also enabled this state to extend its boundaries well 
beyond those laid down by the UN Partition Resolution in 1947. This 
increased the size and created rooms for Jewish immigration and greater 
physical security. In 1948 Israel signed Armistice Agreement and with Arab 
countries that shared its borders. These agreements which put end to the 
war left many issues unsettled. Israeli territory expanded from 56.4% of 
Palestine allotted to it under the UN Partition Plan to 77.4% within 14 months 
of foundation of Jewish state. The armistice agreements while 
acknowledging territorial changes said nothing about the refugee. A UN 
Resolutions of December 1948 had ruled that those Palestinians wishing to 
return and live at peace with their neighbours should be allowed to do so. 
After the creation of Israel, the Israeli army continued to attack Arab villages, 
blew up houses and indiscriminately killed men, women and children. The 
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majority of the original population of the country was forcibly displaced and 
uprooted by a militant minority of foreign origin. Jewish terrorism and 
intimidation played a major role in the exodus of Palestinians from their 
homes in the newly created state of Israel. 
The Arab-Israel conflict of June 1967 once more threw West Asia 
tension into sharp relief and escalated the problem of statelessness in West 
Asia still further. During the war Israel occupied all the territories commonly 
referred to as West Bank and Gaza Strip. In the aftermath of the June war no 
less than 300,000 Palestinian who had been living in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip were exiled. Most fleeing West Bank residents relocated on the 
East Bank, although some of those displaced persons continued on to 
second settlements areas mostly in Lebanon. Whereas just before the June 
War, some 63% of all Palestinian still lived in Palestine, by the end of 1967 
this percentage had dropped to only 50%. The losses were experienced 
primarily on the West Bank and secondarily in Gaza. The immediate effect of 
1967 war was an increasing the dispersion of the Palestinian population. 
While the East Bank of Jordan received the largest number of new expellees 
about 5% of the population scattered in other Arab countries. Some were 
refugees from 1948 war who had been living in camps the newly Occupied 
Territory, who were forced to flee for the second time in their lives. Thousand 
of other left as the military occupation and the expansions of the Jewish 
settlements deprived them of their homes and livelihoods and left them 
vulnerable to economic stagnation and political oppression. 
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In the beginning the Arab States tried to help the refugee as best as 
they could but the number of destitute was so enormous that they finally 
referred the problem to the UN in late 1948. The UN Mediator Count 
Bernadotte appealed to Israel to accept repatriation of some of the refugees, 
but Israel rejected the Bernadotte proposal on the ground that it could not 
accept the refugee back in view of the continuance of the state of war. 
The situation created two distinct problems, the problem of emergency 
relief and the problem of permanently, re-establishing the homeless people. 
A relief programme was initiated under the supervision of a UN Director of 
Disaster and Relief and with the assistance of the World Health Organization 
(WHO) and other specialized Agencies of the United Nations. The Disaster 
Relief Project initiated by Count Bernadotte was soon replaced by United 
Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees (UNRPP), established under a General 
Assembly Resolution on November 19, 1948 in which the Secretary General 
of the UN was requested to take all necessary steps to extend aid to 
Palestinian refugees and to establish such administrative organization as 
may be required for this purpose, inviting the assistance of several 
governments, the specialized agency of the UN, and other voluntary 
agencies. On 11 December, 1948, the UN passed another resolution GA 
Resolution 194 (III) and established a Conciliation Commission and 
instructed it, to take steps to assist the Government and authorities 
concerned to achieve a final peace settlement of all questions outstanding 
between them and to "facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic 
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and social rehabilitation of the refugees and payment of adequate 
compensation to them. In November 1949 the Conciliation Commission 
recommended setting of special agency known as the UNRWA to take over 
the function of UNRPR. 
The Arab State which gave refuge to the Palestinians have adopted 
varied approach in dealing with the problem of stateless Palestinian. Jordan 
approached the refugee problem in a manner that was abhorred by her Arab 
neighbours. Jordan's King Abdullah envisaged a settlement with Israel as a 
method of improving his country economic outlook and as opportunity to 
open up new development possibilities by means of the assistance obtained 
from the UN towards the rehabilitation of the refugees. Therefore, in 1950, 
after annexing the Arab occupied portion of Palestine West of Jordan river, 
King Abdullah willingly integrated its native and refugee populations into his 
kingdom on the basis of constitutional representative government and 
equality of rights and duties of all citizens. But the Palestinians had no loyalty 
for the Hashemite Kingdom and neither intellectual, emotional or ideological 
attachment to monarchial rule. The Palestinians characterized King 
Abdullah's annexation of West Bank as a calculated scheme executed with 
Zionist approval. 
With the advent of the Palestinian guerilla movement in late 1960's, 
Palestinians started to acquire great power and influence within Jordan and 
began to develop a state within a state over which the Jordanian monarchy 
had virtually to control. Thus Palestinians were free to attack Israeli troops in 
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the West Bank without restraint, and cross border attacks by both Israelis 
and Palestinian guerillas became more frequent. The growing military might 
of the Palestinian guerillas was perceived as a source of threat by the 
Jordanian monarch and in September 1970 King Hussain ordered his army 
to move against the Palestinian guerillas. In ten days of intense fighting, 
thousands of Palestinians were killed and the guerilla movement in Jordan 
was crushed. Within a year of "Black September", virtually all the Palestinian 
fighters had been expelled from Jordan and forced to seek refugee in 
neighbouring Arabs countries like Lebanon and Syria. 
The Palestinians who took refuge in Lebanon lived in legal void. They 
were neither citizen nor were they classified as foreigners. Ninety percent of 
the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon were Muslim and this proved to be a 
source of great worry for the Lebanese Government. If the Lebanese 
government had officially sanctioned their permanently residence, the 
delicate balance between Christians and Muslims which determined the 
countries political system would have been upset permanently residence. 
The first two decades of exile in Lebanon were marked by economic 
exploitation political and social marginality and officially sanctioned 
repression. Social and political control over Palestinians by the Lebanese 
government was maintained through a variety of measures; Work permits 
requirement, the presence of Lebanese police and intelligence force in the 
camps. The government response to political expression and activity was 
often arrest. Palestinians were subject to restrictions on their travel abroad 
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and within Lebanon. The refugees were placed under the jurisdiction of the 
section of the Ministry of Interior, called the General Bureau of Palestinian 
Affairs. The General Bureau, in conjunction with the religious courts of each 
sect governed personal status matters such as marriage, divorce, custody 
and inheritance. Within the camps the Lebanese police and Lebanese 
intelligence exercised strict control over the population, contempting to 
prevent any form of political expression. Such measure not only 
discriminated against the poorer Palestinians who sought refuge in Lebanon 
but also made it difficult for broken families to be reunited with their kin and 
kith. Palestinians Christians were also separated from their Muslim 
compatriots, movements from one camps to another or from camp to the city 
was forbidden without express permission from the government authorities. 
In Lebanon, because of official restriction on their employment, refugees 
often provided black market labour at wages below the minimum established 
by government. 
Towards the end of the 1960s refugee camps became centers of 
political and social unrest. In December, 1968, the Israelis reacted to the 
military operations of Palestinian guerrillas from South Lebanon with a 
surprise attack on Beirut airport and Israeli airborne troops destroyed the 
greater part of Lebanon's civil aviation fleet. This first retaliation on Lebanese 
territory gave a foretaste of the problems raised by the new guerrilla activity 
of the Palestinians, who were now operating from Lebanon without the 
permission or even the knowledge of the Lebanese army. The Palestinian 
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resistance movement established its open, armed presence in the camps in 
Lebanon in 1969 after a year long series of battles with the Lebanese army. 
Concomitantly, the Lebanese authorities withdrew from the camps. 
The sizable Palestinian presence in Lebanon contributed heavily to 
government immobilism as Lebanese political groups became increasingly 
polarized. Most Muslim supported the Palestinians and wanted the army to 
prevent Israeli attacks on southern Lebanon and on the Palestinian camps. 
Most Christians wanted government to restore sovereignty to Lebanon and 
control the Palestinians who seemed to form a state within a state. 
Growing polarization ultimately plunged the country into a bloody civil 
war in April 1975. As the Lebanese state collapsed, Israel stepped up its 
intervention in Lebanon and invaded the country twice, once in 1978 and 
again in 1982. Approximately 60,000 Palestinians were left homeless as a 
result of the Israeli invasion of 1982. After their camp homes had been 
destroyed, they took shelter in apartment garages, storefronts, unfinished 
apartment buildings and shelters built from scrap. With the signing of the Taif 
Agreement (1989) and the return of civil harmony to Lebanon, some attempts 
have been made to rehabilitate the Palestinian camps in the South Lebanon. 
In the Syrian Arab Republic, the overall size of the Palestinian 
community is smaller than the number of Palestinians in the other Arab state 
and regions bordering Israel. Palestinians have not been given citizenship 
and cannot travel abroad. In Syria, where economic restriction and controls 
of socialist government make free enterprise difficult, business minded 
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Palestinians were much more restricted in money making. There were thus 
fewer gaps in the social structure of the Syrian Palestinian community. The 
high number of Palestinian refugees who found works in the building trade 
was direct result of official government policy which aimed to channel 
Palestinian labour. While some refugees still complains that they are 
discouraged from taking more advanced jobs or from finding more amenable 
professions in the service sector, others have accepted the opportunities 
because of need to support large families or to finance high cost of 
education. 
The Palestinian in West Bank and Gaza Strip came under Israeli 
occupation after the 1967 war. The war extended Israeli military rule to the 
occupied areas of West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israel violation of human rights 
of the Palestinians increased and were intensified after June 1967. Israel 
was faced with a large Arab population in the territory under its control which 
was constantly challenging the occupation. Israel resorted to illegal and 
brutal means to spread terror, reduced opposition and force the submission 
of the civilian Arab population even though such means constituted grave 
violation of human rights. Several travels restrictions were placed on the 
Palestinian population. The Israeli authority rarely permitted Gazan to travel 
to West Bank and West Bankers to travel to Gaza. Travels restrictions were 
particularly severe for young Palestinian males, considered by the authorities 
to be security risks. Palestinian often do not travel abroad for fear of being 
denied re-entry to the Gaza Strip or the West Bank. Israeli authorities do not 
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permit adult Palestinian males traveling to Jordan to return less than nine 
months after leaving, yet generally forbid them from returning permanently, if 
they spend more than three years abroad. Israel uses an array of harsh 
measures against Palestinians in the Occupied Territories such as 
deportation, arbitrary arrest, policy of torture, demolition or sealing of houses, 
settlements of Jews on Palestinian land and denial of adequate water to 
Palestinians. Palestinian in the Occupied Territory have enjoyed since 1967, 
no rights and no representative institutions. There is no authority to which 
they can appeal, no protection which they can invoke. Their every movement 
action is subjected to the arbitrary authority of Israel Military Governor. They 
can be detained the intervention of any tribunal. Their houses and property 
may be destroyed, their land confiscated, their camps burnt and their trees 
cut down. Attempts made by Amnesty International, International Red Cross, 
by private organization or individuals or even by the formally constituted 
United Nations Special Committee to investigate Israeli practices in the 
Occupied Territory have met with no cooperation from the Israeli 
government. 
In the Occupied Territories there is a surplus of unemployed or under 
employed labour among the Arab population. Thousands of Palestinian 
farms laborers also works on Israeli farms where they are under paid and are 
generally abused. The worst case of exploitation and abuse involve 
Palestinian children as young as eight and ten years old who work for 
Israeli's. All workers from Occupied Territories have to carry identity card. 
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which they are required to show on demand. They are in Israel only as 
migrants workers and must return to the Occupied Territories every night. 
There are estimated thirty thousands unorganized workers who gather every 
morning to go to work in Israeli farms. Forty percent of their wages is 
deducted for insurances funds, yet they are entitled to no benefits and do not 
receive any benefits. In short, in many respects, the workers of the territories 
are a treasure for the Israeli economy. 
Arab labour was largely responsible for Jewish settlement in and 
around Jerusalem and Hebron and the wages they are paid are far below the 
minimum wages paid to Israeli labour. The Occupied Territories not only 
served as a source of cheap labour but also provide Israel with markets for 
its goods. Since the occupation, Israel has increased six fold its exports to 
the Occupied Territories making these territory the second largest market, 
second only to United States. In classical colonial fashion, the economy of 
occupied areas are distorted to serve Israeli interest. Palestinian agriculture 
also been distorted in addition to being to divested by massive land 
expropriation, expulsion and displacement. Palestinian crops have been 
destroyed by petrol, sprayed poison on fields, thereby, destroying many 
acres of wheat, barley, and olive groves. 
The track record of the Palestinian Authority setup after the Oslo 
Accords in the field of human rights has been no better. Intolerant of internal 
opposition to it policy and under intense pressure from Israel and the US to 
combat terrorism, the PA conducts mass and often arbitrary arrest of 
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suspected militants and opponents of the peace process. By strictly limiting 
the boundaries of PA power, the Oslo Accord have denied the PA those 
power (e.g. sovereignty) to mobilize people around state building projects by 
maintaining effective control of the economy and pursuing unrestricted 
access to international markets. Yet the PA has been given all the powers 
and resources needed to physically punish its people. 
The stateless Palestinians residing either in West Bank or Gaza Strip 
or in one of the front line Arab state have certain internationally protected 
rights. In general the rights of stateless persons are covered by the UN 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948), the Convention Relating to 
the Status of Stateless Persons (1954), the International Covenant of Civil 
and Political Rights (1966), and of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, Cultural Rights (1966). These instruments clearly deals with the 
Human and Civil Rights of Stateless Palestinian Refugees and other 
stateless person. While most host government have accepted these 
covenant, they have failed to abide by them and tend to apply their national 
laws. 
Another instrument which deals with the basic nghts of Palestinians is 
the Casablanca Protocol which the League of Arab States adopted in 1965. 
This protocol is related in particular to the rights of the Palestinian refugees 
to work, to enjoy freedom of movements and full residency status. Between 
1970 and 1973, the UN General Assembly has also adopted a number of 
resolutions in which Palestinian rights are enumerated. These are: (a) The 
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Palestinian Arab constitutes a people who have inalienable right under the 
Charter of Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (b) The rights of nev\/ly 
displaced persons after 1967 to return immediately to their homes, (c) The 
people of Palestine are entitled to self-determination and equal rights, (d) 
The Rights of refugees to repatriation or compensation. 
The UN Convention of 1957 and 1967 Relating to the Status of 
Refugees also covers the Palestinians with the exception that those 
Palestinian refugees falling within the UNRWA mandate have been excluded • 
from the jurisdiction of UNHCR. In effect, this meant that UNHCR does not 
concern itself with Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. It may assist Palestinian refugee outside the UNRWA 
mandate. This exception proved a serious obstacle for Palestinian refugees 
who have resided in one of the UNRWA area of operation and then 
attempted to seek asylum and protection elsewhere. 
Seeking to lessen the plight of the Palestinian refugee and displaced 
persons, the General Assembly in 1949 established the United Nations Relief 
Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA). It is exclusively a refugee 
welfare organization, and designated as a temporary non-political organ of 
the United Nations General Assembly. UNRWA has been functioning in all 
the refugees areas of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, as well as in Lebanon, 
Syria and Jordan. It has become an established institution in its area of 
operation and plays an important role in the lives of Palestinian refugees. 
UNRWA is not only an agency which provides valued services in the field of 
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education, health and social welfare but is also the symbol of international 
commitment to the welfare of Palestinians and to a just resolution of their 
plight. 
The signing of the Oslo Accord in September 1993 had profound 
impact on the work and responsibility of UNRWA. With the establishment of 
Palestinian Authonty in Gaza Strip and Jericho and anticipated extension of 
self-rule to the rest of the West Bank, UNRWA entered a new era in its 
relationship with the Palestinian people. In mid 1993, UNRWA began to 
prepare a forward looking response to support the peace process in the 
changed environment which emerged in self-rule areas. Immediately, 
following signing of the Declaration of Principles, UNRWA made preliminary 
identification of projects that it could undertake to help improve social and 
economic conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. At the same time it 
took steps to strengthen its administrative and managerial structure in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip in order to ensure the timely implementation of 
projects. 
UNRWA is run primarily on voluntary contribution made by donor 
governments. It has received contribution from about forty states. Ninety 
eight percent of the sums contributed have come from the USA, UK, Canada 
and France. This complicate the UNRWA's budgetary process because at 
the beginning of the year the Agency is not in a position to make an accurate 
estimate of its income for the rest of year. The budget, therefore, has to be 
based on assumptions, which may or may not turn out to be correct. Many 
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tiroes during the last five decades the agency had faced acute finartcial 
crises and has barely managed to get by. The lives of the refugees are "still 
clouded by economic insecurity and most families continue at the margfe of 
subsistence. They still express their resentment at the hardship which'^ ifriey 
have endured over the last five decades and voice their aspirations to relurn 
to their previous homes. 
, The Oslo Agreement establishes hopes for a peaceful, eventOfeliy 
even a just solution. The agreement lays the foundation for a limited intfefrim 
P^estine self-rule in those areas of Palestinian occupied by Israel sihce 
1967. The agreement does not define the political nature or territ^irial 
extension of the future Palestinian entity, but entails stipulations with re^rd 
to-mechanisms and deadlines for a step-by-step implementation of p^ce 
prpcess. Contentious issues like Jerusalem, refugees, settlements %nd 
borders have been left for future talks but the political reality is that they-have 
been on everyone's mind and have dominated the agenda all the waylShce 
1^3. Israeli occupation had not only strangled all normal economic %nd 
community activity, but even threatened the very existence of the Palestftiian 
society in the remaining parts of Palestine. Through the settlement policies, 
the confiscation of land and water resources and a military regime'that 
isolated the Palestinian population centers from each other and the worl^ at 
large, Israel had created conditions that many Palestinian feared would%nd 
in^a complete disintegration of identity and Palestinian society. The Oslo 
Agreement thus represents a starting point for a new Palestinian nati<inal 
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vitality. It is true that Israel has not irrevocably renounced its sovereignty over 
the Occupied Territories. There is still not much to indicate that Israel 
intends to surrender the real control over the Occupied Territories and still 
less to indicate that it will surrender the very Zionist System itself The 
purpose of Palestinian self-rule from the Israeli point of view will remain to 
unburden Israel from the role of direct occupation; it hopes therefore, to 
transfer the politically and economically expensive tasks of maintaining 
peace and order to a Palestinian leadership which is loyal to Israel However, 
having already recognized the principle of Palestinian national rights, it would 
become extremely difficult for Israel to prevent the emergence of a 
Palestinian political entity, which has the sympathy of the world in the years 
to come. The strength of the stateless Palestinian is that they have justice on 
their side simply because they have been deprived of fundamental rights. 
The accords thus represent a new beginning for the Palestinian peoples 
enduring struggle for a decent life among the nations. 
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